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ABSTRACT
The Social Rule Theory of Law

(February 1982)

Brian McCalla Miller, B.A., New York University,
M.A., University of Massachusetts,
J.D., Harvard Law School,

Ph.D., University of Massachusetts

Directed by:

Gareth Matthews

The principal elements of H. L. A. Hart's social

rule theory of law in The Concept of Law are developed
and defended and Hart's critique of the coercive orders

theory is examined and criticized.

Legal systems are

characterized as systems of conventional social rules.
The existence of certain "secondary" rules of recognition,
change,

and adjudication as social rules is shown to be a

necessary condition for the existence of

a

legal system.

The social and conventional nature of legal norms is

accounted for by the requirement that secondary rules be
social rules.

The fundamental concepts of legal validity

and legal obligation are explained by such secondary rules

without the introduction of any substantive moral considerations

.

The existence of certain attitudes toward the use
of a norm as a standard of conduct as a condition of the

V

6xistence of that norm as

a

social rule is examined.

It

is argued that Hart's analysis of social rules cannot

explain certain common attitudes towards legal norms and

must be made more complex in order to account for the
attitudes of persons, such as legal professionals, who

regard legal norms as binding standards but who may not
regard those standards as desirable or preferred patterns
of behavior.

A number of criticisms of the social rule theory are

considered and rejected.

Most of these criticisms attempt

to show that the identification of legal norms requires

the introduction of substantive moral considerations.

Dworkin's arguments that the social rule theory cannot
account for certain fundamental aspects of a legal system
and the argument that a legal system has certain essential

functions the realization of which requires that legal
norms have a certain minimum moral content are rejected.
Finally,

it is argued that the social rule theory is

neutral with respect to the question whether there is
moral obligation to obey the law.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
This study will examine the theory of law developed

by H.

L.

A.

Hart in The Concept of Law .^

Although The

Concept of Law was originally published some twenty years
ago,

it has been the subject of continuing philosophical

interest. 2

This continuing interest attests to the sig-

nificance of the issues Hart addresses and pays tribute to
the lasting contribution he has made to the discussion of

those issues.
Law

,

The seminal character of The Concept of

the fact that it contains fundamentally sound in-

sights about the nature of law and legal systems even in
cases where the supporting arguments are flawed, and the
fact that Hart's critics and commentators have failed in

certain cases to grasp or appreciate key features of the
theories presented are the justification of the enterprise

undertaken in this dissertation.
Hart's goal is to analyze the concepts of law and
legal system.

He seeks to show that laws are norms or

rules that provide, among other things, that certain types
of behavior are prohibited, permitted, or obligatory.

How-

ever, Hart also seeks to show that the normativity of law

does not derive from morality.

Rather, the existence of

legal norms depends entirely upon certain social facts

1

2

that need not have moral significance.

In particular,

a

legal norm is a rule that is identified under a social

rule of recognition as a valid rule of a particular group
of persons.

Social rules,

including rules of recognition,

are rules that apply to the members of a particular group

by virtue of the fact that certain favorable attitudes and

practices regarding use of those rules as standards in
that group exist among at least some of the memb»ers of the
group.

In general. Hart maintains that social rules of

recognition and the rules validated under such social
rules need not embody any substantive moral criteria.
Thus,

the identification of law and the legally obligatory

does not depend upon morality and what is morally obligatory.

Although Hart's analysis of law and legal obligation
in terms of social rules will be defended as fundamentally

correct, we will reject some of the critical claims that

Hart relies on as the background against which he develops
his constructive theory.

Thus,

in the next chapter we

will examine Hart's criticism of the "coercive orders
theory" of law, according to which laws are general orders

backed by threats given by one who is habitually obeyed
but who habitually obeys no one.

Although we will agree

with Hart that the coercive orders theory provides an
inadequate theory of law in certain respects, we will
reject Hart's principal line of criticism.

In particular.

3

rsjGct the thesis that the coercive orders theory
cannot account for rules that confer powers even if it can

account for rules that impose duties.

Consequently, we

will question whether it is necessary under the coercive

orders theory to postulate the notion of habitual obedience in order to account for certain salient features of
a legal

system,

such as the continuity of law in

a legal

system through successive regimes.
We will see in Chapter III that the distinction

between habitual behavior and rule following is

a useful

heuristic device for developing the social rule theory,
even though it is not a sound basis for criticizing the

coercive orders theory.

However, this distinction does

not yield an account of the social normativity of law that
is rich enough to account for the variety of attitudes

that people who recognize

a

particular rule as setting

standard may have toward that rule.

In Chapter V,

a

it

will be argued that Hart's theory cannot distinguish

between the person who actively supports and seeks to

maintain certain rules as standards for appraising conduct
and the person who recognizes that those rules are so used
and identifies those rules as the rules that are consid-

ered to be appropriate for use in appraising conduct but
who is indifferent or hostile toward maintaining those
rules as the rules applicable to his group.

We will see

that the latter attitude is characteristic of lawyers and

4

who

oth.6irs

ha.v6

a profossiona.!

intarast in idantifying

laws and advising paopla as to thair rights and dutias

undar

a

systam of rulas.

In ganaral,

howavar, Hart's social rula thaory will

ba dafandad as a fundamantally corract analysis of law

and lagal sys tarns

.

In Chaptars IV and VI, various axpress

or impliad criticisms of tha social rula thaory will ba

considarad and rajactad.

Soma of thasa criticisms focus

on cartain logical characteristics of a lagal systam and

Hart's thaory.

Thus, wa will dafand Hart against tha

claim that ha raducas laws to complaxas of behavior or
other social phenomena.

In addition,

the thesis that it

is logically possible for a single legal system to have

valid laws that are not mutually satisfiable will be
defended.

Certain other criticisms of Hart's theory have in
common the attempt to show that legal normativity depends
in some essential way on moral considerations.

Thus,

Ronald Dworkin argues that judges can always decide cases,
including controversial cases, in accordance with extant
legal material, and that the social rule theory cannot

account for this fact because the identification of extant
law in such a case requires consideration of what is mor-

ally required and not of what is required according to
social consensus.

We will see in our consideration of

Dworkin in Chapter IV that this argument and related

a

5

arguments can be met without introducing
substantive moral
considerations into the theory of law.
Similarly,
the

argument considered in Chapter VI, according to
which
legal system has an essential function that
either

a

is

itself moral in nature or is realizable only if
certain
moral criteria are satisfied, will be rejected.

The posi-

*^®fsnded in this study is that legal systems are

systems of con-ventional norms that may, but need not,

coincide with or incorporate moral criteria.
laws may, but need not,

ments and the constitutive rules of

Thus,

state moral requirea

legal system may,

but need not, provide that the substantive rules of the

system must satisfy certain moral criteria.
The social rule theory of law leaves the question
of political obligation open,
VII.

as we will see in Ch^lpter

That is, nothing in the analysis of law and legal

systems provided by the social rule theory entails that
there is

a

prima facie moral obligation to obey the laws

of the particular country in which one resides or is present.

Although

a

skeptical answer to the question of

political obligation will not be defended in this study,
the fact that the social rule theory of law leaves the

question open will be taken as

a virtue,

not

a defect.

CHAPTER

I

I

THE COERCIVE ORDERS THEORY OF LAW

Hart's Version of the Coercive Orders Theory
Before presenting his own theory of law in The Con -

cept of Law

,

Hart develops and criticizes an account of

law based on Austin's theory.^

Although Hart maintains

that his version of Austin's theory conforms substantially
to the positions actually held by Austin, he acknowledges

that his statement of the theory probably diverges from

Austin's doctrine at certain points.

However, Hart's

goal is not to reconstruct and analyze Austin's theory as
such, but to demonstrate that a theory like Austin's in

key respects is an inadequate account of law and legal

systems and that insights into a more adequate theory can
be gleaned from the shortcomings of the Austinian theory.

Consistent with this goal. Hart ignores entirely certain
theories, such as those of Hobbes and Bentham, that share

fundamental assumptions with Austin's theory.
Since the principal concern of this dissertation is
the investigation of Hart's theory, it is not necessary to

evaluate the faithfulness of Hart's version of Austin's
theory,

its relation to other similar theories, or the

persuasiveness of his criticisms as they apply to those
theories.

Rather, the purpose in this chapter is to
6

7

understand Hart's version of Austin's theory and his
criticisms of that theory in order to understand better
the constructive theory that he offers as a solution to
the problems he finds in the Austinian account.

The

thesis of this chapter is that some of Hart's criticisms,
as well as other criticisms not developed by Hart,

appear

to be decisive objections to the Austinian theory.

Other

criticisms advanced by Hart are less persuasive, but an

examination of Hart's arguments will aid significantly in

understanding Hart's theory.

Some of the arguments set

out here will be examined more carefully in the next chapter,

since they lead directly into Hart's theory.

Hart's version of Austin's theory can be stated
briefly.

According to Hart, Austin maintains that laws

are "general orders backed by threats given by one gener-

ally obeyed."

3

This claim about law is the fundamental

thesis of what for convenience may be referred to as the

command theory or the coercive orders theory of law.
Hart prefers to use the term "coercive orders" rather
than the term "command" for two reasons.

First, he argues

that since the term "command" may be applicable in circum-

stances where there is no patent or latent threat of harm
in the event of disobedience,

it fails to reflect the

thesis that laws are imperatives backed by threats of
harm.

Hart cites as an example the commands of a holy

man to his disciples.

Secondly, Hart argues that the

8

term "command" implies that the issuer has authority over
the subjects to whom the command is addressed.

Since the

Austinian theory is intended to explain legal authority,
among other things, use of

a

concept that arguably

includes the concept of authority presupposes an under-

standing of what it is meant to explain.
The latter point focuses on the fact that the coer-

cive orders theory offers
legal rules.

a

reductive analysis of law and

As Hart explains,

the goal of the Austinian

theory is to employ seemingly simple, unproblem.atic elements such as commands or orders and threats of harm to

build up to the idea of law.

4

However, the theory should

not be confused with other theories that focus on the
role of sanctions in a legal system.

For example,

although the concept of sanctions or threats of harm is
central to the coercive orders theory, the theory does

not claim that an assertion of a legal duty to perform
some act is equivalent to a prediction that the obligor

will suffer the imposition of

perform that act.

a

In contrast,

sanction for failing to
some legal theorists,

such as Holmes, have maintained the view that the "prophecies of what courts will do in fact, and nothing more

pretentious, are what

...

is meant by the law ...."

According to this position, which is characteristic of
legal realism,

bad man

.

.

.

"the notion of legal duty

mainly,

.

.

and in the first place,

means to a

.

a

prophecy

9

that if he does certain things he will be subjected to

disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or com-

pulsory payment of money.
The coercive orders theory does not analyze laws as

predictions.

Rather,

assertions of legal obligation, or

assertions of obligation generally, are treated as direc tives

.

For present purposes, we can understand a direc-

tive to be an expression that

"

formulate

[s

]

for someone a

possible course of action" and which is "capable of
guiding those to whom it applies."^

What distinguishes

the directives involved in the coercive orders analysis

of assertions of obligation is that they are "supported

only by threats." 7

A coercive order provides its

addressees with a reason for acting in accordance with
the course of conduct set forth in the directive, but

only to the extent that the addressees desire to avoid
the imposition of the sanctions that are threatened for

noncompliance.

The analysis specifically excludes the

idea that the issuer of a coercive order has a right to
the obedience of the addressees or that the addressees

have a duty to obey the directive, or more generally that
the issuer of the order is authorized to issue the direc-

tive.®

In Kelsenian terms,

the relationship between

issuer and addressee is not interpreted "normatively"
that is, the relationship is not interpreted as involving
"obligations,

authorizations, rights, etc. constituted

10

by objectively valid norms.”

Rather, the relationship

is interpreted as a "power relation”;

that is, as a

"relation between commanding and obeying or disobeying

human beings."

The reason for excluding the "normative"

interpretation from the coercive orders theory is simple:
the point of the analysis is to explain how assertions

about one's legal obligations are reducible without residue to directives issued in the context of appropriate

power relationships.

Hart argues that in order to distinguish laws from
the directives issued by the highwayman to his victim,

several complicating elements must be introduced into
the coercive orders theory.

are laws are doubly general.

First, coercive orders which

They specify general types

of conduct which are prohibited or mandated and they

apply to

a

general class of persons.

Secondly,

laws are

distinguished from the orders of the gurjnan by the fact
that the gunman has only temporary "ascendency or superiority" over his victim, so that his orders are effective

directives only to the extent that the threatened harm is
imminent, whereas laws have a "standing" or "persistent"

character.

Under the coercive orders theory. Hart

attributes the persistence of law to the existence of

a

"general belief on the part of those to whom the general

orders apply that disobedience is likely to be followed

by the execution of the threat not only on the first

11

promulgation of the order, but continuously until the
order is withdrawn or cancelled.
unlike the orders of

a

Thirdly,

laws,

gunman, not only are believed

generally to be continuously enforced but are habitually
obeyed by most people.

As we will see. Hart's claim that

the coercive orders theory must postulate

a

general habit

of obedience is erroneous although it helps us to under-

stand his constructive theory.
Finally, Hart argues that in order for the coercive

orders theory to accommodate the fact that "the legal

system of a modern state is characterized by

a

certain

kind of supremacy within its territory and independence
of other systems

.

.

.

,

"

the fundamental thesis that laws

are general orders backed by threats given by one who is

generally obeyed must be augmented by an account of the
person who gives the orders.

Hart suggests that accord-

ing to the coercive orders theory the supremacy and

independence of a legal system are explained in terms of
the supremacy and independence of a source of coercive

orders.

A supreme and independent source of coercive

orders, viz.,

a sovereign,

is a person or entity whose

orders backed by threats are habitually obeyed by others,

but who does not habitually obey the orders of others.
In short,

the coercive orders theory maintains that "the

laws of any country will be the general rules backed by

threats which are issued either by the sovereign or

12

subordinat 0 s in obediBncs to tho sovoroign.
It may be noted in defense of the integrity
of Kart's

version of Austin's theory that Hart's characterization

generally follows the following synopsis given by Austin:
[T]he superiority which is styled sovereignty, and the independent political
society which sovereignty implies, is
distinguished from other superiority and
from other society, by the following
marks or characters.--!.
The bulk of the
given society are in a habit of obedience
or submission to a determinate and common
superior: let that common superior be a
certain body or aggregate of individual
persons.
2.
That certain individual, or
that certain body of individuals, is not in
a habit of obedience to a determinate human

superior
However, the principal concern here is to develop an

understanding of Hart's theory by considering his criticisms of Austin, rather than to defend the coercive

orders theory.

As will be seen, many key criticisms cen-

ter on the necessity and role in a legal system of rules

that confer powers.

Some aspects of Hart's arguments

that the coercive orders theory is unable to accommodate
such laws will be addressed in this chapter, while other

aspects will be dealt with in the next chapter in con-

sidering Hart's theory.
Hart's Criticisms of the
Coercive Orders Theory
Hart's first criticism of the coercive orders theory
is that there is a kind of law that cannot be perspicu-

13

ously analyzed as a sanction-supported directive,
namely,
laws that appear to confer powers on individuals
or

officials rather than to impose requirements to perform
or forbear an act.

For example, there are laws that

enable individuals to make contracts or to devise property.

Other laws enable officials to adjudicate disputes or to
enact new laws.

Although Hart does not clearly acknow-

ledge the fact, these laws are directives at least inas-

much as they set forth certain conduct as

a

model

.

For

example, certain conduct is "required" in order to make
a

contract, or to convey land, or to devise property, or

to pass legislation.

Thus,

testamentary transfer in

a

in order to make an effective

particular jurisdiction, it

may be necessary that the testator's will be reduced to
a

written form signed by the testator and witnessed by

two persons.

If the testator fails to conform to these

requirements, and if these requirements are enforced,

then the testator's property will be distributed in

accordance with the laws of intestate succession and not
in accordance with the distribution specified in his

will.

If the interests given to the testator's heirs

under the laws of intestate succession are not identical
to the interests allocated to the devisees specified in

his will,

and if the testator intended the persons named

in the will to receive the property allocated to them

under the will, then distribution of the testator's prop-

14

erty to his heirs will prevent the realization of
the

distribution intended by the testator.
However, the conduct required,

for example,

to make

testamentary dispositions of property, is not "required"
in the sense that the addressees are subject to sanctions

for failure to conform to the model.

Or so Hart argues,

claiming that the legal "nullity" that results from non-

conformance with such

a

law is not a sanction for noncon-

formance and that such laws are not segments of more

complex laws that are analyzable as directives supported

by conventional sanctions.

Both of these claims and the

persuasiveness of this criticism generally will be questioned below.
Hart's second criticism is that an "order backed by
threats is essentially the expression of

a

wish that

others should do or abstain from doing certain things.
The argument appears to be grounded in the fact that

coercive orders are other-directed because it is not

possible to threaten oneself.

In contrast,

laws are

apparently not necessarily other-regarding, since it
appears that the legislators who originate a particular
law may themselves be subject to it.
ity,

Given the possibil-

and actual frequency, of laws that apply to the

lawmakers as well as to nonlawmakers, the coercive orders

theory must explain how the model of coercive orders is
an appropriate one.

15

Hart plausibly maintains that the viability of the
coercive orders theory in light of this apparent difference between laws and orders backed by threats depends

upon distinguishing between the lawmaker as the issuer
of a directive and the lawmaker as the addressee who is

ordered to comply with the directive.

However, this

distinction requires the ability to identify conduct in
an official capacity whereby a person is authorized to

issue orders and conduct of the same person in an unofficial capacity as an addressee of those orders.

Hart

correctly believes that this distinction can be made
only in terms of rules that confer powers.

That is,

person has authority to legislate by virtue of
that empowers him to formulate legal rules.

a

a

rule

Since Hart

concedes that by distinguishing between an individual's

capacity as lawmaker and his capacity as subject the

objection based on the other-regarding character of
coercive orders can be avoided, this objection is persuasive only if the argument that power-conferring rules

cannot be analyzed as coercive orders is persuasive.
Consequently, this second argument ultimately rests on
the soundness of the first argument and Hart's other

arguments that the coercive orders theory cannot account
for power-conferring rules

Hart's third criticism of the Austinian model does
not turn on the peculiarties of power-conferring rules.

16

He argues that if laws are orders issued by a
sovereign
or his delegates then all laws originate in datable
acts

of order-giving.

However, at least some laws originate

in customary social practices.

Since at least some

customs lack the force of law, such as the custom in

American society of giving gifts on birthdays, it does
not suffice to postulate a general order according to

which the sovereign commands obedience to all custom.
Thus,

it is necessary to identify orders concerning each

custom that is recognized as law.
to those customs which are laws,

However, with respect

there often appears to

be no act of order-giving whereby the custom is originally

recognized as

a

legal rule.

Furthermore, even in cases

where there is some official act whereby a customary

practice is given legal recognition, it seems to be erroneous to maintain that the practice did not become law
until it was recognized by some official.

In fact,

when

courts apply customary practices in cases before them

they appear to consider themselves to be enforcing extant
lav/

rather than creating new laws.

ex rel

.

Thornton v. Hay

,

For example,

in State

the court held that although

private ownership of littoral property extended to the
high water mark, there was a public right of passage over
dry sand areas which had been acquired by customary usage.
The court stated:

Because so much of our law is the product

17

of legislation, we sometimes lose sight
of the importance of custom as a source
of law in our society.
It seems particularly appropriate in the case at bar to
look at ancient and accepted custom in
this state as the source of a rule of law.
The rule in this case, based upon custom,
is salutary in confirming a public right,
and at the same time it takes from no man
anything which he has had a legitimate reason to regard as exclusively his.^^

Admittedly, a court's assertion that it is merely enforcing extant law that has its origin in custom rather than

legislating

^

novo may carry little weight in support

of the view that the act of recognition of the legal

status of

a

particular custom by

a

court is not itself

an act of order-giving of the sort required by the coer-

cive orders theory.

After all, the political system

may purport to be a representative democracy in the sense
that the individuals who are authorized to legislate are

chosen by the governed whereas members of the judiciary
are not so chosen.

In such a system,

judges may want to

conceal their legislative functions.
Nevertheless, the actual practice of judges as

exemplified by Thornton v. Hay is at least

a

datum to be

explained by the coercive orders theory in its undertaking
to identify particular acts of order-giving:

since recog-

nition of custom by courts is the most likely candidate of
an order-giving act,

the theory must explain the widely

held view that courts in fact are enforcing extant legal
rules in such cases.

It appears to be necessary to

18

hypothesize some sort of antecedent "tacit" order by the
sovereign that is implemented by the court.

If this

hypothesis makes the theory too implausible, and if the
idea that custom becomes law by virtue of the court'

act of recognition is accepted, it is nevertheless still

necessary to hypothesize
eign.

a

"tacit" order of the sover-

This conclusion follows from the assumption that

the courts are subordinate to the sovereign,

and that the

acts of the court constitute laws, that is, orders of the

sovereign, only if the sovereign has "tacitly" ordered

what the court has ordered by not intervening and preempting the court. 19
In either case it is necessary to give some sense to

the idea of a tacit order.

Hart maintains that "[t]he main

objection to the use of the idea of tacit expressions of
the sovereign's will to explain the legal status of custom
is that,

in any modern state,

it is rarely possible to as-

cribe such knowledge, consideration and decision not to in-

terfere to the 'sovereign,' whether we identify the sover-

eign with the supreme legislature or the electorate."
In other words,

20

it would be difficult in most cases to

establish that the nonaction of the legislative body
constitutes the expression of a desire that certain
individuals conform their behavior to a particular model.
Hart's objection is based on the fact that it is diffi-

cult to ascertain whether the sovereign expressed any

19

will at all and if so what the sovereign willed
in cases
of "tacit" orders.

The notion of a tacit order is required by the coer-

orders theory because under the theory every law is
a

coercive order expressing the unitary psychological

will of the sovereign.

Laws having their source in cus-

tomary practices are not the only laws that appear not
to be expressions of the will of the sovereign.

will see, laws originally promulgated by

a

As we

predecessor

sovereign and never reaffirmed by subsequent sovereigns
frequently continue to exist as current laws despite
the fact that they appear not to express the will of the

current sovereign.

Furthermore, laws adopted by legis-

lative bodies typically are not expressive of any uni-

tary psychological will.
a law

Thus,

a

legislature could enact

by following certain procedures, compliance with

which is

a

sufficient condition for legislating, without

willing the content of the law.

For example, the legis-

lators could have been bribed to vote for a particular

bill without having any knowledge of its contents.

In

general, the steps necessary to enact legislation could

have been taken by any particular legislator because he

desired the addressees to engage in the specfied behavior,
or because he wanted people to conform to some other

behavior specified in another bill, and mistook the one
enacted for the one he wanted enacted, and so on, or for
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no reason at all.

in contrast,

the coercive orders theory

appears to postulate in the case of every law

a

unitary

sovereign will that certain models of conduct be followed,
despite the fact that many laws appear to have been created without the occurrence of the psychological events

required by the theory.
The fact that it appears to be possible for orders
to be issued under circumstances which are such that the

content of the order does not express the will of the
issuer may suggest that orders and laws are not dissimilar
in their relationship to acts of will.
a

law passed by

a

That is, just as

legislature does not express any actual

psychological will, so the orders issued by an intoxicated
sovereign might not express the actual psychological will
of the issuer.

However, these cases appear to differ

precisely in the respect we have been focusing on;
namely,

in order to interpret what the intoxicated sover-

eign issued as an order, it seems to be necessary to pre-

suppose that it expresses the sovereign's will.

However,

in order to interpret what the legislature enacted as a
law,

it is not necessary to assume that it expresses any

will at all.
We will return later to the question of what beliefs,
desires, or other psychological states, if any, must exist
in a society in order to have a legal system.

Although it

will be important to establish that the existence of

a
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legal system depends upon at least some people in
society

having favorable attitudes towards conformity with at
least some directives, the point remains that the coercive orders theory erroneously requires that there be a

psychological will with respect to every law.^^
In his fourth argument, Hart returns to his concern

about the role of empowering rules and the alleged in-

ability of the coercive orders theory to account for them.
He argues that the model of law according to which there
is a legal system if there is a group of persons who

habitually obey the orders backed by threats of an individual who habitually obeys no one cannot account for
the continuity of authority to make law that is possessed

by successive legislators.

The idea that there must be

habitual obedience to the sovereign was introduced into
the coercive orders theory by Hart in an effort to dis-

tinguish coercive directives that qualify as laws from
the coercive orders of a gunman.

Since

a

legal system

displays a "relatively enduring and settled character,"

whereas the gunman situation represents "mere temporary

ascendancy of one person over another," Hart suggests
that a legal system is distinguishable under the coercive
orders theory by virtue of the habitual nature of obedience.

The notion that obedience in the case of con-

formity to legal directives is habitual establishes the

settled nature and continuity of

a

legal system without
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reintroducing elements that the coercive orders analysis
seeks to eliminate.

Thus,

the settled and enduring nature

of a legal system, as manifested in the fact that
each of
the sovereign's orders is recognized as law immediately,
is not attributed to a right or authority of the
sovereign

to make law, but to the fact that his orders are habitu-

ally obeyed.

Hart is challenging the coercive orders theory to
explain how in the structurally simple and familiar situation in which

a

sovereign, Rex

I,

is succeeded by another

sovereign, Rex II, the orders or directives issued by Rex
II

can be law from the beginning of Rex

II 's reign.

As

Hart understands it, the "habit of obedience" that the
coercive orders theory must hypothesize in order to dis-

tinguish the settled character of a legal system from
the temporary regime of a gunman is a "personal relation-

ship between each subject and Rex."

Because the habit

of obedience is a personal relationship between sovereign
and subject. Hart argues that the fact that Rex

I

is

habitually obeyed provides no reason for thinking that
Rex I's successor, Rex II, will also be habitually obeyed.
Thus, until it is demonstrated that the subjects will

habitually obey Rex
orders are not laws

II 's
,

coercive directives, Rex

II 's

but are analytically equivalent to

the orders of a mere gunman.

The result follows because

an order is not a law unless its issuer, de re,

is habitu-
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ally obeyed.

Rex

II

cannot be habitually obeyed until he

has for some period of time successfully issued orders

that have been generally obeyed.

Hart argues that the only explanation of the fact
that there is continuity in

a

legal system (that is, that

successive legislators do succeed in having their enacted
directives function as laws from the outset) is that the
successors have
laws.

a

right to succeed and

a

right to make

Moreover, Hart argues that there are rights of the

kind required if and only if there are rules specifying
the conditions of succession and the manner of lawmaking.
As Hart puts it:

under the coercive orders model "there

were no rules, and so no rights or titles, and hence

a

fortiori no right or title to succeed:

there were just

the facts that orders were given by Rex

I,

were habitually obeyed."

habit of obeying Rex

I
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and his orders

However, in Hart's view the

cannot account for continuity in

the legal system because a habit of obeying Rex

I

fails

to confer any right on Rex II to give orders and because
a

habit of obeying Rex

that the orders of Rex

I

II

gives us no reason to suppose

will in fact be obeyed.
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Hart's argument that continuity in a legal system

cannot be explained on the basis of habits of obedience
to a particular person seems correct.

However, the argu-

ment raises several related questions which will be

addressed in the next chapter.

First, we may question

24

whether the concept of habitual obedience is consistent
since the fact that

a

person is obeying seems to preclude

his acting habitually.

Further,

it may be questioned

whether the idea of habits of obedience is
component of the coercive orders theory.

a

necessary

If the coercive

orders theory need not postulate habits of obedience,

then it would analyze continuity in terms of rules of
succession, just as Hart suggests.

However, since rules

of succession are rules that empower an individual or

group of individuals to legislate and enforce laws, this

approach raises the point Hart is most insistent upon,
but which remains doubtful, namely, that the coercive
orders theory cannot account for rules that confer powers.

Hart's fifth argument derives from an amalgam of
his thesis that the coercive orders theory cannot account
for rules of the power-conferring kind and the thesis
that,

as a will theory,

the coercive orders theory must

postulate in certain instances the existence of tacit
orders

.

Hart argues that the coercive orders theory can-

not adequately explain the persistence of law in a typical legal system.

For example, even if a particular

criminal statute promulgated by Rex

I

to his subjects can

be conceived as an order backed by threats,

it is diffi-

cult to conceive how it is an order of any kind when it
is enforced some time later in Rex IX 's regime against

subjects none of whom existed at the time Rex

I

issued
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the order.

Hart's diagnosis is the now familiar one that

what is needed is

a rule of the sort

that confers powers,

that the coercive orders theory cannot account for
such rules.

As he puts it, what is needed is:

the notion of currently accepted fundamental rules specifying a class or line of
persons whose word is to constitute a standard of behavior for the society, i.e., who
have the right to legislate.
Such a rule,
though it must exist now, may in a sense be
timeless in its reference:
it may not only
look forward and refer to the legislative
operation of a future legislator but it may
also look back and refer to the operations
of a past one .26
.

.

.

Although Hart's argument is based on

a

questionable

view about the inability of the coercive orders theory to
account in any respect for the kind of rules needed to

explain the persistence of law, his argument nonetheless
contains

a

core criticism that is valid.

The problem of

explaining persistence arises because the relationship
involved in issuing

a

coercive order is directed to par-

ticular individuals who are coerced by the issuer.
we will see below,

As

although Hart's arguments about con-

tinuity are vulnerable to the argument that Rex

I

may

order his subjects to obey his successors, whoever they

may be, such an order is still an order to his present
subjects.

What seems to be needed is the reiteration of

the relevant order by the current sovereign to the current

subject.

The reiterated order could be

a

directive to

engage in particular specified conduct or it could be an
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order to engage in whatever conduct was
directed by some
past line of sovereigns. The shortcoming
of the coercive
orders theory, as Hart correctly perceives,
is that it
must take one of two unacceptable approaches.
On the
one hand,

laws issued to earlier subjects can be treated

merely as sources of law, rather than as laws, which
become law only if actually enforced.

The enforcement

activities therefore would constitute the requisite act
of ordering the present subjects.

The defect of this

approach is that it fails to accord with the fact that
courts generally are considered to be applying extant law
and not legislating (even if from restricted sources),

a

point discussed above in connection with Hart’s argument
about the need under the coercive orders theory to iden-

tify particular order-giving events.

On the other hand,

the necessity that directives be issued to the present

subjects in order to constitute coercive orders might be

provided for by postulating

a

tacit order by the current

sovereign to present subjects to obey particular prior
orders.

Again, the defects of this approach were pointed

out above

Hart's final argument is based on the fact that
there appear to be various legal limitations on the sov-

ereign legislator in many legal systems.

For example,

there may be constitutional provisions that forbid the

enactment of certain kinds of legal rules.

These are
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familiar phenomena that a theory of law must explain.
However, under the coercive orders theory, there can
be
no legal limits on the sovereign.

because

a

There can be no legal

legal limitation on the sovereign's

power (i.e., a law limiting the sovereign) is, according
to the theory,

the addressees.

an order of an entity habitually obeyed by

However, under the theory, the sovereign

by definition habitually obeys no one.

Therefore, there

can be no such law.

Hart argues that the only recourse open to the coercive orders theory is to look for an underlying, unlimited

sovereign that will replace the apparent sovereign in the
account of the legal system.

For example,

rather than

supposing that an elected legislature is sovereign, it is

necessary to maintain that the electorate is sovereign
and imposes limits on the legislature's power to legislate.

However, Hart argues that the coercive orders

theory cannot carry out this program for in order to do
so it is necessary to differentiate the electorate acting

in a sovereign capacity from the electorate as the ad-

dressee of its own orders.

However, this distinction

in roles can be made only by reference to rules that

authorize lawmaking, which Hart argues are outside the
coercive orders model.
This criticism follows the familiar pattern that
was noted in our discussion of Hart's other criticisms.
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First, Hart argues that if laws are coercive
orders of

the sovereign, then in order to be subject to
legal lim-

itations the sovereign must give orders to himself, which

reguires distinguishing between himself as law— giver and

himself as subject.

However, Hart argues that this dis-

tinction can be made only by means of power-conferring
rules, which Hart has argued are beyond the ability of

the coercive orders theory to provide for.

Thus,

the

coercive orders theory must seek to identify an underlying sovereign--a "sovereign behind the legislature"^®
that issues orders to and thereby legally limits the

apparent sovereign.

This underlying sovereign in the

case of a democratic political system is the electorate,

which by virtue of its direct or indirect power to elect
legislators, executives, and adjudicators has the ability
to issue and enforce orders indirectly through its agents.

However, postulating such a role for the electorate merely

raises at another level the need to distinguish the elec-

torate as the issuer of an order and the electorate as

subject of the order.

Moreover, this solution requires

the questionable notion of a tacit order,

since in order

for the orders enacted and enforced by the sovereign

electorate's agents to constitute orders of the sovereign
it must be supposed that these orders were tacitly issued

by the electorate by the electorate's not intervening.

29

Powers under the Coercive Orders Theory
As we have seen, many of Hart's criticisms are based

on the distinction between laws that appear to impose

duties and those that appear to confer powers and on the

argument that even if the former fit the model of coercive orders, the latter do not and are not reducible to
the former.

Hart does not contend that all legal material that
is typically not expressed in imperative form is a coun-

terexample to the coercive orders model.

Certain "laws"

that are not directive in form may be analyzed as seg-

ments of more complex laws that are directive in form.
For example,

used in

a

a

law may provide a definition of a term

directtive or may expand or narrow the apparent

scope of a directive.

The supplementation of a directive

by other legal material can be illustrated in the case of
the rule discussed earlier regarding the formal require-

ments for making valid testamentary instruments.

The

legislature may have provided by statute or a court may
have held in a decision that where

ment is witnessed by

a

a

testamentary instru-

person who is not

a

supernumerary

and who either has a beneficial interest under the in-

strument or is related in certain specified ways to

a

person who has such an interest, then either the instrument is ineffective for purposes of making

a

testamentary
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disposition because it has not been properly witnessed
or
the instrument is effective for purposes of
making testa-

mentary dispositions to all persons under the
instrument
except the interested witness.
Further, it may have been
held that the interest that an attorney who is appointed
in the will as the legal representative of the testator's

estate has in collecting legal fees from the estate propis not a beneficial interest so that such an attorney

may be an essential witness to

a

will without the will's

being invalidated or having the interest of the attorney

purged from it.

The former "law" supplements the direc-

tive regarding the making of a will by specifying the

characteristics of persons who qualify as witnesses for
purposes of making an enforceable will (e.g., they must
be disinterested) or providing for varying degrees of

enforceability depending upon the compliance with the
specified formalities (e.g.,

a

will witnessed by an

interested person is enforceable but only with respect
to dispositions to disinterested persons).

The second

"law" also supplements the directive regarding the making

of a will by spelling out what constitutes an "interested

witness."

Many,

if not most,

form of these examples.
in form,

legal statements have the

Although they are not directive

they supplement statements that are directive,

and so do not seem to be persuasive counterexamples to
the coercive orders analysis.
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Hart is not concerned about the analysis of
legal
material that spells out the scope of a
straightforward
directive.

Rather, he focuses on rules that authorize

persons to make general rules (for example, constitutive
rules of a legislature), or rules that enable persons to

create particular legal obligations (for example, rules

governing the formation of contracts or the conveyance
of property), or rules whereby other rules are recognized
as rules of the system.

Hart's argument is that in many

cases these rules do not appear to be orders backed by

threats
As mentioned earlier. Hart discusses and rejects two

arguments intended to demonstrate that power-conferring
rules do come within the coercive orders model.

The first

argument is that just as duty-imposing laws are backed by
the sanction of punishment or seizure of property if one

does not comply with the directive to perform or refrain

from certain conduct, so power-conferring laws are backed

by the sanction of nullity if one does not comply with
the directive to perform or refrain from the conduct

required in order to accomplish certain transactions.
The second argument is that all laws, including those

that fall under the categories of laws imposing duties
on citizens and laws conferring powers on citizens, are
in fact orders addressed to officials directing them to

apply sanctions in the event certain conduct occurs or
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fails to occur.

Hart's criticism of the first argument is
neither
clear nor persuasive.

He states:

... [W]e can distinguish clearly the rule
Prohibiting certain behaviour from the provision for penalties to be exacted if the
rule is broken, and suppose the first to
exist without the latter.
... But we cannot logically make such a distinction
between the rule requiring compliance with
certain conditions, e.g., attestation for
a valid will, and the so-called sanction of
"nullity."
Inthis case, if failure to
comply with this essential condition did
not entail nullity, the rule itself could
not be intelligibly said to exist without
sanctions even as a non-legal rule. 2

In part. Hart's argument appears to be that nullity cannot

be considered to be a sanction because sanctions are only

contingent consequences of noncompliance with

a

duty-

imposing directive whereas nullity is a necessary consequence of noncompliance with

a

directive specifying how

a

power must be exercised in order to be legally effective.
One difficulty with Hart's argument is that even if it
is true that nullity is a necessary consequence of non-

compliance with an empowering rule, whereas punishment or
other undesirable occurrences are only contingent consequences of noncompliance with a duty-imposing rule. Hart
has not given us an argument that sanctions must be con-

tingent consequences.

Furthermore, there is some ground

for arguing that necessary consequences may be considered
to be sanctions.

Sanctions may be viewed as generally
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undesirable circumstances that are applied to an
individual upon the occurrence of some condition.
To the extent
that these undesirable consequences are applied
as
a

result of the individual

’

s

failure to comply with the

requirements of some directive, they function as general
or specific deterrents to such noncompliance.
regard,

In this

the function of deterring noncompliance occurs

whether the undesirable consequences occur necessarily
or contingently.

Hart might justifiably reply that this view of sanctions fails to distinguish sanctions from undesirable

causally necessary consequences of natural events.

For

example, we do not characterize the hangover that is the

causal consequence of drunkenness as a sanction for

becoming intoxicated.

Rather, we treat sanctions as

undesirable circumstances that are applied
of other human agents,

^

the will

and we suppose that it is a con-

tingent matter whether the sanction will be applied.
But this refinement does not vindicate Hart, for

Hart appears to be mistaken in his view that the logical
relationship of nullity to failure to comply with

a

power-

conferring rule differs from the logical relationship of

punishment or other undesirable circumstances to failure
to comply with duty-imposing rules.

Phillip Mullock

argues that nullity either refers to the fact that the
rule has not been complied with or to the legal invalidity
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oi some act.

For example,

if the testator fails to

procure the proper attestation then there
is nullity
either in the sense that the testator
failed to comply
with the rule regarding witnesses, or in
the sense that
the testamentary instrument is invalid.
However, the con
sequences of failure to comply with a duty-imposing
rule

can be viewed analogously.

That is, with respect to

coercive order directing an individual,

a

to refrain

i,

from engaging in act A, i’s doing A may be viewed as
i's
to comply with the rule directing

or as i's engaging in delictual conduct.

i

not to do

A,

Mullock argues

that the respective characterizations of conduct not in

conformity with the conduct specified by duty-imposing
and power-conferring rules are equivalent.

Given that

behavior inconsistent with what the rules call for has
occurred, that the rule has not been complied with is

necessary consequence in both cases.

a

Further, Mullock

contends that invalidity in the case of power-conferring
rules and punishment or other sanction in the case of

duty-imposing rules is

a

contingent consequence since

there must be an official action in both cases and such

action might not be taken.

Mullock's argument is not quite correct.

It is not

necessary to maintain that some document is invalid or
that some action is delictual only if an official determines that the applicable rules were not followed.

The
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better view is that for both duty-imposing
rules and
power-conferring rules the fact that noncompliance

has

occurred is a necessary consequence.

Further, in the

case of noncompliance with a power-conferring
rule the
fact,

for example,

that the testator's will is, other

things being equal, invalid, is also a necessary consequence,

although it is

a

contingent matter whether in any

particular case the testamentary instrument will be enforced despite its invalidity.

Similarly, in the case

of noncompliance with a duty-imposing rule the fact that
the conduct in question is, other things being equal,

delict,

is a necessary consequence,

although it is

a

a

contingent matter whether in any particular case the
threatened sanction will in fact be applied.
The upshot of this discussion is that Hart's argu-

ment for rejecting the idea that nullity can be viewed as
a

sanction is not persuasive.

As far as the features

singled out by Hart are concerned, power-conferring rules
and duty-imposing rules appear to be on a par.

Hart's argument reflects

a

However,

reasonable underlying concern.

Intuitively, there is a difference between,

for example,

the legal requirement not to commit murder and the legal

requirement that the testator's signature on

a

testamen-

tary instrument be witnessed by a certain number of persons.

For one thing, people are not legally required to

make wills, and so an individual is not required to have
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proper witnessing unless he opts to make
trast,

In con-

an individual is legally required to
refrain

from murder, come what may.
a

a will.

The distinction may reflect

difference between a line of conduct society through

its legal system wants to occur under any
circumstances--

society wants no murder--and behavior desired only
if
people choose to engage in behavior society is otherwise

indifferent towards--society is indifferent whether people make wills, but if people do choose to make wills

society wants them to follow

a

particular procedure that

ensures that the instrument is the voluntary act of the

testator
Nevertheless, this means of distinguishing nullity
and sanction is difficult to maintain.

For suppose that

most people want to provide after their death for their
loved ones and that the laws of intestate succession

provide for escheat of all of the intestate decedent's
property.

In such a case,

conian law reflects

a

it may appear that this Dra-

desire in society, as manifested

in the legal system, that people actively take steps to

provide for the disposition of their property after
death.

That is, the law of intestate succession operates

as a penalty on those who fail to make testamentary

instruments at all or who fail to make them in conformity
to the formal requirements,

at least to the extent that

those who so fail want their property to pass into the
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possession of persons other than government
officials.
In this case,

the nullity due to failure to conform to

the requirements for making a valid will
is more like a

familiar sanction.
In short,

there may be circumstances in which nullity

as the consequence of failure to follow a rule
can be

viewed as an ordinary sanction.
following difficulty.
that nullity is not

a

This fact presents the

On the one hand. Hart's arguments

sanction are not persuasive, so

there appears to be nothing on that account to preclude
the coercive orders theory from analyzing all laws (other

than supplementary laws as discussed above) as orders

backed by the threat of sanctions.

On the other hand,

the coercive orders theory cannot explain why nullity in

some cases functions like a familiar sanction, whereas
in other circumstances it does not.

These problems with the attempt to assimilate nullity
and other consequences of nonconformity under the concept

of sanction do not arise in the second theory considered

by Hart to be an effort to account for power-conferring
rules v^ithin the confines of a theory that treats laws as

orders and assigns a central role to sanctions.

The theory

in question holds that laws are ultimately analyzable as

directives addressed to officials to apply sanctions upon
the occurrence of a specified condition.
is espoused by Kelsen,

This position

whose theory will be considered
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in other respects in a later chapter.

According to

this theory,

duty- imposing and power-conferring
rules are

reduced to

single form.

a

However,

it is not accurate

under this theory to characterize laws as
orders backed
by the threat of sanctions. Rather, laws
are orders to
to apply sanctions upon the occurrence of
a

condition.

The condition for application of a sanction

is what is ordinarily thought of as the content
of a law.

The condition for the application of
a

status rather than

a

a

sanction might be

particular act, as for example

where being black was the condition for the application
sanctions under Jim Crow laws or where having Japanese

ancestry was the basis for the forcible relocation and

incarceration of United States citizens and resident
aliens during World War
is a particular action.

but generally the condition
In the case of a duty-imposing

law--for example, a criminal law that prohibits combinations in restraint of trade--the proper form of the law
is a direction to officials to apply a sanction,

such as

imprisonment or the imposition of pecuniary penalties on
the individuals who have formed the prohibited combination.

In the case of power-conferring laws--for example,

laws dealing with the formation and breach of contracts
the proper form of the law is a direction to officials
to compel the payment of damages or the specific perfor-

mance of contractual undertakings upon the occurrence of
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the events constituting offer and
acceptance, the exis-

tence of legal "consideration," the events
constituting

"conditions precedent" to performance, the event
of nonperformance (breach), the nonoccurrence of certain
events
(defenses),

and so on.

If the conditions are satisfied

and if the individual the official is directed to
imprison or to exact damages from fails to submit voluntarily,

then an official is directed to seize his person or property.

As Kelsen puts it:
As a coercive order, the law is distinguished from other social orders. The
decisive criterion is the element of force
this means that the act prescribed by
the order as a consequence of socially
detrimental facts ought to be executed even
against the will of the individual and, if
he resists, by physical force. 33

—

In short,

law is a coercive order (i.e., system) "... in

the sense that it prescribes coercive acts, namely the

forcible deprivation of life, freedom, economic and other

values as a consequence of certain conditions."
Hart's criticism of this thesis is largely unobjec-

tionable as far as it goes.

He complains that the theory

distorts the nature of law by failing to recognize that
laws guide action not only indirectly by virtue of the

minimally compliant citizen's acting so as to avoid the
imposition of sanctions that Kelsenian laws direct officials to i.mpose, but also directly by providing models

that citizens might choose to follow as such.

However,
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this complaint is not a sufficient basis
for abandoning
an otherwise acceptable analysis of
law unless there is
a

more penetrating analysis available.

Furthermore,

although Kelsen makes coercive sanctions and
force central features of a legal system by analyzing
laws as

directives addressed to officials to apply sanctions
upon
the occurrence of a condition, he does not analyze
these

directives as coercive orders issued by a sovereign.
thu-s

respect, Kelsen'

s

In

theory is unlike the Austinian

coercive orders theory and does not suffer certain defects
of the Austinian theory discussed above.
On the other hand, because laws are analyzed as

directives to officials to apply sanctions, it does not
appear that the theory can account for the obligation of

officials to comply with these directives unless there are

directives to other officials to apply sanctions in the
event the former officials fail to apply sanctions as
they were directed.

However, this result fails to reflect

the fact that officials may have legal duties to apply or

enforce the law in cases where they are not subject to
any sanction--including nullification, if that is

a

sanc-

tion--for failure to conform to that requirement.
Furthermore, it appears to be impossible to distin-

guish between a tax and a penalty under the Kelsenian
model.

Ordinarily, we would not maintain that taxable
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transactions or statuses are transactions or
statuses
that individuals have a legal obligation to
refrain from.
In fact,

if the tax is imposed for revenue-raising
pur-

poses then the taxing authority would generally
want taxable events or circumstances to occur.
Nevertheless,
in

some cases taxes are imposed in order to discourage
cer-

tain activities.

For example, so-called nuisance taxes

(taxes on "nuisances") such as extraordinary taxes on

gasoline, tobacco, and liguor may be imposed to discourage

consumption.

Conversely, exemptions or deductions or tax

credits may be made available to encourage certain activities,

such as credits toward income tax for investment in

machinery or equipment.

However, even when taxes are

used to encourage or discourage activities there is no

implication that the activities in question are legally
required or prohibited, respectively.

On the other hand,

if a fine is imposed on an individual for engaging in

certain activities, then it is implied that the activity
is legally prohibited.

However, this distinction cannot

be reflected in the Kelsenian theory--in either case

there is

a

directive to the official to collect

a

sum of

money upon the occurrence of certain conditions.
Summary
We have reviewed six principal criticisms brought by

Hart against the coercive orders theory:

the general
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argument that laws that confer powers
cannot be analyzed
as coercive orders, the argument
that self-referential
laws cannot be analyzed as orders to
oneself, the argument
that some laws arise without there being
a datable enacting event as required by the coercive
orders theory, and
the arguments that the coercive orders
theory cannot

account for continuity of legal authority, the
persistence of law, or legal limitations of sovereign
power.
As we have seen, these arguments turn largely
on two

principal criticisms of the coercive orders theory.

The

first criticism is that the coercive orders theory is

unable to account for power-conferring rules and that
such rules are necessary to explain certain key features
of a legal system,

such as continuity of law-making

authority and the existence of legal limitations on
sovereign power.

The second criticism is that in order

to explain certain features of a legal system,

the coer-

cive orders theory must postulate the existence of tacit

orders

With respect to the general argument about power-

conferring rules we have examined Hart's criticism of
the attempt to assimilate power-conferring rules and

duty-imposing rules by treating nullity as

a

sanction

and by treating all laws as directives addressed to offi-

cials to apply sanctions upon the occurrence of
tion.

a

condi-

Although Hart's arguments against the latter theory
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are persuasive, his arguments against
the thesis that nul^

sanction appear to be incorrect.

Thus, he has

not foreclosed an analysis of
power-conferring rules as
orders backed by the sanction of nullity.
Furthermore,

discussion of certain other aspects of Hart's
argument
that power-conferring rules cannot be
accounted
for

within the confines of the coercive orders theory
has
been deferred until the next chapter, as the
discussion
will take us to the core of Hart's constructive
account
of law and legal obligation.

Although Hart's arguments about the inability of the
coercive orders theory to account for power— conferring
rules have been disputed, we have agreed with his criticisms of the notion of tacit orders.

Furthermore,

it has

been argued that the concept of tacit orders is required
because the coercive orders theory appears to require
that laws be the expressions of
will.

a

unitary psychological

The apparent lack of such a will is what gives

rise to the hypothesis that certain laws are tacitly

ordered by the sovereign.

CHAPTER

I

I

I

THE SOCIAL RULE THEORY OF LAW

After presenting the arguments against the
coercive
orders theory of law which were discussed in
the preceding
chapter. Hart states a general lesson that he
thinks
can

be drawn from his assessment of that theory:

The root cause of failure [of the coercive
orders theory] is that the elements out of
which the theory was constructed, viz. the
ideas of orders, obedience, habits, and
threats, do not include, and cannot by
their combination yield, the idea of a rule,
without which we cannot hope to elucidate
even the most elementary forms of law.l

then sets forth his own account of law in response
to the alleged defects of the coercive orders theory.

The central thesis of Hart's constructive account is that
the minimum necessary and sufficient conditions for the

existence of
(i)

a

legal system for a group of persons are:

that certain "... rules of recognition specifying the

criteria of legal validity and

.

.

.

rules of changes and

adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of official behaviour by

...

officials" of

the group and (ii) that "... rules of behaviour which are

valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of

validity must be generally obeyed...."

As will be seen,

with some reservations this thesis is broadly correct and
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provides

penetrating and perceptive account of law that
is generally defensible against certain
criticisms
a

of it

made from time to time since the publication
of The Concept of Law. However, in order to examine and
defend
Hart's thesis it is necessary to develop his concepts
of a
social rule, primary and secondary rules, rule of recognition,

and legal validity.

This task requires us to

return first to Hart's argument that the coercive orders
theory cannot explain the continuity of legislative

authority in a legal system, for it is in that context
that the idea of a social rule is introduced.

Habits of Obedience:

Hart's Straw Man

The argument that the coercive orders theory cannot

explain continuity of legislative authority was discussed
in the last chapter.

Briefly, Hart's argument was that

in order to distinguish the orders of a gunman, which are

not laws,
laws,

from the orders of the sovereign, which are

the coercive orders theory must maintain that orders

backed by threats are laws only if the issuer of the
orders is habitually obeyed by his addressees.

However,

habitual obedience is an inadequate foundation for ex-

plaining the phenomenon of continuity of legislative
authority, since habitual obedience to a particular

individual, Rex

I,

does not imply that another individual,

Rex II, will be habitually obeyed; indeed, it is not
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possible for Rex

II

to be obeyed habitually until he
has

been generally obeyed for some period of
time.
less,

Neverthe-

It appears quite clear that if Rex II
satisfies a

rule of succession within the legal system
whereby his
commands are laws, then his commands are laws
from the
outset, whether or not he is habitually obeyed.

There are several related problems with Hart's
argu-

ment that merit attention because of the light they
shed
on his own theory.

First, even if we accept Hart's claim

that in order to distinguish the mere gunman from the
sovereign, the coercive orders theory must postulate

habitual obedience, it appears to be possible to deal

with the problem of continuity.

Hart claims that the

habit of obedience hypothesized by the coercive orders
theory is a "personal relationship" between each subject
and a particular individual or entity that issues orders.

Although it is possible that the members of

a

group have

the habit of complying with the orders of a unique indi-

vidual as such, this is not the only, or even the most
probable, social situation.

could never be

a

In such a society there

successful imposter situation.

example, if the sovereign, Rex

I,

For

decided to switch

places with his physically similar subject. Pauper, the

members of the society who habitually obey Rex
not,

I

would

at least as a matter of habit, obey the orders issued

by Pauper while he was posing as Rex

I.

They would con-
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tinue to obey orders, if any, issued by
Rex

I

himself.

Since rhe exclusion of the imposter case
seems arbitrary, we might reformulate the required
obedience relation such that the members of the group
habitually obey
the individual believed by them to be Rex I.
In order to

reach the imposter situation it is not necessary
to suppose that the members of the group must believe the

absurdity that Pauper is Rex

I.

It is sufficient to sup-

pose instead that:

(3x)[(x = Pauper) and (the members of
society believe that x = Rex I)].
Although this modification of the habitual obedience relation deals with the imposter case, for practical purposes
it does not deal with the successor case.

That is, Hart

can still make his critical point that the theory cannot

account for the successor's commands being law

^

initio

even if the habitual obedience relation holds between
subjects and the person believed to be Rex

I,

since as a

matter of contingent fact it would be improbable that the
subjects would believe with respect to the successor,
that

s

is Rex

I,

s,

in a social situation in which there was

habitual obedience to the individual believed to be Rex

I

However, the reformulation of the habitual obedience

relationship proposed in order to accommodate the imposter

situation also suggests

a

means of reformulation that will

accommodate the successor situation.

Rather than suppos-
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ing that the relationship of habitual
obedience holds

between subjects and

a

particular named individual, or

between subjects and an individual believed by the
subjects to be a particular named individual, we can
hypothesize that the relationship holds between subjects and
any individual who is believed by the subjects to satisfy
some definite description.

habitually obeying Rex

I

For example, rather than

or the individual believed by

the members of the society to be Rex

I,

the members of a

society may be supposed to obey the individual who at the
time has the greatest enforcement power to support his
edicts.

The identity of the individual that satisfies

this description may change.

However, change in the

identity of the individual satisfying the description
does not preclude the existence of the habitual obedience

relation.

All that is required is that the members of

society routinely obey the orders of whoever monopolizes
or controls the greatest quantum of enforcement powers.
As an empirical hypothesis,

it is likely that the

relationship between subjects and the governing officials
is more aptly characterized in terms of such a descrip-

tion rather than in terms of particular named individuals.
Thus,

this solution is not an implausible response to

Hart's criticism.

Moreover, it is an adequate response

since continuity is explained without tacitly assuming

unanalyzed rights to govern or succeed or legislate.

The
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possibility of accounting for continuity
in such
within the confines of the coercive orders

a

manner

theory has

been illustrated by Stanley Bates. ^

Bates’ example is a

child who frequents playgrounds where he
habitually conforms to the demands of the "playground
bully." The
identity of the bully changes over time and
across playgrounds but the child's behavior is accurately
charac-

terized as habitual obedience to the playground bully.
The individual satisfying this description need
not be

assumed to possess unanalyzable rights in order to

6xplain the situation of the obedient child.
Hart's argument about continuity is based on the

presumed need to postulate
a

a

habit of obedience that is

personal relationship between each subject and Rex.

Hart seems to have assumed erroneously that
relationship to

a

a

personal

named individual is necessary because

he assumes that the alternative to a social situation in

which the same type of action is taken by different people
in response to a norm is a situation in which different

people "for their own part" without regard to whether the

behavior of others is the same, in fact do engage in the
same type of action in response to an order. ^

The latter

situation is one in which the behavior of the group is

merely convergent.

The fact that the obedient individual

does not regard the commanded behavior as a standard to
be followed by all makes the obedience relation in some
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sense personal to him; but this aspect
does not imply
that it can hold only between a subject
and some named
person, as Hart seems to have concluded.
A further difficulty with Hart's argument
about con-

tinuity is that he inexplicably denies the coercive
orders
theory the benefit of certain obvious rebuttals.
In this

regard,

the peculiarity of Hart's form of argument may be

noted.

In general,

in analyzing the coercive orders

theory. Hart seems to assume that the data that a theory

of law seeks to account for are legal rules or norms
The adequacy of the theory is measured in part by how

well the theoretical model--in this case of orders backed

by threats--matches the salient characteristics of the

phenomena being analyzed.

As we have seen, certain

aspects of certain legal rules are poorly reflected in
the coercive orders model.

For example, the model cannot

account for customary sources of legal rules or the persistence of particular norms over time without introducing
the dubious concept of a tacit order.
In light of this expected procedure. Hart's argument

that the coercive orders theory cannot explain continuity

because the theory relies on the concepts of habits of
obedience and orders but not on the concept of a rule is
perplexing.

One would have expected Hart to argue that

one salient feature of a legal system is its continuity,

that continuity appears to be provided for by rules whereby
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individuals are deemed to have authority
to legislate and
so on, and that the coercive orders
theory cannot account
for such rules.
Hart might well argue that the coercive
orders theory is most persuasive in analyzing
legal rules
that impose obligations but is unsuccessful in
analyzing
legal rules that confer powers, including rules
that pro-

vide for continuity in a legal system by conferring
powers
to legislate on certain named individuals or
individuals

who satisfy some description.

Presented with this form of argument, the coercive
orders theory would reply by subjecting the rule in ques-

tion to its standard reductive analysis.

Thus,

assuming

that it is necessary to postulate habitual obedience,
then according to the coercive orders theory, the rule

providing for continuity is

a legal rule

only if it is

an order backed by threats issued by a sovereign who is

habitually obeyed.

For example, the legal rule of suc-

cession might provide that the oldest male child of Rex n
living at the time of Rex n's death, or the oldest female
child of Rex n living at the time of Rex n’s death if
there are no living male children of Rex n shall at the
time of Rex n's death and thereafter be named

Rex

+

1^

and succeed to all sovereign powers formerly held by

Rex n.

At this point, it would seem appropriate to

appeal to Hart's complaint that the coercive orders

theory cannot explain such power-conferring rules.

How-
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ever,

the eai.lier criticism is not
persuasive in this

case.

The succession rule under the theory
is an order

by Rex

I

to his subjects to do whatever the
individuals

who satisfy this description order.

As such,

it is a

coercive directive formally equivalent to an
order to
perform or abstain some action specified in the

order.

In each case,

ordinary sanctions are available:

it is

not necessary to suppose that nullity is

a

Moreover, it is not necessary that Rex

survive to impose

the sanctions:

I

sanction.

it is sufficient if the members of society

believe that sanctions will be imposed even if Rex
no longer present.

obeyed.

Since Rex

By hypothesis, Rex

I

is habitually obeyed,

habitually obeyed.

is

is habitually

Consequently, this order qualifies as
I

I

a law.

this order will be

In obeying this order habitually,

the members of society will

a

fortiori be obeying the

orders of Rex II, Rex III, and so on, habitually.

Con-

sequently, the orders of Rex II, Rex III, and so on will
also qualify as laws, and the criticism that continuity

cannot be explained by the coercive orders theory because
it depends upon power-conferring rules can be avoided.

Of course, this response by the coercive orders
theory is not the end of the matter, as we have seen in
the last chapter.

One problem that this response brings

to the fore is that of explaining the persistence of law.

Although Rex

I

may be able to ensure continuity of legal
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authority by commanding

^

addressees to obey Rex

II,

III,

and so on, subsequent generations
and new members
of the group who did not habitually
obey Rex I, but who
do habitually obey Rex IX, presumably
must have the suc-

cession rule reiterated to them by Rex IX.

In the coer-

cive orders model this requirement appears
to be satisfiable only if the idea of a tacit order
is accepted.

Nevertheless, the preceding dialogue does not
occur;
instead. Hart focuses on the differences between
habits
and rules, or, more specifically, on the differences

between the social situation in which
exists

a

habit of obedience

and the social situation in which there exists

the "more complex” "general social practice” by virtue
of

which

a

social rule "exists” under which the new legisla-

tor is entitled to succeed.

Unfortunately, it is not clear that the notion of

habitual obedience is required by the coercive orders
theory.

Although Austin referred to habitual obedience

to an individual or group that habitually obeys no one
as a distinguishing characteristic of a legal system,^

Bates seems to be correct in maintaining that "rather

than speaking of

a

'habit of obedience' we should speak

of a 'fact of general obedience.'”

fi

Even Hart shows

a

limited recognition of the incongruous nature of a habit
of obedience.

He notes in passing that if there is a

habit of obedience then there is regular compliance with
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Rex's orders, but that such compliance
lacks "the unreflective, effortless, engrained character
of a habit.
Hart attributes this fact to the existence
of onerous
laws which engender a temptation to
disobey and risk

punishment
However, Hart has misdiagnosed the problem.

The

reason that compliance with an order lacks those
characteristics of habitual behavior is that order-following

behavior necessarily is, but habitual behavior need not
'

Qi^scted conduct.

The coercive orders theory does not

maintain that the regular performance of some action, A
(e.g., paying Rex one-tenth of annual income) in a social

which Rex has ordered that A be performed
is merely a matter of there being a habit of doing A in

that society.

Rex's addressees do not pay one-tenth of

annual income as a matter of habit but by virtue of con-

forming their behavior to an ideal model, viz. the model
of paying Rex one-tenth of annual income.

Presumably, in

general the motivating factor for conforming to the model
is the desire to avoid the sanction that backs Rex's

order.
hand,

In the case of habitual behavior,

on the other

the behavior is not engaged in by virtue of its

being the content of
For example,

a

a

habit but for some other reason.

person is correctly described as having

a

habit of watching the news on television each night simply

because he in fact does regularly engage in that activity
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for any reason or none.

However,

it need not be the case

that he engages in the activity in order
to conform his
behavior to the behavior type of watching
the news on
television each night.
In contrast, in obeying
order
to watch the news each night he engages
in that behavior

^

^
se,

lea^

in order to conform to the behavior type,

although he may also engage in the activity for
other

reasons

Hart does not seem to acknowledge any element of directedness in the coercive orders theory, at
least in the context of introducing his analysis of
social rules, it may be that Hart admits that under the

coercive orders model the addressees of

a

legal rule are

considered to act directively and not habitually, but only
with respect to the particular behaviors ordered by Rex.
In contrast,

the habitual behavior that Hart believes the

coercive orders theory must assume is present in a social
group if there is to be a legal system in that group is
the habit of obeying the sanction-backed commands of a

certain individual, whatever they are.

This habit must

be differentiated from the individual habits of doing A^,
in case Rex ordered that

be done, of doing

Rex ordered that A^ be done, and so on.

in case

As we have seen,

the coercive orders model does not assume that Rex's

addressees do each of A^,
has commanded A, & ... & A
1

.

n

.

:

.

A^ habitually, where Rex
Rex's addressees treat each
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of A^,

as a model or standard by which
their con-

duct IS judged as conforming or conflicting.

However,

according to Hart, under the coercive orders
theory Rex's
addressees do not treat "compliance with a
command of Rex"
as itself referring to a model behavior
type.

In the

first social situation, Rex commands that some
act be

performed or abstained from, and Rex's addressees
treat
that act type as a standard of conduct compliance
with
which is prudentially justified.

However,

in treating

that act type as a standard, Rex's addressees are acting

habitually.

In contrast,

in the latter social situation,

Rex commands that some act be performed or abstained from,

and Rex's addressees treat that act type as

a

standard of

conduct because they treat the property of being commanded
by Rex as determining which act types establish standards
of conduct.

The distinction between the two cases is

obscured by the fact that in each case the substance of
Rex's command establishes

a

standard of behavior by which

the conduct of his addressees is judged and in each case

the fact that the behavior type was the subject of a com-

mand issued by Rex is important.
An example will help to illuminate the point.

Let

us suppose that it is a matter of contingent fact that

the regular performance by a particular individual

certain act types will produce

a

i

of

greater total welfare

in the world than would the performance by

i

of any other
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actions.

For example,

let us suppose that the only

actions performable by

i

that for each pair

B),

(A,

are A, B, C, D, E,
D),

(c,

and

F,

and

and (E, F) the first

and second members of each pair are not
jointly realizable,

that i's life consists entirely of choices
between

the performance of one or the other of the
act types of

each pair, and that the performance of the first
act type
of each ordered pair will always produce the greatest
welfare.

Thus,

if

choice of A or

i,

B,

always does A, when presented with

a

always does

a

when presented with

C,

choice of C or D, and always does
a

choice of E or F

,

when presented with

E,

then ^ will have followed

a

course of

conduct that in fact conforms to the standard of acting
so as to produce the greatest welfare.

We can imagine several ways in which

pursue this course of conduct.
C,

and E as a matter of habit.

might actually

i

For example,

Although

might do

A,

is acting

habitually, it is not necessary to suppose that

i

is not

selecting or choosing to engage in the first type of
action of each pair.

However, if

then he does not treat doing

A,

i

is acting habitually,

doing

C,

or doing E as

standards to which his conduct must conform and he does

not treat doing whatever will produce the greatest welfare as a standard to which his conduct must conform.

Nevertheless, his habitual behavior in fact satisfies
each of these standards.
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In contrast,

might treat A'ing, C'ing, and E'ing

i

as standards that constrain his
choice.

each occasion that

in that case,

on

is presented with a choice pair he

i

will select on the basis of these standards
and in making

his selection

will treat his choice as constrained or

i

necessitated by the standards.

It is possible that for

^ these act types are standards that constrain choice
solely in virtue of prudential considerations.
_i

However,

need not treat doing whatever will produce the greatest

welfare as a standard that directs and constrains his
behavior, even thougn his actual behavior in accordance

with those act types that he does treat as constraining
standards also accords with the general standard of acting to maximize welfare.

Although

i

regularly does what

produces the greatest welfare, he does so only in virtue
of his doing what, as it happens, is in accordance with

other standards.

pair

(G,

H),

If

were presented with a new choice

i.

and as a matter of fact the regular perfor-

mance of G by

i

would maximize welfare, we would not

expect on the basis of that fact alone that ^ would treat
G'ing as establishing
v/e

might say that

i

a

constraining standard, although

does have a habit of acting in accor-

dance with standards that, as a matter of fact, do conform to the standard of acting to maximize welfare.
Finally,

establishing

i

a

might treat maximizing welfare as itself
standard that constrains his behavior.

If
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regularly performing A instead of

B,

C

instead of

D,

and

so on,

will maximize welfare, then the standard
of acting
such that one will maximize welfare
functions as a validating principle for establishing A'ing,
C’ing, and so on
as standards of conduct.
However, A'ing, C'ing, and so
on are not standards simpliciter
It is by virtue of
.

their possessing the property of being such that
regular

performance of them will maximize welfare that they
serve
as standards of conduct.

if

i

treats the validating

standard as a constraint on his behavior then we would
expect on the basis of that fact alone that

i

would treat

G'ing as a constraining standard when presented with the
choice pair,

mize welfare.

(G,

H),

and the fact that G'ing will maxi-

We would not need to know that

i

routinely

or habitually treats as standards those activities which
if regularly performed will maximize welfare.

There appears to be no justification under the coercive orders theory for adopting a distinction between

order-following in the case of the particular act types
commanded by Rex and engaging in merely habitual behavior
with respect to obeying Rex per se.

The theory postulates

that most members of the group generally obey the orders
of an individual who does not obey the orders of any other

individual.

However,

it is not merely a matter of habit

that members of the group obey the orders of Rex.

It is

by virtue of being the subject matter of orders issued by
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Rex

or perhaps of orders issued by the
individual possessing a monopoly of force--that the behaviors
ordered

by Rex serve as models to which Rex's addressees
conform
for prudential or other reasons.

Rex's addressees are

not me rely taking A'ing, B'ing, and so on as models
to

conform to in cases where Rex orders

A,

B,

and so on.

^^ther, they are taking being ordered by Rex as the sali-

f^sture that identifies the types of behavior non-

conformity with which will probably result in the imposition of sanctions
analysis at all.

.

Habitual behavior does not enter the
As we will see,

if Hart had focused

on the distinction between order-following and rulefollowing, rather than on the distinction between habitual

behavior and rule-following, then certain fundamental similarities between Hart's theory and the coercive orders

theory would have been apparent.
Hart's Analysis of Social Rules
As indicated by the unadorned statement of Hart's

central thesis that was made at the beginning of this
chapter. Hart maintains that
if,

inter alia

,

a

legal system exists only

"rules of recognition specifying the

criteria of legal validity and

.

.

.

rules of change and

adjudication [are] effectively accepted as common public
standards of official behaviour by

...

officials."

Rules

of recognition, change, and adjudication are characterized
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by Hart as ^condary

ru_l.es

.

As we will see, under Hart's

analysis,

if a rule is effectively accepted by
members of
a group, then the rule ej^ists
in the group or, in general,
IS a
cial riU^ of that group.
Thus, Hart's thesis is

^

that

a

group has

a

legal system only if certain secondary

rules are social rules of that group.

Certain aspects of the theory of social rules
and
the view that the existence of a legal
system depends
upon the existence of certain kinds of social rules
will
be examined in depth in Chapter V.

For the moment, dis-

cussion of these difficult matters will be facilitated if
the theory is presented first in broad outline.

We can

begin by summarizing and consolidating Hart's analysis
of social rules and considering its relation to the coer-

otders theory.

Hart's foil in developing the analy-

sis of social rules is the social situation in which a

habit of obedience exists.

Whatever the merits of this

expository device may be, the argument of the preceding
section was that

a

habit of obedience is not an element

of the coercive orders theory.

correct in observing that if
tain behavior exists in

a

Nevertheless, Hart is

habit of engaging in cer-

a group,

then most members of

the group have generally engaged in that behavior and

most members of the group are likely to continue engaging
in that behavior.

More importantly, it is

condition for the members of

a

group to have

sufficient

a
a

habit that
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"their behaviour in fact converges."^

sary condition for a group to have

a

It is not a neces-

habit that deviation

from the pattern of behavior is subject to
criticism.

That is, a pattern of behavior can be habitual
within

a

group even though failure to conform one's behavior
to
the pattern is not "a matter for any form of
criticism.
As Hart puts it, under his version of the coercive
orders

theory
all that is required from the community
to constitute Rex the sovereign are the
personal acts of obedience on the part of
the population.
Each of them need, for his
only obey,
no one in the community
need have or express any views as to whether
his own or others' obedience to Rex is in
any sense right, proper, or legitimately
.

.

.

.

.

.

demanded.

On the other hand, if

a

rule requiring a particular

behavior exists in some group, then there is more to the
social situation that "constitutes the existence of
rule" than merely convergent behavior.

a

In Hart's words,

the following conditions must be satisfied in order for
a

rule requiring certain behavior to exist:
(1)

"The behaviour in question ... must be general
though not necessarily invariable
[such
that] it is repeated when occasion arises
by most of the group
.

(2)

.

.

"...

[Djeviations are generally regarded as
lapses or faults open to criticism, and
threatened deviations meet with pressure
..."
for conformity
.

(3)

"... [Djeviation from the standard is
generally accepted as a good reason for
making [such criticism]"; that is, criti-
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cism for deviation "is regarded
as legiti^
mate or justified ...."IS
(

4

)

"...

[S]ome at least, must look upon the
behaviour in question as a general
standard
to be followed by the group as
a whole";
that IS, there must be "... a reflective
critical attitude to this pattern of
behaviour in accordance with which it is
regarded as "a standard for all "16

Hart observes that the first condition
also must obtain in
order for a habit to exist in a group.
That is, neither a
habit nor a rule "exists" unless the behavior
in question
generally occurs "when occasion arises." Thus,
in Hart's
analysis the last three conditions are what
distinguish
the existence of a rule from the existence of
a habit.

With respect to the last condition. Hart states that
it is "implicit in what has already been said."

By this,

he appears to mean that the second two conditions
((2) and
(3)) imply the last condition.

(If this claim is correct,

then (2) and (3) alone are the distinguishing characteristics of the social situation in which a rule exists.

)

Hart

maintains that this condition identifies the internal
aspect of rules.

Elsewhere, he states that

a

person who

has a reflective critical attitude to the pattern of

behavior specified by the rule takes an internal point
of

toward the rule.

Furthermore, he characterizes

an internal statement any statement that "manifests

the internal point of view and is naturally used by one

who accepts" the rule in question.

1

8

Hart's concepts of
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the internal aspect of rules, of the
internal point of
view, and of internal statements will
be explored in

Chapter V when the concept of

a

social rule is examined

in greater depth.

The distinction between habitual behavior
that has a

high incidence of occurrence among the members
of a group
and rule-following behavior by members of a
group
is

intuitively clear.

For example, each of a number of

individuals may generally commute to his job on the same

regularly-scheduled train each day.

Thus,

for example,

among the members of this group, there exists

a

habit of commuting on the 8:15 train every day.

group

Although

each commuter's behavior is "directed" in the sense that

taking the 8:15 train is intentional, goal-directed conduct,

the behavior is not "directed" in the sense of

being the subject of

directive that could appropriately

a

be cited as a justification or rationale for his conduct,

except to the extent that having intended to engage in
certain behavior shows that engaging in the behavior was
not a happenstance.

Thus,

the fact that he generally

takes the 8:15 train may explain to some extent the

commuter's conduct on

a

not justify the conduct.

particular occasion, but it does
The reason that the commuter's

having had the intent to engage in the behavior is not
justification for the behavior is that the concept of

justification does not apply except where the behavior

a

65

is judged relevant to a standard
set by a source external

to the actor.

part

Further, each commuter acts "for his own

without regard to whether others who generally

'

engage in the same conduct in fact do so on
any particular
occasion.
That is, although each commuter may in time
due to the repeated occurrence of the events
develop the

expectation that certain other people will be on the 8:15
train,

failure of this expectation is not per se

a

ground

for criticism, even though the failure may be a source
*^is3ppointment to the person with this expectation.

The failure to follow an established habit may be an

occurrence for which explanation is appropriate, but it
is not an occurrence for which an excuse is appropriate.
In contrast to the group habit of taking the 8:15

train is the regular behavior among the members of the
group of train riders of reporting for work each day at
9:00.

We may suppose for our purposes that this behavior

is the subject of a directive applicable to the members

of the group and accepted by some or all members of the
group.

Unless all of our train riders work at the same

establishment they are members of different groups each
of which has a directive calling for its members to report
for work at nine o'clock.
group,

With respect to each such

if the behavior is the subject of a directive that

applies to the members of that group, then the fact that
the behavior is the subject of the directive is per se
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reason for and justification of

the conduct.

a

member's engaging in

Furthermore, the mere fact that the behavior

is the subject of a directive normally
gives rise to an

expectation that those to whom it applies will
engage in
the specified behavior if only because it
is called
for

by the directive.

This expectation arises even though

the person to whom the directive applies has
never engaged
in the behavior called for by the directive.

If an indi-

vidual to whom the directive applies fails to perform
the

specified act, then there is per se a ground for criticism
and an appropriate context for the individual to offer an

excuse rather than an explanation.
The nexus of habitual and rule-governed behavior is

complex.

Certain behavior may have become habitual as

a

consequence of an individual's regularly engaging in certain actions in order to meet the requirements of some

directive that applies to him.

For example, the members

of our group of train takers may be taking the 8:15 train
in order to follow the rule of reporting for work at nine

o'clock.

As to one another as members of the group of

8:15 train takers, the behavior of taking the 8:15 train
is not the basis of an expectation grounded in a rule of

that group, although members of this group may be aware
that each other member is

a

member of another group that

has a rule compliance with which is the basis for each

individual train taker's regular behavior.

Moreover,
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^

even if taking the 8:15 train
se is not the subject
2
of a rule among the members of the
group of 8:15 train
takers and is not the subject of a rule
among the members
of the separate groups to which the
train takers belong
each of which has a nine o'clock work rule,
taking the
8:15 train may be the subject of a rule of
some other

group the rules of which are applicable to

train taker.

a

particular

For example, a subgroup of train takers

may have agreed to play bridge during their commute
and
to that end resolved upon the rule that they would
all

take the 8:15 train.

When we turn to the coercive orders theory of law,
the analysis of law as an order backed by force issued

by a person or group of persons generally obeyed seems
to fit solidly under the rule-following model rather than

the model of habitual behavior.

mance of some action
order there is

a

A,

That is, if the perfor-

is the subject of a coercive

straightforward sense in which Hart's

conditions for the existence of a social rule are satisfied.

Because there are sanctions threatened in case of

nonperformance of

A,

then there are prudential reasons

not to deviate from the specified action.

These reasons

support, warrant, or justify criticisms of deviant

behavior.

Furthermore, Rex, at least, as the issuer of

the order who willed that A be performed,

and threatened

sanctions for noncompliance, looks upon A'ing as

a
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standard for the group.

in general, because the coercive

orders theory analyzes laws as directives
as predictions of official conduct,

.

rather than

it is incorrect to

ascribe to the theory the view that the
social situation in which a coercive order is issued
is one in which
behavior conforming to the order is habitual
behavior

rather than "directed" behavior.
Bates argues that the fact that the coercive
orders

theory analyzes laws as directives demonstrates that
Hart
can distinguish his own theory from the coercive
orders

theory only by supposing that legal directives under the
social rule theory state moral and not simply prudential

requirements. 19

where

a rule

Bates points out that Hart's claim that

exists deviation from it is treated as

reason for making criticism is ambiguous.
hand,

a

good

On the one

there can be said to be good reason for criticizing

deviation if there is some fact that supports compliance.
The coercive orders theory satisfies this condition since
the existence of sanctions for deviation supports compliance.

On the other hand, there also might be said to be

a

good reason for criticizing deviation if the rule states

a

moral requirement.

One persuasive reason for thinking

that laws are not accurately characterized in terms of

directives compliance with which is only prudentially

justified is that we ordinarily think that

a

law functions

as a directive even if the prudential justification for
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treating the behavior in question as

a

standard is absent.

For example, the legal directive
establishes a standard
even is there is no prudential reason to
comply because
there is no effective sanction. However,
Hart is not

prepared to maintain that

a

law is a directive, compliance

with which is morally required solely in virtue of
its
content, since he insists that the substantive
content
^ legal

directive not only need not correspond to

a

moral requirement, but may actually conflict with morality.

Bates’

argument underscores a point worth making,

namely, that Hart tends to overlook the directive char-

acter of an order and the extent to which order-following
and rule-following are alike.

Since Hart wants to deny

that social rules necessarily concern standards of conduct
that are morally required, he cannot distinguish orders
and social rules on the ground that the former may not,

whereas the latter necessarily do, concern moral requirements.

The characterization of how the coercive orders

theory appears to fit within Hart's analysis of social
rules may suggest that the key distinction is that coer-

cive orders are not sufficiently "social" to satisfy the

criteria for existence of a social rule.

That is, the

issuer may be the only member of the group who regards
the subject matter of his order as setting a standard of

behavior for every member of the group.

In contrast.
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Hart states that where a social rule
exists all except
minority regard the behavior in question
as a standard
for the group.

a

The question of how large the group
of

persons must be who regard some form of
behavior as a
standard for all members of the group is
dismissed as
frivolous.

However, within the space of several pages

Hart appears to ignore the implicit view
that only a
minority may fail to regard the behavior in
question as
a general standard if there is to be
a social rule regarding that behavior.
That is, in discussing the thesis that
if a group has a legal system there are certain
"consti-

tutional” social rules dealing with the identification
of standards. Hart maintains that these rules exist even

though only "officials" or "experts" regard these constitutional matters as the basis for the identification of

standards of conduct applicable to everyone.

Analo-

gously, the issuer of coercive orders is functionally

equivalent to Hart's officials and experts inasmuch as he
regards the property of having been the subject matter of
an order issued by him as the basis for a particular behav-

ior's being a standard of conduct applicable to everyone.

Secondary Rules of
Bates'

a

Legal System

argument and the discussion in the preceding

section do not address Hart's principal thesis, namely.
that the existence of

a

legal system depends upon the
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existence of social rules regarding how
standards of
behavior are identified, changed, and applied
to particular cases.

Discussion in the preceding chapter and

earlier in this chapter suggests that the coercive
orders theory can attempt to address Hart's
thesis by

postulating an order to obey the orders of individuals
who fit certain descriptions.

As we have seen,

this

rejoinder to Hart raises such problematic notions as
that of a tacit order.

In light of these problems. Hart's

analysis appears promising, as long as we bear in mind

that there are significant similarities between order-

following and rule-following that Hart overlooks.
Hart's principal thesis is that the hallmark of

a

legal system is a validating standard that functions in
the same way that the standard of maximizing welfare func-

tions in our example above.

ment about continuity in

In the context of the argu-

a legal

system Hart states:

We may suppose that our social group has
not only rules which
make a specific
kind of behaviour standard, but a rule
which provides for the identification of
standards of behaviour in a less direct
fashion, by reference to the words, spoken
or written, of a given person.
In its
simplest form this rule will be to the
effect that whatever actions Rex specifies
(perhaps in certain formal ways) are to be
done.
This transforms the situation which
we first depicted in terms of mere habits
of obedience to Rex; for where such a rule
is accepted Rex will not only in fact specify what is to be done, but will have the
right to do this; and not only will there
be general obedience to his orders, but
it will be generally accepted that it is
.

.

.
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right to obey
Hart develops the concept of

a

validating rule

through the distinction between primary
and secondary
rules.

Hart characterizes primary rules as rules
under
which "human beings are required to do or
abstain
from

^^rtain actions, whether they wish to or not."

These

rules "impose duties" and "concern actions
involving physical movement or changes.
Primary or duty-imposing
rules are contrasted to secondary or power-conferring
rules.

Secondary rules "are in

secondary to the first."

a

sense parasitic upon or

They "provide that human beings

may by doing or saying certain things introduce new rules
of the primary type, extinguish or modify old ones, or in

various ways determine their incidence or control their
operation."

Secondary rules "confer powers, public or

snd "provide for operations which lead not merely
to physical movement or change, but to the creation or

variation of duties or obligations."
Hart identifies three kinds of secondary rules:
rules of recognition, rules of change, and rules of

adjudication.

A rule of recognition "will specify some

feature or features possession of which by

a

suggested

rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication that
it is a rule of the group to be supported by the social

pressure it exerts." 24

Rules that specify the steps

necessary in order to have some rule expression refer to
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standard that makes certain conduct
nonoptional are
secondary rules of change. Rules that
regulate
a

the

acquisition and transfer of property are examples
of
secondary rules of change.
Such rules specify

the steps

by which property rights are altered.

Property rights

are normative relations among individuals
with respect
to abstract (e.g.,

literary property) or concrete (e.g.,

real property) objects.

These normative relations are

the meanings of certain primary rules.

For example,

a

rule of gratuitous transfer might provide that the comple-

tion of certain steps by

i

will result in transfer of a

certain object of property from
i.

Prior to such a transfer (in

i's death, no one aside from

i

to

i

a

j_

upon the death of

simple case), before

may use the object (at

least in certain ways) without i's consent, so that everyone except

i

is obligated to refrain from using the object

in certain ways unless
dies,

i

consents to such use.

After

i

in virtue of i's satisfying the requirements of the

rules of gratuitous transfer, the obligations regarding
the use of the object (which are the subjects of Hartian

primary or duty-imposing rules) run to

j_.

This example

illustrates how conforming to the requirments of

a

secon-

dary rule of change can alter obligations imposed by

primary rules.

Finally, rules of adjudication are second-

ary rules that empower certain individuals or groups to

determine whether

a

primary rule has been violated or
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whether the procedures specified by

a

secondary rule have

been carried out.
Hacker has argued that Hart's classification
of rules
is defective.
in particular, he argues that Hart
is
mistaken in the view that all duty-imposing rules

are "pri^

mary

rules.

This criticism is well taken since the rule

of recognition as described by Hart is

a

social rule that

imposes obligations on officials, namely, obligations
to

identify as standards of conduct only those types of

behavior identified with reference to particular characteristics specified in the rule of recognition.

Further-

more, Hacker points out that Hart is mistaken in the

view that all rules that concern the exercise of
are not duty-imposing,
to exercise a power.

a

power

since there may be an obligation

Hacker concludes that Hart does

not need the distinction between primary and secondary
rules except for the purpose of having a convenient label
to single out rules of recognition,

rules of adjudication.

rules of change, and

That is. Hart can make the points

he wants to make about a legal system simply by eluci-

dating the concepts of these three kinds of rules, without
regard to whether they are only power-conferring rules,
and so on.

However, we may still use Hart's term "secon-

dary rules" to refer to any of these three kinds of rules.

Hart introduces these three kinds of secondary rules
as the solutions to certain problems that allegedly arise
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in a social situation in which there
are only primary
rules.
Hart characterizes a social system that
has only

primary rules as

a

pre-legal society.

society with secondary rules has

a

in contrast,

legal system.

a

It is

not clear whether Hart’s characterization of
pre-legal
culture and its problems and of legal culture
and its

solutions is intended as an historical and anthropological thesis or as a philosophical theory about
the con-

cept of law.

For our purposes any historical or

anthropological claims can be ignored.

The important

point is that Hart thinks that secondary rules of these
kinds are definitive of law and legal systems.

According to Hart

a

pre-legal society is regulated

entirely by primary rules.

In the light of Hacker's

criticism of Hart's classificatory scheme, this claim

merely restates the thesis that the distinctive feature
of a legal system is the existence of rules of recognition,

change, and adjudication.

Beyond that, however.

Hart's view of pre-legal society is erroneous since

a

society without rules of recognition, change, and adjudication of the sort Hart focuses on may have certain
"secondary" power-conferring rules.
a

For example, such

society could have promising rules, the application

of which creates novel duties.

argument is that such

a

Nevertheless, Hart's

society only has primary rules,

which in virtue of certain contingent, but universal.
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features of human nature typically restrict
violence,
control the economic uses of objects (property),
and disallow deception and misrepresentation. The
assertion that
there is a particular primary rule in

a

society is equiva-

lent to the claim that that rule exists in that
society.
The claim that a certain primary rule exists in
a society
is true just in case Hart's conditions for the
existence

of a social rule are satisfied.

In a Hartian pre-legal

society a particular primary rule is

a

rule of the society

solely in virtue of satisfying these "existence" conditions.
a

Thus,

society,

S,

of the group,
in

S

a rule

regarding a behavior.

A,

"exists" in

only if A is generally done by most members
failure to do A in

S

is generally regarded

as a good reason for criticism,

and some memb'er of

S

regards A'ing as a standard of behavior that everyone

must follow.

Furthermore, this rule is an obligation

rule of the group, according to Hart, only if A'ing typi-

cally requires sacrifice or renunciation at least on the
part of some members of

S

but is regarded as important

enough to warrant being made nonoptional because it is

believed to be necessary to the maintenance of some aspect
of social life.
The substance of Hart's argument about pre-legal

society is that the regulatory structure of

a

society

is extremely limited if the social obligations referred

to by rules that satisfy Hart's conditions for the exis-
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tence of

a

duties.

Hart argues that without secondary rules of

social rule exhaust the domain of social

change the regulatory structure of society is
static,

because there are no methods for deliberately tailoring
rules to changing circumstances

.

Rules change, if at all,

only as new patterns of conduct come to be regarded as
standards for the members of society.

A pattern of behav-

ior may come to be regarded as a nonoptional standard
(i.e.

come to "exist” as an obligation rule of the

social group) for many reasons, except that in the absence
of the existence of a secondary rule of change it is not
so regarded in virtue of being the subject of a rule that
is adopted in accordance with a rule stating the ways in

which rules can be altered.

Hart describes the altera-

tion of primary rules of obligation in a society without

secondary rules of change as

a

"slow process of growth"

whereby patterns of behavior that were optional become
habitual and then come to be regarded as obligatory (i.e.,
come to "exist" as subjects of social rules).

Hart's argument about the shortcomings of a society

without secondary rules of change is not entirely persuasive.

Although

a

society without rules providing means

for deliberate alteration of the structure of the system

of primary duties might be static, there still could be

non-rule-governed forms of rule alteration that are highly
efficient.

For example, treatise writers and law journal

78

commentators are not legislators, yet they
articulate
standards of conduct according to their conception
of
what conduct ought to be nonoptional under
various factual

circumstances.

The members of society might respond very

quickly to these suggested patterns of regulation.

In

that case, the regulatory structure of society might

change relatively quickly, not because there is in

existence in the society

a

rule providing that rules

advocated by treatise writers are rules of the society,
but because the members of society, or some of them, are

persuaded for some reason on

a

case-by-case basis to

regard as nonoptional the behavior suggested by the
writers as proper subjects of rules.

In short,

treatise

writers and commentators are catalysts that accelerate
the process whereby members of the group come to regard

certain behavior patterns as appropriate standards.
There are other more or less effective non-constitutional
sources of standards--the news media, interest group
lobbies,

for example--but the role of legal scholars

is clearest for present purposes.

Hart gives similar arguments about the shortcomings
of a society lacking secondary rules of adjudication.

That is, without rules empowering an individual or group
to make determinations about whether the regulatory struc-

ture of society has been maintained, there can only be

diffuse social pressure to sanction nonconforming behav-
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lor.

Moreover, individual members of society
would engage
in risky and inefficient modes of self-help
in order
to

enforce their rights under the scheme of primary
rules.
Like Hart's argument about the defects of a
society

without rules of change, his argument about the defects
of a society without secondary rules of adjudication
is
less than fully persuasive.

For example, there could

be a relatively efficient system under which certain

individuals were called upon by disputants on

a

voluntary

basis to hear grievances based on the primary rules.

The

opinions of these individuals would be advisory in that
they were not enforced and were not regarded as binding

by the disputants.

However, because of their reputation

for fairness and the persuasiveness of the reasons for

their decisions disputants in fact generally might abide
by the results reached by these "arbiters."

The important

point is that there would be no rule according to which
their decisions regarding rights and duties under primary
rules would be themselves obligatory, just as there is no
rule according to which a pattern of behavior that com-

mentators argue should be obligatory is obligatory.
Finally, Hart argues that a society that lacks a rule
of recognition--the most important secondary rule for

Hart's theory--is characterized by uncertainty about what
the primary rules of obligation for the society are.

There is uncertainty because the primary rules are not
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systematic, and there are no procedures
for settling
doubts about the identity or scope
of the rules.
The
primary rules of obligation can be
identified only by
determining which patterns of conduct are
directly

regarded as nonoptional standards for
the group.
For
example, the behaviors required or
forbidden by the Biblical commandments are the subjects of
rules of a pre-legal

society only in virtue of there being the
requisite critical attitudes toward nonconforming conduct
per se, not in
virtue of being referred to by an authoritative
source.
The relevant behavior in each case is regarded
by some
(at least) as a standard to which everyone
must conform.
In contrast,

in a legal culture it is not necessary

(although it is possible) that the behaviors required
or forbidden by these commandments are the subjects
of

rules that "exist” in Hart's sense.

What is required for

these behaviors to be the subjects of the rules of a legal

culture is the "existence" in the society of a validating
rule that identifies rules concerning those behaviors as

rules of the society; i.e., the members of society, or
some of them, must regard as determinative of the duties
of ^11 whatever behaviors are referred to by rules specified by some particular source (e.g.,

a

sacred scroll,

particular stone tablet, the Magna Carta, the Constitution).

Rules identified by such

valid rules of the society. 27

a

recognition rule are

A legal obligation is an

a
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obligation that arises under

a

valid rule.^®

The concept of a rule of recognition
and the derivative concepts of legal validity and
legal obligation enable us to explain important features
of modern legal
systems.
These concepts provide a means of dealing
with
the complexity of a legal system.
As a practical matter,
only relatively few rules can "exist” in
Hart's sense in

any given social group.

For example, the Internal Revenue

Code contains provisions that state or imply,
alone or in

conjunction with other provisions, that if an individual
or entity engages in certain kinds of transactions
then

that individual or entity must pay
fied amount.
a

tax of some speci-

There are many such provisions.

taxable transaction

plex property.

a

t^’po

In general,

Typically,

is identified by a very com-

it is empirically likely

that for any given transaction type, T^, where according
to the Internal Revenue Code it is not permissible to

engage in T^ and not to pay a specified amount to the
Treasury, that there are relatively few individuals who

directly regard engaging in T^ and not paying the specified tax as a good reason for criticism, etc., as required
in order for a rule requiring payment of a tax if T^

occurs to "exist."

transaction type, T^

Moreover, there is probably some
,

which under the Internal Revenue

Code may not occur without the payment of
if engaged in without payment of a tax,

^

a tax,

one

,

that,

including
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the legislators who enacted it,
would directly regard as
a good reason for criticism.
Even in those cases where
there is a critical regard concerning
the taxation of a
type of transaction, it is unlikely
that there would be
such regard with respect to the
transaction type as

specified in its full complexity under
the statute.
For
example, under the Internal Revenue
Code redemptions of
corporate stock are transactions taxable to
the same ex-

tent as dividend distributions out of
current or accumulated earnings and profits, as these terms
are defined
under the Code, unless the redemption has one
of several

properties that qualify the transaction for taxation
as
sale or exchange of stock.
The tax significance of

a

the

presence or absence of the qualifying properties is that
the full amount of the dividend distribution is taxed
at

higher ordinary income rates, whereas a "sale or exchange"
results in taxation of the gain at lower capital gain
rates (if the redeemed stock has been held for

a

speci-

fied length of time by the redeemed stockholder and is a

capital asset in his hands).

One transaction type that

qualifies for sale or exchange treatment is

tially disproportionate redemption."

a

"substan-

Such a redemption

occurs only if "the [redeemed] shareholder owns less than
50 percent of the total combined voting power of all

classes of stock entitled to vote "immediately after the

redemption."

Moreover, there is

a

substantially dispro-
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portionate redemption only if the ratio
that the redeemed
shareholder's voting stock after redemption
bears to all

voting stock is less than 80 percent of
the ratio that
the redeemed shareholder's voting stock
before redemption
bears to all voting stock.
Clearly it is difficult to
imagine that Hart's existence conditions could
be satisfied for this rule it is difficult enough even
to understand it, let alone to regard noncompliance with

—

it

critically.

it is less difficult to imagine the princi-

ples underlying the rule having Hartian "existence."
Thus,

it is quite possible that some at least directly

possess the requisite critical regard for the principle
that economically equivalent transactions ought to be

taxed equivalently and consider redemptions without sig-

nificant erosion of control to be economically equivalent
to a dividend distribution

— in

each case cash is removed

from corporate solution without altering equitable ownership of the corporate entity.

However, even if the pur-

pose of Section 302(b)(2) is understood, and the Hartian

conditions for the "existence" of the underlying principles are satisfied (albeit only for relatively few persons) we still do not have the "existence" of a rule con-

cerning the complex transactions described in Section
302(b)(2).

That rule in its full complexity is

a

rule

of our society only in virtue of the fact that it is

referred to by

a

rule expression that was issued under
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conditions that are regarded in
our society as giving
rise to valid rules that set
forth legal obligations.
In general,

in a complex legal system
legal standards

will fall on a spectrum ranging
from those that no one
regards directly as standards and
which are thus rules of
the system only in virtue of
satisfying the validation
rules to those which most people
regard as standards
regardless of their satisfying the validation
rules.
One
of the typical functions of an
adjudicator is to relate
rules accepted as rules merely because
they are valid to
rules directly regarded as obligatory.

The oughtishness

of some obligation claim is more easily
accepted when we
see that noncompliance violates some primary
rule we

accept as obligatory.

This function is not unlike the

function of a priest.

The faithful accept the oughtish-

ness of a rule "A must be done" merely on the ground
that

God issued the rule, since the faithful accept the
oughtishness of the rule that rules issued by God ought to be
obeyed.

The priest contributes to the maintenance of the

system of rules by explaining how failure to do A is

inconsistent with some values that the faithful have
independently of God's commands.
Summary
Several important aspects of Hart's characterization
of a legal system as

a

union of primary and secondary
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rules should be noted before
turning our attention to
some criticisms of Hart's
theory.
First,

as we have seen,

the theory provides an

account of legal validity;
To say that a given rule is
valid is to
recognize it as passing all the
tests
provided by the rule of recognition
and
so as a rule of the system.
We can in^
Statement
particular rule is valid means that that
satisfies all the criteria provided it
by
the rule of recognition. 29

a

This account of legal validity
accommodates the fact that
many rules are part of a legal system
even though they do
not exist as social rules.
Such rules are laws even
though they are too complex (such as
the tax statute described above), or widely disfavored
(such as prohibition
laws were), or long disused (such as
the witchcraft law
referred to by Hart^^ to exist as social
rules.
On the
other hand, this account of legal validity
explains why
certain rules that do exist as social rules
nevertheless
are not legal rules.

In particular,

as a rule of etiquette,

a social rule,

such

is not a legal rule unless it

passes the tests of the rules of recognition.
Secondly, Hart's theory accounts for the social basis

of a legal system.

A rule is a legal rule only if it is

either a social rule (namely,

a

rule of recognition) or

a

rule that passes the tests provided by the rules of recognition.

Consequently, all laws have a social source.
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Thirdly, there is no necessity
under Hart's theory
that legal rules satisfy moral
criteria, unless the rules
of recognition specify that
legal rules must meet certain
moral requirements. Moreover,
it is a contingent matter
of fact whether the rules of
recognition of a particular
group contain moral tests which
a rule must pass in order
to qualify as a legal rule.
Fourthly,

it is a contingent matter whether
a par-

ticular factual situation is regulated
by
that IS, there may be "gaps" in the

a

legal rule;

legal system.

Such

gaps occur under Hart's theory where
according to the
rules of recognition there is no specific
legal material

applicable to the facts of

a

case and the rules of recog-

nition do not identify any general gap-filling
rule (e.g.,
a closure rule according to which
anything that is
not

otherwise prohibited is legally permissible).
Fifthly, nothing Hart says precludes the logical

possibility of inconsistent laws being validated by the
rules of recognition.

For example, a rule of recognition

may provide that the enactments of

a

particular legisla-

tive booy are legal rules but may fail to identify any

provision for dealing with inconsistent enactments.

In

such a case, the addressees of the inconsistent enactments

would be subject to inconsistent legal obligations.

Ordi-

this difficulty will not arise since the recogni-

tion rules of actual legal systems identify legal rules
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of priority that eliminate
inconsistency.
For example,
there may be a rule according
to which later enactments
supercede prior inconsistent
enactments; or there may be
a rule according to which
later enactments are narrowly
construed so as to be consistent
with prior enactments
unless the later enactment
specifically repeals the prior
enactment; and so on.^^ However,
there is no requirement
under Hart's theory that any
particular legal system have
such rules.
Finally, under Hart's theory, the
expression of a

particular rule refers to

a legal rule of a group

because

the rule referred to has certain
properties which at

least some members of the group regard
as identifying the
rules that apply to the group.
Hart maintains that it is

erroneous to suppose that "the bulk of society

.

.
.

gener-

ally share, accept, or regard as binding the
ultimate
rule of recognition specifying the criteria in
terms of

which the validity of laws are ultimately assessed.
Rather,

"in a complex modern state ... the reality of

the situation is that a great proportion of ordinary

citizens

perhaps a majority

— have

no general conception

of the legal structure or of its criteria of validity.

^^^thermore, it is possible that only

a

handful of people

in the group regard as sources of obligations the direc-

tives that are identified by the rule of recognition as

rules applicable to the group.

Each of the other members
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of the group individually
may regard such directives
merely as orders that must be
obeyed in order to avoid
sanctions.
in short:
[Ojbeying a rule (or an order)
need
involve no thought on the part
of
person obeying that what he does the
is the
right thing both for himself
and for
need have no view of
^ fulfillment of a standard of behaviour for others of
the social
group.

Many of these features of Hart's
theory are directly
or implicitly called into question
by the critics

and com-

mentators discussed in the following
chapter.
The discussion of their views will enable us
to obtain a more complete understanding of Hart's theory.

chapter

I

V

CRITICS OF THE SOCIAL RULE
THEORY OF LAW
Social Rules, Norms, and

or

one source of misunderstanding
of Hart's theory is
the failure to distinguish
between Hart's treatment of
believing or accepting a rule
and the concept of a rule
se.
J. w. Harris' argument
that Hart's theory is

inconsistent seems to be based on
this misunderstanding.
However, before considering
Harris' argument, it may be
noted that some of Hart's claims,
such as the claim that
a society without a
rule-recognition rule is marked by
uncertainty about what the rules of
obligation of
the

group are, are unfortunate, because
they contribute to
the misunderstanding of his basic
theory.
Hart's terminology, if there is no rule of
recognition in a group,

m

then a particular obligation rule is
a rule of that group
only if the rule exists in that group—
that is, only if
the rule is a social rule. As we have
seen. Hart argues
that a social rule asserting that some
behavior is

required or forbidden "exists" only if deviations
from
that behavior pattern are considered to be a
good reason
for criticism and are in fact generally
criticized.

Hart

maintains that these two conditions imply that at least
some members of the group "look upon the behaviour
in
89
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question as a general standard
to be followed by the
group as a whole.
These conditions identify two
key
elements in the social situation
in which a rule "exists":
First, there is an "external"
feature of the social situation that consists of negative
behavioral responses to
conduct that does not conform to
the behavior type specified by the rule.
Second, there is an "internal"
feature
that consists of acceptance of the
rule
as a rule appli-

cable to the group.

Hart appears to think that there may
be uncertainty
about the identity of existent, or
facto rules

^

of a

social group because he tends to rely
on behavioral
m anifestations of believing and other
mental phenomena
as the means of establishing that a
rule has been accepted.

However, an account of the psychological
phe-

nomenon of accepting

a rule

based on behavioral manifesta-

tions is not equivalent to a reduction of
normative phe-

nomena into complexes of behavior.

In fact.

Hart does

not tell us about the ontological characteristics
of
rules.

Rather, he appears to tell us that a rule, what-

ever it is, establishes a social obligation of a group
if the rule is accepted and regarded by members of the

group as a rule that includes the members of the group

within its domain of applicability.

Since Hart looks

at this social situation from the perspective of someone

who is trying to determine what another person believes
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to be normatively
required,

and since he analyzes
believ -

ina in terms of behavioral
manifestations, he focuses
on expressions of approval
or disapproval of certain
actions, tendencies to
criticize certain conduct,
and so
Given this approach, there
is uncertainty about
what
rules are i.e., about what
the identity of the objects of belief or acceptance
are-to the extent that
there is doubt about whether
some verbal or nonverbal
behavior is or signifies believing
or accepting one rule
rather than another. However,
Hart's reliance on behavioral manifestations of acceptance
of a rule is not inconsistent with the theory that a
legal rule is "a
'pure

norm,

that is,

...

an ought or may meaning-content,"

which is the theory that Harris
attributes to Kelsen.^
Rules are propositions containing
a normative element;
they are the meanings of rule
expressions— sentences containing "ought" or terms logically
related to "ought," or
sentences or symbolic conduct analyzable
in terms of sentences containing such terras.^ Harris,
however, attributes to Hart the following quite different
hypotheses:
A positive legal rule is to be equated
with a ’rule situation,
that is, with
3 social situation in which a certain
pattern of behaviour is regarded as a
standard
'

.

A legal system is to be equated with a
social situation in which obligationstandards that is, standards enforced
by strong social pressure are generally

—

—

92

observed, and the officials
of the sowhich patterns of
to the
ot
0 f^nIi°oM
new obligation-standards .5 creation

This interpretation of Hart
seems to be based on the
view
that Hart reduces or "equates"
legal norms with complexes
of behavior.
contrast, the interpretation
of Hart
advanced here is that Hart regards
legal rules as "pure
norms" and is giving us a theory
about when a particular
norm "applies to" a certain group
or is "in force" in that
group.
A rule that applies or "exists"
in virtue of

m

acceptance of it as
pplies because

a

standard is

a

social rule.

The rule

certain social situation exists, but
the
rule is not equivalent to that
social situation.
a

Harris’ argument that Hart’s theory
is inconsistent
is based on the view that Hart
maintains both that legal
rules are equivalent to "rule situations"
(i.e., certain
complexes of behavior) and that they are
equivalent to
"pure norms" (i.e., propositions containing
deontic ele-

ments).

Harris argues that the latter view is implicit

in Hart’s discussion of rule-skepticism,

conception of

a

since Hart’s

rule as an entity that has a "core of

settled meaning" is coherent only if rules are pure norms.
That is, a deontic proposition logically might have
of settled meaning,

"

a

"core

but a complex of behavior is not an

ontologically appropriate subject of such

a

property.^

Although Harris’ argument about the implications of Hart’s
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treatment of rule-skepticism
seems correct, he is not
correct in his conclusion
that Hart has been
inconsistent in
his account of legal rules.
For the reasons already
cited,
Harris appears to reach his
erroneous conclusion because
he mistakes Hart's reliance
on behavioral manifestations
in his characterization
of the psychological phenomenon
of believing that a rule is
a standard that applies
to
one's group for a reductive
analysis of the rules which
in this case are the objects
of belief.

Hart can consistently maintain
that the conditions
for the existence of a social
rule, rather than operating
as an analysis of rules,
define a function that

selects
from the set of all rules a subset
of rules that apply to
the members of a particular social
group.
contrast, we
can think of moral rules as the
members of the subset of
the set of all rules that is selected
by the function
defined by the correct moral theory. The
rules of baseball are members of the subset of all
rules that is

m

selected by the function defined by the theory
of baseball.

And so on.

mutually exclusive.

These subsets of rules need not be
Some members of the set of moral

rules might belong to one or more sets of social
rules.
In the case of social rules,

a

rule of recognition is

picked out of the set of rules by the social-rule

existence-condition function.

That rule, in turn, picks

out other rules from the set of rules.

A social rule of
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recognition and the rules
validated by such a rule are
the rules of a group simply
because they are treated as
such by members of the group.

Possibility of Inconsistent

r.^^w.c;

A second criticism of Hart's
theory is implied by
Harris' own theory of law and
is not based on a misunderstanding of Hart's theory.
Harris proposes the following fundamental schema, which
he calls "the basic
legal science fiat"
Legal duties exist only if imposed
not excepted) by rules originating (and
in
the following sources:
... or by rules
subsumable under such rules. Provided
that any contradiction between rules
originating in different sources shall
be resolved according to the following
ranking amongst the sources: ... and provided that no other contradiction shall
be a^itted to exist, (ellipsis in
origi^
nal
‘

)

The aspect of this conception of law that
conflicts with
Hart's theory as it has been interpreted
here is the

thesis that it is impossible for

have inconsistent legal norms.

a

single legal system to

Elsewhere, Harris charac-

terizes the principle of non-contradiction as:
[T]hat principle in accordance with which
legal science rejects the possibility of
describing a legal system in such a way
that one could affirm the existence of a
duty, and also the non-existence of a
duty, covering the same act-situation
on the same occasion.^

Harris is not merely stating that as a matter of fact all
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existing legal systems have
rules for eliminating inconsistencies among laws.
Rather, he argues that his
principle of non-contradiction is
"part
of the 'logic' of

legal science.*'^

Harris

characterization of the principle of
non-

contradiction and his incorporation
of it in the "basic
legal science fi^- do not preclude
one interpretation
that IS consistent with Hart's
theory.
Namely,

the prin-

ciple might be construed as the
statement that:
(p)

(It is not possible that (Op & ~
Op)),

where "0" is a deontic operator for legal
norms of
ticular legal system and "p" is a proposition.

a

par-

This prin

ciple is compatible with Hart's theory:

it merely states

that it is not possible that some rule both
is and is not
a legal rule of a particular legal
system.
For
example,

it is not possible that a legislature has
enactd a par-

ticular law and that it has not enacted that law, where

being enacted by

a

legislature is

a

criterion for identi-

fying rules of the system.
However, it seems clear that Harris has in mind a

principle that does conflict with Hart's theory; namely,
the principle that it is not possible for a given legal

system to impose inconsistent obligations.

The notion

of inconsistent obligations can be elucidated simply in
terms of the concept of an obedience statement.

of the form

"_i

A rule

ought not to do A" has an obedience state-
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ment of the form
Of the

fo™

"i does xiuL
not do
ao A
A.

"

^
Although statements

ought to do A" and "i ought
not to do A"
are contraries rather
than contradictories,
their corresponding obedience statements
are contradictories.
since
the obedience statements
corresponding to these two rules
are contradictories, it
is impossible for both
of these
rules to be obeyed or conformed
to simultaneously.
..i

Thus,
we can say that inconsistent
obligations are obligations
the obligation statements
for which have corresponding

obedience statements that are
contradictories
in his article on Kelsen's
theory.

Hart specifically

notes that the logical impossibility
of joint obedience
to two rules does not imply
that it is logically impossible for the two rules "to coexist
as valid rules either
of the same or different systems.
With respect to the
possibility of conflicting laws in the
same legal system.
Hart states that "... though it would
certainly be deplorable on every practical score if laws
of a single legal
system conflicted and the system provided
no way of

resolving such conflicts, it is still far from
obvious
that even this is a logical impossibility."^^

He then

notes that on the issue of the possibility of
inconsis-

tent laws, legal rules, and second-person orders
appear to
be on a par, and it seems clear enough that it is
possible
for an individual to issue inconsistent orders.

Inasmuch

as Hart's views in The Concept of Law appear to
conform to
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the views expressed in
the article on Kelsen,
it seems
fair to conclude that Hart's
theory permits the possibility of inconsistent laws,
whereas Harris' theory does
not.

Despite Hart's apparent
commitment to the thesis
that inconsistent laws are
logically possible, he alludes
to an argument against
that thesis in his statement
that
If an individual "insisted
on producing streams of inconsistent orders and these could
not be explained,
e.g,,

by lapse of memory, we should
conclude that he did not
understand what he was saying, and
might well refuse to
classify what he said as constituting
orders
at all,"^^

Although Hart does not explain this
statement, he may
have in mind the view that if it
is not logically possible for the addressees of a law
(or order) to conform
to its requirements, then it is
not a directive

or action-

guiding entity and thus is not

a law (or order)

at all.

Such an argument is made by von Wright
in Norm and Action
Von Wright poses the question of inconsistency
as follows:

.

It is clear that it is logically impossible for one and the same agent to do
f^o^tear the same thing on the same
occasion.
But is it logically impossible to command or permit an agent to
do and forbear the same thing on the
same occasion?
If commanding and permitting consisted just in shouting out
certain words to him, then this would
not be impossible 14
.

Von Wright rejects this conception of prescriptions and
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argues that a statement of
obligation 'expresses or manifests a will to make agents
do or forbear certain
things"
and a statement of permission
expresses or manifests "a
will to let agents do or
forbear certain things." However, according to von Wright,
"the normative relationship, in the existence of
which the existence of the prescription consists" exists only
if it is logically possible for the subjects of the
prescription to do or forbear those things the issuer of
the prescription wants
to make or let them do or
forbear.
in short:
If for reasons of logic, these
things
cannot be done (and forborne) one
make or let agents do or forbear cannot
them.
Therefore, neither can one command or
permit or prohibit them to agents.
Such
prescriptions cannot 'exist. '15

This argument is not persuasive since
the conclusion
does not appear to follow from von Wright's
premises.
In

particular, although it is true that the
issuer of an
order cannot make his addressee do something
that it is

logically impossible to do, it does not follow
that
c ommand to that effect can't be given,

a

unless one adopts

the improbable thesis that commanding an act to
be per-

formed is equivalent to making the addressee perform
the
act in question.

The more supportable thesis that von

Wright begins with--namely
expression of
some action

a

,

that a prescription is the

will to make the addressee do or forbear

— does

not support his conclusion, inasmuch
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as it see^s entirely
possible to will that
someone do

something that cannot be
done.
Similarly, it seems to
be entirely possible for
there to exist a social
rule of
recognition that identifies
inconsistent rules as rules
applicable to a group.

Although Harris presents his
version of the noncontradiction principle as an
aspect of the "logic of
legal science," his argument
in fact is based on certain
principles of political philosophy.
Harris argues that
l egality "... is a
constituent element of the rules
of
all officials in societies
with developed legal institutions.
"Legality" and "the value of legality"
are
terms Harris uses to refer to
the political principle that
If a legal rule and the known
facts imply a particular

practical conclusion (e.g., if

a legal rule states or

implies that Smith ought to pay five
dollars to Jones if
X has occurred, and x has occurred,
so that Smith ought
to pay Jones),

then officials (especially judges) ought

to make and enforce that decision.

Apparently, the state-

ment that the principle of legality is

a

constituent ele-

ment of a developed legal system is not an
empirical

observation but

a

conceptual claim.

Thus, according to

Harris, no system of rules lacking this principle
is

a

legal system.

Harris relates the thesis that a legal system cannot

contain inconsistent legal rules to the thesis that

a
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legal system must include
the principle of legality:
IS an explicit role-value
of
officials, especially of judges.
One of
'^hich the organized might
of
the modern state is filtered
down to the
individual is through official
which purport to apply the law. decisions
This
mechanism would be gravely impaired
if
judges were regularly to announce
that
whatever they did they would be
acting
contrary to law.
Instead, they purport
to reconcile' seemingly
contradictory
legal rules binding on them. 17

The upshot of this argument is
that unless inconsistencies
among the rules of a system are
precluded, then the principle of legality cannot be satisfied
in that system, and
therefore that system cannot be a legal
system.
The flaw in this argum.ent is that there
is no reason
to think that the application of
inconsistent rules undermines the principle of legality. All that
the principle
of legality holds is that judges ought to
apply any appli-

cable legal rules in the cases that come before
them.

A

judge can satisfy this principle even if inconsistent
rules are applicable in

a

given case.

What is not pos

sible is for the individual to whom inconsistent rules
are applied to conform to the requirements of such
rules.

We are thus left v/ith Hart's conclusion that whereas it

may be deplorable to have

a legal

system that subjects

individuals to inconsistent legal requirements, there is

nothing logically impossible about such

a

situation.
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Le gal Validity and the

Trle a

of

A third criticism of
Hart's theory is presented
in a
recent article by Roscoe
Hill.^® Hill argues that
Hart
presents two radically distinct
and apparently inconsistent theories of legal
obligation.
On the one hand, Hart
gives a straightforward
positivistic theory of legal obligation.
According to this theory legal
obligation is
explained in terms of legal validity.
particular, an
individual has a legal obligation
to perform some act. A,
in a society, s, if and only
if there is a valid rule of S
according to which one ought to do
A.
Legal validity, in
turn, IS broadly defined in terms
of satisfaction of the

m

criteria specified by a socially-accepted
authorizing norm
that IS, a rule is valid just in
case it meets the tests

established by the rule of recognition,
which exists
simply by virtue of the fact that it
actually is used as
the basis for identifying valid rules.
This conception
of legal validity is considered to be a
broad one because
there are no limitations on the content of
the rules

authorized by the validating rule.

A valid rule might

state a moral requirement, it might be morally
neutral,
or it might be morally repugnant.
merit, however,
tion,
that-

a

Regardless of its moral

valid rule establishes a legal obliga-

according to the positivist account.

Hill maintains

the positivist account of legal validity establishes
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IS ig gaJ-ly o bliged to
act in accordance with
a
rule that is legally
valid.
That is, "one should
expect

the authorities to apply
sanctions if they catch him
deviating from the rule, or
law. in question.
However,
according to Hill, legal
validity
does not establish that there is a legal
obligation. Hill's view
appears to be that inasmuch
as Hart maintains the
positivistic thesis that legal
validity establishes legal obligation, his theory is
indistinguishable from the Austinlan coercive orders theory,
and that neither Hart's
theory nor the coercive orders
theory yields anything of

^

normative significance to the extent
that it treats as
sources of obligations valid rules
that fail to conform
to principles of justice and
that may even fail to qualify
as rules that are regarded as
desirable or just by any
members of the group.
On the other hand,

in contrast to the standard posi-

tivist account of legal obligation in
terms of legal
validity. Hill argues that Hart gives
the foundations of
a more adequate account of legal
obligation based on "the
general idea of obligation."

Hill notes that in Section

2

("The Idea of Obligation") of Chapter V ("Law
as the Union

of Primary and Secondary Rules") Hart states
that under-

standing "the general idea of obligation" is

a

preliminary" to understanding legal obligation.

"necessary
Hill

maintains that this statement is inconsistent with Hart's
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commitment to positivistic
analysis of legal obligation
in terms of legal validity:
The positivist doctrine that
legal validobligation irreparably
rSlv^cuts^th^®
cuts the connection between
'the
obligation’ and 'its legal
rendering false the claim
understanding the general idea of that
legal
[Sic] obligation is a 'necessary
preliminary to understanding obligatiL
in its
legal form.
Since we can analyze and
understand the 'wider' concept of
validity [according to which unjustlegal
laws
may be valid] without reference
to 'the
general Idea of obligation' we can
presumably, understand and analyze also,
the
(wider’) concept of legal obligation
without such a reference.
,

Hill proposes to resolve the alleged
inconsistency not by
eliminating Hart's analysis of the
"general idea of obligation" but by rejecting the thesis
that a valid law entails the existence of a legal obligation.
The rationale
for this resolution is that Hill finds
a basis for what
he considers to be an acceptable form of
normativity in

Hart's discussion of the general idea of
obligation, but
not in the positivist analysis of legal validity.
Hiil ^^9^uss that the distinction between the "in-

ternal" and the "external" point of view, which Hart

introduces in order to distinguish habitual behavior from
rule following, can be made without reference to any eval-

uative elements.

That is, a rule can be followed and con-

duct can be meaningfully and correctly justified or criti-

cized with reference to a rule, and so on, without any
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judgment being made about
whether the rule is good,
just,
or desirable and regardless
of whether the rule in
fact
has any of those qualities.
In contrast, according
to
'

Hxll,

in distinguishing between
being obliged and having
an obligation and in
distinguishing between social
rules
that impose obligations and
those that do not impose
obligations. Hart introduces an
evaluative element. Hill
believes that this evaluative
element guarantees that
rules that impose legal
obligations have moral significance

On the one hand, to apply the
concept
legally obliged (or to assert
that one is legally obliged by
a given
law) simply involves the
(value-free)
recognition that the law in question
i-e., that the law passes
all the tests provided by the
rule of
recognition, and that the law will be
enforced.
On the other hand, to apply
the concept of legal obligation
(or, to
assert, from the 'inside,' that a
given
law imposes a legal obligation)
involves
the (value-charged) recognition that
the
law conforms to the 'true' principles
of
justice and morality, that it serves the
interest, the general welfare,

etc.“^^

It is not entirely clear what Hill
means when he says that

legal obligation "involves the recognition"
that the law
in question conforms to the principles of
justice.
In
his example of the legal obligations of the
draftee with
a

dependent parent. Hill refers only to the draftee's

beliefs that conscription and the purposes for which and
means by which it is carried out are "just and necessary."
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This example suggests
that Hill’s view is that
in order
rule to give rise to a
legal obligation it is
necessary only that at least
some members of the group
believe
that the rule in question
conforms to principles of
justice.
However, the thrust of Hill’s
argument in general
appears to be that a rule
imposes a legal obligation
only
If It actually does conform
to ’’true” principles of
justice

Nevertheless, Hill does not maintain
that being subject to a legal obligation
necessarily determines one's
moral obligations.
Thus, he distinguishes between
being
legally obliged, having a legal
obligation, and having a
moral obligation.
Thus, in the example of the
draftee
with the dependent parent. Hill
argues that the individual may have a moral obligation to
care for his parent in
violation of his legal obligation to
report for military
service--which by hypothesis arises by virtue
of its being
called for by principles of justice. On
the other hand.
Hill argues that whereas one might have

a

moral obliga-

tion not to engage in certain acts which are
also prohibited by a valid rule of law, one may have
no legal obli-

gation not to engage in the act.

For example, it might

be argued that abortion is morally impermissible,
and

abortion may in fact be legally prohibited, but there may
be no legal obligation not to perform an abortion under
s

analysis because the prohibition of abortion is
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inconsistent with the principles
of justice.
Hill's argument is mistaken
in two respects relevant
to our present purposes.
First, Hill is mistaken in
his
claim that Hart's account
of legal validity and 1 egal
obligation is "incoherent" or
inconsistent.
Second, Hill
is mistaken in his claim
that Hart introduces evaluative
elements that guarantee that
legal obligations
are

grounded in principles of justice
and therefore possess
justified normativity. These points
are intertwined and
can be discussed in conjunction.
We have already seen that Hill
argues that Hart's

theory is inconsistent because the
account of legal obligation in terms of legal validity does
not refer to or
contain "evaluative" elements whereas
the account of legal
obligation in terms of the general idea
of obligation allegedly does not refer to or contain
evaluative elements.
Hill bases this allegation on the fact
that in drawing the
distinction between being obliged and being
obligated Hart

makes various second-person statements that
appear to call
on the reader's intuitions about what
qualifies
as the

content of an obligation.

Thus, Hart says that with res-

pect to the situation in which A orders B to hand
over
his money and threatens to harm B if B fails to
comply,

^

would say that B was obliged to act, but that

^

would

misdescribe the situation if we said that B had an obligation to act.

Hill's argument, therefore, is that Hart is
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able to make out the
distinction only by appealing
to his
reader's substantive judgments
about what in fact is and
is not obligatory.

Hill's analysis of Hart's
distinction between social
rules that impose duties and
those that do not is less
direct.
on the one hand, Hart follows
a similar method
of arguing that we would say
certain behaviors called for
by a rule are obligatory but
that we would misdescribe
the situation to say that
certain behaviors called for by
another rule are obligatory. On
the other hand, Hill
acknowledges that in characterizing
the conditions under
which a social rule is a rule of
obligation. Hart
does

not refer to or call for any
substantive judgments. Thus,
Hart states that social rules "are
conceived and spoken
of as imposing obligations" only
if:
the general demand for conformity
insistent and the social pressure
brought to bear upon those who deviate
or threaten to deviate is great.
[1]

the rules supported by this serious
[^]
pressure are thought important because
they are believed to be necessary to the
maintenance of social life or some highly
prized feature of it.
... the conduct required by these
[3]
rules may, while benefitting others,
conflict with what the person who owes
the duty may wish to do. 2

These conditions look only at how rules are regarded by

members of a group.

No appeal is made to the reader's

intuitions about which rules really are necessary to the
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maintenance of social life
and so on.
However, Hill
thinks that Hart rs covertly
appealing to such substantive judgments and that
failure to do so makes
the issue
Of legal obligation "turn
upon sociological

facts and
methods, not upon conceptual
or philosophical issues. "24
Clearly, something has gone
amiss here.
One of the
principal points of Hart's
theory is to show how legal
obligation is a matter of
sociological facts. That is,
the
social rule theory endeavors
to reveal the conventional
social basis of legal rules
and the obligations arising under them.
Hill is correct that legal
normativity
under Hart's theory involves
evaluative aspects in addition to the evaluations implicitly
involved in rule
following and justifying and
criticizing conduct relative
to a rule.
That is, under Hart's theory there
is at

least one

s ocial

rule— namely, the rule of recognition—

and it exists because at least
some members of the group
accent and regard it as appropriate for
the purpose of
Identifying the rules that apply to the
group.
However,
there is no requirement that the rule
of recognition of
a group conform to the principles
of justice. Nor is it

necessary that those whose favorable attitudes
toward the
use of a particular rule of recognition
is the reason for
Its existence believe that the rule of
recognition they

are using conforms to the principles of justice.

Further-

more, under Hart’s theory there is no requirement
that the
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rules identified under a
rule of recognition either
(A)
conform to or be believed by
any member of the group to
conform to any principles of
justice or (B) be favorably
viewed by anyone in the group
except that at least some
members of the group must regard
favorably the fact that
the rule possesses the
qualities specified by the rule of
recognition as qualities of rules
applicable to the group.
Thus, although evaluative elements
are an important aspect
of the social rule theory, which
we will explore further
in the next chapter. Hart does
not maintain, and his
theory does not imply, that this
aspect insures that conduct required by a social rule or
conduct required by a
rule validated by a social rule will
be required or permitted by the principles of justice.
Nevertheless,
it

seems that Hart takes such rules to be
the sort of rules
that are determinative of one's legal
obligations.

Hill's misconceptions about Hart's analysis of
social
rules of obligation is reflected in his conclusion
that

Hart has two incompatible theories of legal obligation-one based on legal validity and devoid of normative
sig-

and the other based on the general idea of obli-

gation and possessing normative significance.

The discus-

sion of the general idea of obligation is necessary to

illuminate the idea of a rule of recognition.

The rule

of recognition is a social rule which "exists" in the
social situation, which implies both that people in fact

110

employ the rule to evaluate
conduct and that they regard
what it requires as a standard
that must be followed by
everyone, what the rule of
recognition requires is that
rules that satisfy certain
criteria be used as rules
the group.

of
The members of society may
not directly view

any of the validated rules as
setting proper standards of
behavior, but the rules are linked
to something— namely
the rule of recognition that
is directly regarded by at
least some persons as establishing
a standard.
However,
a rule that no one has a favorable
attitude towards nevertheless IS a source of obligation
if it passes the tests
that are regarded as conclusive of
whether a rule establishes an obligation for members of the
group.
In summary,

given

a

proper understanding of the vari-

ous elements of Hart's theory,

and in particular of the

relationship between the rule of recognition,
which is a
social rule, and rules validated by the rule of
recognition,

there is no basis for Hill's argument that Hart's

theory (inconsistently) articulates the view that one
is
legally obliged to act just in case there is

a

valid rule

requiring the act but that one is legally obligated to
act only if there is a valid rule requiring the act,

where the rule in question conforms to substantive principles of justice.

Ill

one of the most persistent
critics of Hart's social
rule theory is Ronald Dworkin,
who has criticized Hart's
positivism and developed his own
theory in a number of
articles, 25 which in turn have
attracted numerous coramentators.
Although a detailed examination of
Dworkin'
views is beyond the scope of
this study, the principal
arguments of interest for our
purposes can be set forth
and analyzed with reasonable brevity.
J.

Raz Identifies three central theses
defended by

Dworkin, especially in "Hard Cases":

(i)

The "Natural

Law Thesis," according to which the
determination of what
IS and what is not law necessarily
depends in part on
what IS and what is not moral; (ii) The
"Conservative

Thesis," according to which "all judicial
decisions are
and should be justified on the basis of
that political
theory which best justifies all valid enactments
and

binding decisions," and (iii)
kin' s term),

The "Rights Thesis" (Dwor-

according to which adjudication is and

should be a matter of enforcing existing legal rights and
not of judicially legislating new legal relations

These theses are related by the view that judges have an

obligation to enforce extant rights and that this obligation cannot be accounted for if there is only

a

social

rule of recognition for identifying legal norms; further.
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the Moral criteria that
are necessarily involved
in order
to account for the
duties of a judge ensure
that there
always will be a "right
yuu answer
answer" tn
to the question of what
legal rights exist in any
particular case. The first
two theses are directed
at Hart's theory that a
legal

system necessarily has a

so^

rule of recognition that

establishes what is and is not
law and that whether this
rule incorporates substantive
moral criteria is a contingent matter. The last thesis
engages Hart's thesis that
there may be "gaps" in the
rules identified by a social
rule of recognition so that in
some cases a judge must
exercise "discretion" in reaching
a decision
and in such

cases necessarily must fail to
enforce an antecedently
existing legal right, since many
of Dworkin's arguments
have their genesis in his rejection
of the thesis that
judges do or should have discretion,
it is convenient to
begin with that issue.

Both Dworkin and Hart appear to assume
that adjudication IS a process of reasoning from general
norms and

particular statements of fact to particular
practical conclusions.
That is, the form of judicial decision-making
is:

(i)

according to the law of society,

ought to do G;

(ii)

individual

according to the law of

S,

i

i

is an F;

ought to do

shortcomings this schema may have as

a

S,

all F's

(iii) therefore,
G.

Whatever

general account of

legal reasoning, it captures the idea that adjudication
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involves the "application'- of
"legal material" to par
ticular facts to reach determinate
conclusions.
Where Dworkin and Hart appear
to part company is
over the issue of whether
legal decisions are invariably
possible.
Roughly, Hart thinks that it
is in principle
impossible and in practice undesirable
to have legal
material that antecedently resolves
every factual situation of conflict with complete
determinacy.
it
is impos

sible in principle to achieve
complete determinacy
because legal materials-legal
norms-are expressed in
general terms whose inherent vagueness
precludes complete
determinacy in applying them to particular
cases.
Legal
norms have an 0 £en texture that interferes
with the opera
tion of the practical syllogism of legal
reasoning:

Whichever device, precedent or legislation, is chosen for the communication
of standards of behaviour, these, how^ver smoothly they work over the great
mass of ordinary cases, will, at some
point where their application is in
question, prove indeterminate; they will
have what has been termed an open tex^*-^^tainty at the borderline
IS the price to be paid for use of general classifying terms in any form of
communication concerning matters of
fact.
Natural languages like English
are when so used irreducibly ooen tex*

*

.

tured. 28

In addition. Hart argues that it is often undesirable to

adopt legal norms that can be expressed with the maximum

specificity that language permits.

A vague proposition

of law can be adapted more easily to unanticipated factual
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situations and permits shifts
in the goals sought to
be
furthered by the adoption
of the norm.^^ Finally,
although Hart does not focus
on this point, the fact
that
the existence of law is
a matter of fact
contingent upon
what is provided by a social
rule of recognition implies
that there may be gaps in
the law such that no rule
of
law specifies the rights
of the persons involved
in a

case and the rule of recognition
does not provide a closure rule according to which
that which is not specifically prohibited is specifically
permitted.

According to Hart, when adjudication
of

impossible— that

is,

a

dispute is

when the application of legal
mate-

rial to the facts of a case does
not produce a determinate

practical conclusion— then the resolution
of the practical
question of what an individual is
legally required or permitted to do is discretionary. A
discretionary decision
IS an instance of legislation or
the creation of a legal
norm rather than an instance of adjudication
or the appli-

cation of extant legal norms to the facts
of a case. By
hypothesis, discretionary decisions are not
based upon
the application of legal norms, but upon
the application
of non-legal criteria.

Taking the example discussed by

Hart of the rule prohibiting the use of motor vehicles
in the park, and supposing that an ambulance has
been

used in the park to rescue an injured person, the question of whether use of the ambulance is prohibited

115

appears to be logically
foreclosed by the fact that
the
ambulance is a motor vehicle.
However, there may be
other
norms that narrow the
generality of the rule.
For example, there may be
a legal rule that exempts
uses
relating to the delivery of
emergency services from

1^

the

rules regarding the use of
the park.
On the other hand,
there may be no
norms that preclude the
application
of the general rule to the
ambulance case, but the rule
may be treated as "open textured"
by an adjudicator in
order to avoid what are deemed
for extra-legal reasons to
be undesirable results.

1^

Dworkin's complaint about Hart's
account is that
whereas Hart believes that some cases
cannot and should
not be adjudicated, but must be
decided legislatively by
the adjudicator's exercise of
discretion, Dworkin thinks
that all disputes can and should be
adjudicated.
Dworkin's argument in "The Model of Rules,"
in relevant

part,

is that Hart failed to see that all
cases can be adjudi-

cated because he only accounted for legal
rules and
failed to account for legal material that Dworkin
calls

"principles."

Dworkin maintains that Hart's failure to

account for principles is due to Hart's mistaken belief
that no proposition is

validated by

a

a

proposition of law unless it is

"master rule of recognition" that stipu-

lates the necessary and sufficient conditions for a norm's

being

a legal norm,

and that principles are norms that do
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not pass any litmus test
established by social
practice
that separates legal from
non-legal norms.
The cogency of Dworkin's
argument depends upon the
assumption that there are
items distinct from rules
that
Hart failed to take into
account and that cannot be
ac-

counted for by Hart's social
rule theory.
Even if there
are certain norms-principles-that
are distinct from
rules, if Hart's theory
does not exclude them from
the
domain of legal material, then
Dworkin has not engaged
Hart's thesis that some cases
cannot be adjudicated
on
the basis of extant legal
rules that yield determinate

practical conclusions.

Furthermore, even if there are

principles, as distinct from rules,
the existence of
which as legal norms cannot be
accounted for by a social
rule of recognition, it must be
shown that the addition
of principles to the domain of
legal material eliminates
the need for discretionary
adjudicatory decisions.

Before examining Dworkin's principal
arguments, one
non-argument that underlies much of his
presentation
should be considered. Dworkin appears
in part to base
his claims that there are legal
principles distinct
from

legal rules and that the application of
principles to the
facts of a case produces determinate practical
conclusions
on a particular understanding of the
phenomenology of

judicial decision-making.

Dworkin seems to think that

since (in Anglo-American legal systems) we experience
the
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of

nara cases —that
i-]-i=>+is, cases that Hart
thinks are decided by the exem'
r
exercise of discretion
**]ri3jrcl

in the

absence of legal norms that
yield determinate resultsas having been constrained
by law and since we identify
the constraining factors
as principles, then there
are
in fact legal principles
that constrain decisions in
cases where the application of
rules fail to determine
a result.

Aside from the fact that the felt
legal necessity of
a juaicial decision does
not logically entail that the
decision is in fact legally necessary,
the phenomenology
of judicial decision-making itself
does not conclusively
support the view that all judicial
decisions
are con-

strained by legal norms.

Although some judges may char-

acterize their decisions in "hard cases"
as vindications
of pre-existing legal rights, other
judges characterize
their decisions in such cases as the legislative
creation
of legal rights and duties.
It is not uncommon for a

court to acknowledge the novelty of

a case,

to consider

competing rules of law that are applied in other jurisdictions, and to adopt one of those rules or some other

rule as the law of its jurisdiction.

Furthermore, regard-

less of the court's characterization of its decision,

the respective party's perceptions of the decision may

well differ.

For example, in the well-known case of

Hennigsen v. Bloomfield Motors,

Inc.,^^ which Dworkin dis-
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cusses, the court ruled
that a written contract
for the
purchase and sale of an
automobile agreed to by
the purchaser and containing a
limited warranty and
disclaimer
of liability for damage
caused by defective parts
was
ineffective, so that the
manufacturer of the automobile
could be required to pay
damages for personal
injuries
caused by defective parts
notwithstanding the contractual
agreement to the contrary.
The injured

plaintiff in
Hennigsen may have experienced
the decision of the court
as a vindication of her
legal rights, but the
defendant
who had not insured against
liability for defective

prodon the assumption (grounded
on existing legal rules
about the power of individuals
to arrange their respective
rights and duties by mutual
assent) that an assented- to
ucts,

limited warranty and disclaimer
of liability was an effective bar to liability, probably
experienced the court's
decision as ex post facto legislation,
in short, even if
the phenomenological facts had
a bearing on the soundness
of Dworkin's position, they do not
conform to his characterization and so do not favor his
position in any event.
The first substantive argument offered
by Dworicin is
intended to support the thesis that rules
and principles
are distinguishable kinds of norms.

Dworkin claims that

"[t]he difference between legal principles
and legal rules
is a logical distinction."^^

Rules and principles are en-

tities the ontological characteristics of
which presumably
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are such that a logical
distinction between them is
reflected in a difference in
the logical forms by which
they
are expressed.
Unfortunately, Dworkin has not
provided us
with a formal characterization
that elucidates the claim
that rules and principles are
logically distinct. Moreover, his claim that "[i]t
is not always clear from
the
form of a standard whether
it is a rule or a principle"^^
suggests that we ought not to
take the claim that there
IS a logical distinction
between rules and principles
very seriously.
it seems reasonable to suppose
that
norms are entities such that there
are logical distinctions among them if and only if
there are differences in
the form in which they are properly
expressed.
Therefore,
If two norms are properly expressed
by statements having

the same logical form, then it is
false that there is
logical distinction between the two norms.

a

Since Dworkin has not provided formal
criteria for
distinguishing rules and principles, we must rely
on his
less precise characterizations.
Dworkin claims that
rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing
fashion"

whereas principles "... do not set out legal consequences
that follow automatically when the conditions
provided
are met. " 33

in turn,

this difference between rules and

principles is taken by Dworkin to imply that principles
do,

but rules do not, have "the dimension of weight or

importance
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It is not clear what
Dworkin-s thesis is.

He appears
to be suggesting that
principles are incomplete rules.

Thus, perhaps both rules and
principles are properly expressed by a statement roughly
to the effect that if
instances of event types E^(x,y)
E^(x,y) occur, involving individuals X and
y, then x has a duty to
y to do
A.
If this statement expresses
a rule, it is complete

in

the sense that it conclusively
settles the matter of x's
legal duty and y's legal right
with respect to the performance of A by X. However, if the
statement expresses a
principle, it is an incomplete rule
in the sense that the
question of x's and y's legal duties and
rights is not
settled.
Although the principle identifies factors
that
are relevant in determining what x's
and y's legal rights
ana duties are in the circumstances,
whether x has a duty
to y to do A depends upon whether certain
other events

have occurred.

The value of a principle is in signalling

factual circumstances that have potential
significance in
the ascription of legal rights and duties.

For example,

the legal norm that an executory agreement that
is not

supported by consideration is not legally enforceable in
an incomplete rule that focuses on potentially signifi-

cant facts in determining whether the promisee who has
not given consideration has

a

legal right to the perfor-

mance of the act promised by the promisor.

The fact that

the promisee has not given consideration signals that the
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promisor may have no legal
duty to perform the
promised
act, but whether this
fact is dispositive
depends upon
the presence or absence
of other facts, such as
whether
there has been reasonable
detrimental reliance
by the

promisee on the promisor's
promise.

Although Dworkin's presentation
suggests that his
legal principles are incompletely
expressed legal rules,
he rejects this interpretation
on the ground that it is
theoretically impossible to enumerate
the "counter-

instances" to any given legal
principle.

The counter-

instances cannot be enumerated,
according to Dworkin,
because of "... those numberless
imaginary cases in which
we know in advance that the
principle would not hold."^^
Aside from the logical and ontological
questions raised by
the claim that the "counter-instances"
to a proposition
cannot be enumerated, this basis for
rejecting the interpretation of principles as incompletely-expressed
rules
does not appear to help Dworkin reach
his goal of demonstrating that we never run out of legal
material. By presupposing that we can always reach a determinate
practical
conclusion by applying a particular principle
to a particular factual evaluation, he assumes that
there is a "right
answer" to every legal question. Dworkin supposes
that if
we run out of rules, we can turn to principles,
but this

consideration yields his desired conclusion only because
he assumes that principles always yield determinate
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results

Although Dworkin's formal
characterizations of rules
and principles do not reveal
the alleged logical distinction between them, it may
be possible to determine
the
basis for the distinction
from his examples. Dworkin
states that the legal norm
according to which a will is
invalid unless it is signed by
three witnesses is a legal
rule, whereas the legal norm
according to which a person
IS not permitted to profit
from his wrongful
acts is a

legal principle.

These examples suggest that the
distinc-

tion IS based on whether or not
it is possible for a particular type of legal norm to lack
moral content.
That
is, perhaps Dworkin's view is
that principles necessarily
contain substantive moral content whereas
rules may not.
His claim that principles state
requirements of justice
and fairness suggests this criterion.
However, since

nothing Dworkin (or Hart) says precludes

a rule from

having moral content, this criterion is not
an adequate
basis for differentiating rules and principles;
that is,
a legal norm lacking moral content could
only be a rule,

but a norm with moral content could be either
a rule or
a

principle.
Finally, although Dworkin has not recanted his argu-

alleging that Hart's theory is defective in part

because it cannot account for legal principles, it is not
clear that he still maintains the view that rules and
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principles are logically
distinct and that the
latter
cannot be identified by
a rule of
recognition.
"Hard cases,., principles
are defined as
propositions
that describe rights ......37
.

erty of "all-or-nothing
applicability" is meaningful,
it
seems to be characteristic
of categorical ascriptions
of
rights and duties.
Thus, if principles are
statements
that ascribe rights, then
both rules and principles
are
applicable in all-or-nothing
fashion, which undercuts
Dworkin-s effort to distinguish
them.
The upshot of this examination
of Dworkin's arguments is that he has not given
us any persuasive reason
for thinking that there is
a type of legal norm
that
Hart.s theory cannot account for,
since he has not shown
us that there are different
types of norms distinguishable in the way he claims.

Even if there are such things as
legal principles
that are distinguishable from
legal rules, Dworkin's
view that they are not identifiable
by means of a social
rule of recognition still must be
defended.
His principal argument will be discussed below.
However, a threshold difficulty that Dworkin appears to
have overlooked
in "The Model of Rules" may be noted
at this point.

Even

if principles have a logical form that
excludes them from

validation by

a

Hartian rule of recognition, it seems to

be necessary to appeal to some other sort
of rule of
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recognition in order to
distinguish those principles
that
are norms of a particular
legal system from

those that are
Obviously, a judge could
sit in his chambers
and
spin off propositions
that have the form of
principles
but which do not express
any existing legal norms
of his
jurisdiction.
For example, assuming
that the statement
that no one should hold
property as capital expresses
a
principle, it is false that
this proposition states an
extant law of any jurisdiction
in the United States.
Thus, in order to distinguish
principles that are within
the domain of legal material
of a particular jurisdiction
from those that are not, some
sort of validation proceSG0ITIS to b© necGsssry.
not.

For the moment, let us assume
that we can identify
certain principles that have a
function in legal reasoning
in a particular legal system.
The role assigned to them
by Dworkin is that of filling
gaps left by rules in hard
cases, such that there is a determinate
result to every
case that a judge is obligated to
reach based on extant
legal material.
A positivist might respond to Dworkin
's

characterization of the function of such
principles by
agreeing that there are certain maxims or
principles cited
by judges as justifications for their
decisions in hard
cases that are so entrenched in the legal
profession that
we can identify these justifying principles
as legal prin^
ciples.

Nevertheless, the positivist may argue against
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Dworkin that these
principles
ipies do not
no-.
.
constrain
decisions
in cases because there
is no requirement
that a judge
consider them in reaching
a decrsion.
That is, whether
or not a legal principle
is applied in a case
is a matter
of discretion.
•

Dworkin ’s defense of the
thesis that there are binding legal principles is
suggested by his statement
that
"[ujnless at least some
principles are acknowledged
to be
binding upon judges, requiring
them as a set to reach
particular decisions, then no
rules, or very few
rules, can

be said to be binding upon
them either.

argument
suggested by this assertion is
as follows.
First, there
are binding legal rules;
that is, there are rules that
a
judge is obligated to apply
in adjudicating a case.
If a
rule IS binding, then it cannot
be abrogated by the exercise of discretion. However,
abrogation of a rule by the
exercise of discretion is precluded
only if there
are

standards that constrain a judge
from such action.
The
only standards that constrain a
judge from abrogating a
legal rule at will are binding legal
principles.
Therefore, since there are binding legal
rules, then there are
binding legal principles.
The basic idea seems to be that unless
there are

principles that constrain judicial decisions
to overrule
rules,

then rules would lose their binding force
because

they would be subject to abrogation at will
and

a

rule
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that can be abrogated
at will is not a rule
at all.
However, the supposition
that a rule that can be
abrogated
at will is not a rule
seems to be false. The
at will
abrogation of a rule is simply
a process of legislation
rather than adjudication,
but the fact that a legal
rule
can be legislated out of
existence does not demonstrate
that it is not a rule.
Thus, Dworkin's argument in
effect amounts to the
that if the judicial abrogation
or

modification of

legal rules is a legal
decision--that is, if it is the
outcome of adjudication and not
legislation— then it must
be based on binding standards.
However, this thesis is
not an argument against Hart,
since Hart’s claim is that
the judicial abrogation or
modification of rules

is a mat-

ter of judicial legislation, and
in the process of legislating, the adjudicator is not
logically confined to the
domain of existing legal material in
giving reasons for
decisions
It is important for Dworkin to
maintain the thesis

that there are legal principles that
judges are obligated
to apply because his conclusion that
Hart's social rule

of recognition is inadequate is based
on the argument that

there are such legal principles, but that the
assumption

that there is

a

social rule of recognition implies that

there are no such principles.
ly,

Dworkin's argument, rough-

as developed in "Social Rules and Legal Theory,"
is
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that the social rule theory
maintains that whether
there
IS an obligation
depends upon a consensus
view about what
is required, which
consensus is borne out to
a large
extent in conforming practice.
the case of the social
rule of recognition, a
judge's obligation to decide
a case
in accordance with a
particular norm exists by virtue
of a
consensus view and corresponding
practice about what

m

the

norms of the group are.

However, in hard cases,

it is a

matter of controversy what the
legal rights and duties of
parties are, that is, there is
no consensus view and
general practice about the
applicable rule
for the case.

In such a case under the
social rule theory,

according to

Dworkin, there is no norm that
the judge is obligated to
apply.
As we have seen, Dworkin believes
that even in

hard cases there are extant legal
rights and duties speci
fied by legal norms that judges are
obligated to apply.
These legal norms are principles,
since the case is a
hard case for which no consensus exists
as to its proper
resolution, the applicable legal norms are
not identifiable by a social rule.
One reply to Dworkin has already been
developed
above; namely, that there are no legal
principles of the

sort he postulates that fill in the gaps left
by rules

identified by a social rule of recognition; or, if
there
are maxims or principles that are cited by judges
from

time to time in support of decisions in hard cases, these
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are not principles that
constrain decision but in
fact are
extra-legal justifications
for new (judicial)
legislation.
^Another reply to Dworkin's
argument is made by c. L.
39
Ten.
Ten argues that although
the cases that Dworkin
Identifies as hard cases may
be resolved in accordance
with rules that are controversial
and which are not
novo in the sense that
legislation is, it does not follow
that the application of such
rules disproves the social
rule theory.
Rather the positivist can say

^

that:

law consists not just of
itly adopted rules and principles explicbut
also of whatever rules and
principles
are embedded in constitutional
provisions, legislative enactments,
and
authoritative judicial decisions
[Tjhere may be considerable disagreement among judges about what rules
and
principles are embedded in the legal
sources.
But even so, the rule of
recognition is dependent on social
practice--the practice of recognizing
constitutional provisions, legislative
enactments and judicial decisions, as
well as what is en^edded in them, as
legal standards ^
.

In short,
a legal

controversy about whether

a

particular rule is

norm does not preclude recognition of its
applica-

tion by a judge as being in conformity with
the obligation
of officials under the rule of recognition,
if the contro-

versial rule is arrived at by the judge by means of
an
acceptable procedure of reasoning from accepted sources
The solution outlined by Ten parallels the approach

described by Dv/orkin as reasoning to legal conclusions on
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the basis of the
"soundest theory of law. "41
view, in part, is that
hard cases are decided
by a judge -s
reasonrng from the theory
he thanks best explains
settled
law.
However, Dworkin's theory
goes further than the
embedded principles theory
Ten proposes as the
positivists'
solution to legal reasoning
in hard cases.
First, Ten's
proposal describes a contingent
feature of a legal system.
In other words, it is
a matter of fact
determined by social
practice whether and under
what circumstances reasoning
on
the basis of embedded
principles constitutes a judge's
obligation in deciding a case.
this regard, Dworkin's
view that rules identified
on the basis of the "soundest
theory of law" are an essential
feature of any legal system ties into his view that
there is always a right answer
to any question of law.
That is, the right answer to a
hard case can be determined by
reasoning from the soundest theory of law. The flaw in
this position is nicely
exposed in A. D. Woozley's critique
of Dworkin's "right
answer thesis. Dworkin analogizes
statements about

m

whether a particular norm is

a legal

norm to statements

about characters and events in fiction.

His thesis is

that a theory of the settled law yields
answers to difficult questions of law, just as a theory
of the fictional

work yields answers to hard questions about
the characters and events.

Thus,

it is possible to settle on the

truth of ascriptions of motives and beliefs
and so on
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regarding characters in the
novel, even though the
author
has not expressly
provxded that the characters
or events
were so, based on what
the author does say.
Similarly,
we can answer questions
of law based on a theory
of settled legal norms. However,
Woozley points out that the
fact that some statement
is consistent with or
explains
or follows from what the
author says does not imply
that
the statement is true
according to the story.
larly,

the fact that a particular
norm follows from a
theory that accounts for the
settled law of a jurisdiction does not eer
imply that it is also a law of
that
jurisdiction unless there is a social
practice of treating
such norms as laws.

^

In summary,

this brief discussion of Dworkin’s
cri-

tique of Hart has called into
question Dworkin's view that
there are legal principles that have
a logical form distinct from legal rules.
Further, it has been suggested
that the addition of principles does
not necessarily imply
that judges lack discretion to reach
legislative solutions
to problems, since principles may
not be binding. Moreover,

even if there are binding principles,
Dworkin's

argument that they cannot be accounted for by
rule of recognition is mistaken.

sary to hypothesize

a

Thus,

a

social

it is not neces-

normative rule of recognition that

incorporates moral elements.

Therefore, Dworkin has not

shown that it is necessary to appeal to moral criteria
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in order to identify
what is and what is not
law.

chapter

V

legal NORMATIVITY and the
"INTERNAL ASPECT" OF LAW
In the examination of
the coercive orders theory
in

Chapter ll, we rejected the
position required by that
theory that there is a unitary
psychological will with
respect to every law of a given
legal system.

However,

discussion of the question of
what beliefs, desires, or
other psychological states,
if any, must exist in a
society in order to have a legal
system was
deferred,

in this chapter we will
address this question and clarify

and defend the thesis that the
existence of a legal system depends, at a minimum, upon
there being at least some

members of the group who have favorable
attitudes toward
using a particular rule of recognition
in identifying the
norms that apply to the group. As we
will
see,

text for developing these views is

a

the con-

discussion of Hart's

notion of the "internal point of view"
and the "internal
aspect" of rules.
We have already encountered

these ideas

in the course of describing Hart's basic
theory, but de-

tailed examination was postponed until this chapter.
In the first section below it will be argued
that

Hart's concepts of the internal point of view and
the
internal aspect of rules must be made more sophisticated
in order to allow for the existence of individuals who
132
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regard the legal syste.
as a syste. of „or.s,
hut who »ay
not regard favorably
what is required by
those norms
such an attitude is
characteristic of the legal
professional.
in the second section,
Hart's theory of social
normativity will be developed
further and it will be
argued that Hart correctly
maintained not only that a
system of directives need not
be justifiable on moral
grounds
order to be a system of legal
norms but that it is not
necessary that anyone in the
social group to whom

the system of directives applies
believes that the rule of recognition or any rules validated
by it are justifiable on
moral or any other grounds in
order for the system to be
a system of legal norms.

Z2Le

’’I

nternal Aspect” of Legal

Hart does not clearly differentiate
between his concept of the internal point of view
and his concept of the
internal aspect of rules. ^ A review
of some of his char-

acterizations reveals that these concepts
are used by
Hart to develop a view about what
attitudes and beliefs

must exist in

society that has

a

legal system.

already seen that in Hart's view

a

social rule exists

*

'

some at least

•

question as
as a whole."

a

a

.

.

.

We have

look upon the behaviour in

general standard to be followed by the group
This condition is identified as the inter-

nal aspect of social rules.

Later, Hart states that
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a member of the group
which accepts and uses

[the

rules of conduct of the
group] as guides to
conduct" is
"concerned with the rules"
from the "internal point
of
view. "3 The internal
point of view is "... the
view of
those who do not merely
record and predict behaviour
conforming to rules, but use
the rules as standards
for
the

appraisal of their own and
others' behaviour.""* Thus,
it
appears that the internal aspect
of rules is the property
a rule has by virtue of
being regarded from the internal
point of view by some members
of a group.
turn, regarding a rule from the internal
point of view is a matter of
"accepting" and using the rule as
a guide to conduct.
In the broad overview of Hart's
theory that was presented in Chapter III, the most
important element of the
theory was identified as the thesis
that a society has a
legal system only if certain social
rules— namely secondary rules of recognition, change and
adjudication— exist
in the group.
The role of acceptance in the existence
of
a social rule of recognition
is brought out in

m

the fol-

lowing passage:
First, a person who seriously asserts
the validity of some given rule of law,
say a particular statute, himself makes
use of a rule of recognition which he
accepts as appropriate for identifying
the law.
Secondly, it is the case that
this rule of recognition, in terms of
which he assesses the validity of a
P^^ticular statute, is not only accepted
by him but is the rule of recognition
actually accepted and employed in the
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general operation of
the system.^
fact that a legal
system may exist under
Hart's
theory even though only
the rule of recognition
is "accepted.. and then only
by those in the group
who have coerive power (viz.,
officials) has engendered
criticism.
Beehler, for example,
argues that by not requiring
general
acceptance of a rule by
the members of a society,
Hart
fails to move beyond the
coercive orders theory.®
Beehler 's argument seems
to be as follows,
on the one
hand. Hart is correct
that the typical use of
the statement that an individual
has a particular obligation
is to

remind the^individual that
his case falls under a
particular rule.’ However, a
statement reminding the addressee
that his case falls under
a rule is ordinarily
made only
If the fact that his case
falls under
the rule ..makes

a

difference., to the speaker
and his addressee.

But the
fact that the case falls under
the rule ..makes a difference only if the speaker and
the addressee accept the
rule.
Therefore, Hart.s characterization
of the typical
use of statements about one's
obligations is correct only
if the rules according to which
one has those obligations
are accepted by the speaker and
his addressee.

Beehler 's argument is flawed by the
failure to take
into account the variety of reasons
the fact that one's
case falls under a rule may "make a
difference." The
speaker may be providing information to
the addressee
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about the rules of the
group without regard to
the merits
Of the rule or of the
social practice by virtue
of which
It IS recognized as a
rule.
Or the fact that his
case
falls under a rule may
make a difference to the
addressee
because the addressee wants
to avoid the probable
imposition of sanctions for
noncompliance.
Furthermore, although some degree of acceptance
of a rule is required in
order for the rule to be a
soci^ rule that establishes a
soci^ Obligation, the fact that
the obligor does not accept a rule establishing a
moral obligation is irrelevant
to the existence of the
obligation. Thus, inasmuch as
Beehler seeks to show that the
obligation to obey the law
IS a moral obligation,^ the
requirement of acceptance is
sn obstacle to his goal.

Hart's position, then, is that

condition for the existence of

a

a

minimum necessary

legal system is the ac-

ceptance by officials of a secondary
rule of recognition
as the appropriate means of
identifying rules of conduct

applicable to the group.

Hart gives us virtually no

guidance in understanding what constitutes
accepting
rule.

a

The only elaboration offered is the intimation
of

an account of believing that relies largely
on behavioral

manifestations of psychological phenomena.

That is, as

mentioned in the last chapter in the discussion of
Harris'
argument that Hart equates legal norms with social situations, Hart appears at times to identify acceptance
of a
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rule with certain overt
behaviors such as using
particular expressions to
criticize conduct that
deviates from
the rule and citing the
rule as justification
for conduct
that conforms to it.
Such a behavioristic
analysis does
not give us much insight
into how to distinguish
among
individuals who "accept" a rule
because they prefer what
it calls for on moral or
other grounds, individuals
who
accept" a rule on prudential
grounds, and individuals who
"accept" a rule on professional
grounds for the purpose
of advising a client. All
of these individuals could
"appropriately" use normative
expressions in criticizing
and justifying conduct.
Furthermore, whether an individual who, for whatever reason,
evaluates conduct against
the requirements of a particular
rule, chooses to express
criticism or justification is adventitious
in relation to
the existence of the individual's
attitudes and beliefs.
Moreover, the fact that certain
expressions— namely normative expressions— and not others are
the proper means of
expressing such criticisms and justifications
indicates
that acceptance of the norms in terms of
which evaluations
are made is independent of the expression
of them.^°
,

Aside from this unhelpful flirtation with

a

behav-

ioristic analysis of acceptance of norms. Hart
offers no

illumination of what is involved in accepting

a norm.

Moreover, the basic concepts Hart has proposed are not
^^iii*-i®ntly sophisticated to account for the complexity
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Of social negativity.

Hart contrasts the
internal pornt
external view.
The external point
of view for Hart
IS the vantage point
of the individual who
records regularrtres in behavior
without taking cognizance
of the fact
that the behavior is
rule-governed. That is.
from the
external point of vxew,
there are only group
habits-for
xaraple, the habit
operators of motor vehicles
have of
stopping at intersections
when the light facing
them is
red.
From the external point
of view, this behavior
is
not different in kind
from the migratory patterns
of
birds.
in contrast, the internal
point of view for Hart
is the vantage point
of the individual who
recognizes and
accepts certain standards
of behavior-such as stopping
at
red lights-as appropriate
guides to conduct.
From this
point of view, the regular
behavior is not merely a matter
of habit; it is behavior
that is directed by the standard.
Some of the inadequacies of
this account have been
discussed in Chapter III. First,
even habitual behavior
may be directed in the sense of
being purposeful; recall
the commuter who habitually
rides the 8:15
a.m.

train,

whose behavior is guided and directed
at least in that
he acts so as to realize his
intention of catching the
train, although he is not following
a rule in doing so.
On the other hand, an individual who
is following a rule,
and so has taken Hart's internal
point of view, may be

doing so for the prudential reason of
avoiding the imposi-
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txon Of a sanction for
nonco^pliance, or he .ay
have no
reason at all for following
the rule,
such an indivrdual
might be acting .'for his
own part," without regard
to
whether others also follow
the rule and be indifferent
to
Whether the rule is maintained.
In contrast, an individual who follows a rule
may accept the rule in the
sense
of desiring the occurrence
of the conduct it calls for
and
preferring the occurrence of
that conduct to some alternative.
Both of these rule-followers
seem to view behavior
from the internal point of
view under Hart's analysis,
but
there are differences between
them that must be explained.
In addition. Hart's dichotomy
of internal and external
p ints of view cannot account for the
observer who not
only recognizes the existence
of behavioral regularities
among the members of a group, but
recognizes that the
individuals engaged in that behavior
are following a rule
He can describe and evaluate conduct
relative to that
normative order without having any opinion
about its
merit.
He is, as it were, an outsider with
the internal
point of view.

Neil MacCormick's suggestion that Hart's
theory must
distinguish between what he terms the "volitionally
internal point of view" and the "cognitively
internal point of
view" enables us to deal with the situation of
the out-

sider with the internal point of view.

The cognitively

point of view is the point of view:
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from which conduct is
appreciat^H

|uidLrst^nda?ds:^\^L^^I
In contrast,

the volitionally internal
point of view is

bome aegree and for reasons agent, who in
some^dearee^Ld^/^^'^
good to him has a volitional which sepm
commitment
to observance of a given
pattern
of coL
duct as a standard for
himself or for
other people or for both:
his
includes, but is not included attitude
by,
cognitively internal' attitude. 12 the

MacCormick argues that

a rule

identifies a model or stan

dard pattern of conduct; it
refers to a possible (or at
least conceivable) state of
affairs against which actual
conduct can be compared. However,
if a rule exists in a
group, the possible state of
affairs referred to by the
rule IS not regarded merely as a
hypothetical basis for
comparison, but is regarded by at
least some members of
the group as the basis for
appraisal of actual conduct.
Possible or conceivable patterns of
conduct are regarded
as the basis for appraisal only
if the patterns of conduct are "actually willed, desired,
preferred, approved as
patterns
conduct and its appraisal in our society just
now."
In short, "the relevant appraisal is
appraisal for

conformity or not with some pattern which is
envisaged as
a pattern of preferred conduct."
The thesis underlying the distinction between the

cognitively internal point of view and the volitionally
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internal point of view
accounts
of Hart's social rules.
A rule
either some member of the
group
that the behavior called
for by

for the social character
is a social rule only
if

actually prefers or wills
the rule occur or some

member of the group believes
that some one in the group
prefers or wills that the
behavior in question occur.
The
element of preference is
necessary if the pattern of behavior IS to serve as a model
for purposes of evaluating,
criticizing, and justifying actual
conduct.
It is because
actual conduct does not measure
up to what is or is presumed to be desired that it is
appropriately criticized.
The requirement that some one
in the group actually have
the preference or at least believe
that some one
has the

preference gives the rule its social
basis.
The cognitively internal point of
view depends upon
the volitionally internal point of
view,

as MacCormick

explains
[T]he position of those who, while understanding a norin, and able to frame judgments in terms of it, remain indifferent
or hostile to it, is a position which is
P^^^sitic on that of those who do for
whatever reason will the pattern of
behaviour in question as a standard for
all in their group.
This detached
view of social rules makes sense only
if those who hold it suppose (and it
may be a false supposition) that there
are some who do care about maintenance
of the pattern of conduct in question.
That there can be common patterns of
criticism of conduct or states of affairs depends upon our conceiving that
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patterns

P ople in given circumstances.^^

This view about the
necessity of some actual or
supposed
volitional element-a pro
attitude toward some conceived
pattern of conduct-must be
refined in order to avoid
the
criticism brought against the
coercive orders theory that
it erroneously supposes
that every legal norm
expresses
the actual will of the
sovereign legislator. The
inadequacy of this theory is manifest
in the case of complex
statutes that are law by virtue
of the actions of persons
who may have had no volitions
at all with respect to what
the statutes call for.
Moreover, there are occasions
when lawyers are called upon to
ascertain the legal rights
and duties of individuals involved
in novel circumstances.
It was argued against Dworkin
in the last chapter that in
some cases the proper conclusion
is that there is no

"right answer” to the question of law
presented, and that
If the case were to be litigated,
the judge's decision
would involve interstitial lawmaking.
However, in other
novel cases the existing substantive
rules and the ac-

cepted rules of legal reasoning may enable
the lawyer to
conclude that there exist certain dispositive

legal rules

applicable to the facts.

Nevertheless, by hypothesis,

since the situation is novel, no one has or
had the voli-

tionally internal point of view with respect to the
normative conclusion the lawyer concludes is applicable.
Thus,
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the lawyer is not merely
reporting what is believed
or
actually willed to be the
rule applicable to the
case.
The resolution of these
problems is provided by
Hart's theory of a social
rule of recognition.
At a minimum there must exist or be
assumed to exist a volitionally
internal point of view to a
rule by virtue of which other
rules are identified as being
applicable to the group.
Some member of the group must,
for whatever reason,
actually prefer, desire, or will
that certain rules-for
example, those rules adopted in
accordance with certain
procedures by persons satisfying
certain criteria— be used
as the standards for appraisal
of conduct, or some member
of the group must actually believe
that some member of the
group has those preferences or desires.
So long as this

minimum condition is satisfied, in
conjunction with general conformity to the rules so
identified, a
rule so

validated specifies

a

standard for appraising conduct of

members of the group even though there is
no actual or
imagined volitional element with respect to
what the rule
calls for.
In general,

the volitionally internal point of view

appears to be diffusely directed in a mature municipal
legal system.

On the one hand, as Hart observed, it will

generally only be officials and legal professionals who
are familiar with the secondary rules of recognition in

any detail.

The volitional element or the belief that
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there is a volitional
element regarding those
rules may
exist only among the
members of those subgroups,
if at

all.

Most people, if they have
favorable attitudes toward
secondary rules, direct their
attention to very general
enabling norms.
For example, the average
citizen may
regard favorably a system
providing for legislators who
are elected periodically
by a relatively large
subgroup
of persons regarded as
subject to the
system.

The rules

adopted by these legislators,
perhaps as limited by some
imprecisely conceived constitutional
constraints, are
the rules regarded as valid
by these citizens. Perhaps
an even more common favorable
attitude toward secondary
rules of recognition is that of
regarding as valid whatever is regarded as valid by
persons who satisfy a particular description or whatever is
valid according to
whatever rules of recognition are
regarded as the appro-

priate validation standards by persons
who satisfy that
description.
On the other hand, it seems as

a

matter of fact that

in actual legal systems there is
substantial congruity

between what the legal rules of the system
require and
what members of the group as a whole or
members of
the

subgroups especially affected by particular rules
generally prefer as standards for the society
irrespective

of

what the legal rules require.

may exist only at

a

However, this congruity

very general level or it may exist
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only indirectly in
the sense that
people favorably regard
the goals promoted
by particular rules
and so, other
things being equal,
regard those rules
favorably as well
For example, there
may be direct support
for a particular
taxing statute in virtue nf
of the revenue goals
served by
it (as where the
revenues
t^venues aen»ar-a-i-^^
u
generated by
an excise tax are
used to fund a specific
proiect that is regarded
favorably by members of the
group, or in virtue of
non-revenuerelated social or political
goals (as where wealth
transfer taxation is utilized
to prevent accumulation
of dynastic wealth or where tax
expenditures that involve deviation from a "normal" tax
are employed to subsidize
favored
goals such as home ownership
and industrial development)
The interest of members
of the group in promoting
goals
intended by the legislators
who adopted a particular
rule may account for some
degree of direct support for
particular rules.
For example, federal laws
in the
United States that generally
prohibit commercial banks
from engaging in the securities
industry are broadly
supported by securities businesses
because of the beneficial anti-competitive effects
these laws have on such
businesses.
many instances, private enforcement
for
self-interested reasons is the principal
reason that certain valid rules are actively
maintained even after the
original rationale for the adoption
of the rule no longer
applies

m
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This range of favorable
attitudes towards general
authorizing norms broadly-conceived
or towards particular
rules for self-interested
or disinterested reasons,
or for
no reason other than
patriotic inculcation, is in
sharp
contrast to the cognitive,
non-evaluative internal point
of view.
The latter point of view
is characteristic of
the legal professional who
for the purpose of advising
his client or promoting
his client's goals (generally
for a fee), treats the
legal system as a system of
norms
that specify what his client
ought to do or refrain from,
what his client is permitted
to do, and what other persons are required to do or
refrain from with respect to
his client's affairs.
The lawyer may regard the legal
system in this way although he
regards unfavorably what
the legal system provides.
Kelsen recognized that the
legal professional might treat the
law as normative and
yet not regard it favorably on any
grounds.
First,

Kelsen states:
The fact that the basic norm of a positive legal order may but ne ed not be presupposed means:
the relevant interhuman
relationships may be, but need not be,
interpreted as 'normative,
that is, as
obligations, authorizations, rights, etc.
constituted by objectively valid norms.
It means further:
they can be interpreted without such presupposition (i.e.,
without the basic norm) as power relations (i.e., relations between commanding and obeying or disobeying human
beings) --in other words, they can be
interpreted sociologically, not juristically 18
'

.
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This distinction between
regarding the system
sociologically and presupposing
the basic norm is a
version of
the distinction between
the external point of
view and
Maccormick's volitionally
internal point of view.
However, in a footnote,
Kelsen acknowledges that
it is posto regard the legal
system as a system of norms
without approving of it.
In particular, he argues
that
the anarchist, who "emotionally
rejects the law

as a coer-

cive order," nevertheless
as "a professor of law,
could
describe positive law as a system
of valid norms, without
having to approve of this law."
short, the anarchist
law professor takes the
cognitively internal point of
view.

m

Because lawyers are professionally
concerned with the
legal system, are generally relatively
better informed
about the content and scope of the
enabling and obligation
norms of the system, and must view
the legal system as a
system of valid, even if not desirable,
norms in order to
function as legal advisors and advocates,
they are important in maintaining the legal order,
even if they do not
approve of the legal order they are dealing
with.
It is

interesting to observe that the jurisprudential
significance of the legal profession has not always
been appreciated by legal institutions.
For example, the reasoning of
Justice Powell in In re Griffiths invalidating

a

Connecti-

cut law prohibiting aliens from admission to the
practice
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Of law IS insensitive
to the peculiarities
of the lawyer’s
posrtion.
in general, alienage
and certain other characteristics such as race are
considered to be "suspect
classifications" under the Equal
Protection Clause of the
united States Constitution,
so that a state law that
discriminates on the basis of such
classifications must withstand "strict scrutiny" under
which the State must demonstrate that the use of the
classification is necessary
in

order to advance or protect
a substantial, legitimate
governmental interest.
contrast, differential treatment based on certain other
characteristics, such as sex,
must withstand "intermediate
scrutiny." Finally, most
ciassificatory criteria need pass only
a weak "rational
relationship" test.
In the domain of regulation of
labor
the rational relationship test
has been applied under
Equal Protection Clause examination
of laws limiting
access to public employment by aliens
on the ground that
a sovereign state has the inherent
power and right to preserve its conception of political
community by permitting
only those individuals who are citizens
to hold elective
or non-elective positions that involve
direct participa-

m

tion in the "formulation, execution, or
review of broad
public policy."^® Under the rational relationship
test
xaws excluding aliens from employment as state
police
21
f-f
otlicers
and as public elementary and secondary school

teachers 22 have withstood Equal Protection Clause chal-
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lenges
In contrast,

ir^re Griffiths applied
Equal Protection strict scrutiny and
invalidated a Connecticut
statute
disqualifying aliens from
admission to the bar. The
court
refused to apply the weaker
rational relationship test
that had been applied in
examining other laws that excluded aliens from employment
in jobs having "governmental
functions."
his opinion for the court
Justice Powell
made the following remarks
about the role of legal professionals in a legal system:

m

Lawyers do indeed occupy
professional
positions of responsibility and
ence that impose on them duties influcorrelatheir vital right of access to
he courts.
Moreover, by virtue of
professional aptitudes and natural their
interests, lawyers have been leaders
in government throughout the history of
our
country.
Yet, they are not officials of
government by virtue of being lawyers.
Nor does the status of holding a
license
to practice law place one so
close to
the core of the political process
as to
make him a formulator of government
policy .23

From a philosophical point of view,
in re Griffiths
reaches a sound conclusion for the wrong
reason.
Although
it is probably too strong to describe
lawyers qua lawyers
as formulators of government policy,

the point made above

about the importance of lawyers in maintaining
the legal
order raises the concerns that led to the
application of
a

weaker standard of review to laws discriminating against

aliens in public employment.

That is, the legal profes-
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-on

.3 sufficiently close
to the functioning
of govern-

ment to raise the
question of the threat,
if any. its
practitioners pose to the
political co^nunity.
Thus

-ast

at

in the light of
earlier cases healing
„ith the'
right of aliens to hold
public offices and
positions

involving participation
in public policy-making
or execution, IrLr^Griffi^
i^ „^ong in applying
the weaker
rational relationship
criterion,
on the other hand, in
Irght of the internal
attitude that is characteristic
of
the legal professional
regardless of his personal
political preferences. In re
Griffith.s reaches the
correct conclusion about admitting
aliens to the practice of
law.
short, neither alienage
nor anarchism is incompatible
with
the lawyer's role.

m

Motwithstanding the importance of
the lawyer in reinforcing and maintaining the
legal order by advising his
client of the relevant legal
rules,

secondary in that the lawyers

's

this role is always

cognitively internal point

of view presupposes a volitionally
internal point of view
to the rules of recognition
the lawyer uses in identifying
particular rules of conduct as legal
rules of the system.
Unless there is assumed to be or
unless there actually is
somewhere in the group a favorable
attitude towards
iden-

tifying applicable rules by using
particular rules of
recognition, then there is no occasion
for the lawyer's
point of view. Whatever may be the case
with respect to
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moral obligations, at
least in the case of
social obligatrons it seems correct
that no conduct is
obligatory unless
It is assumed that
someone regards that conduct
as preferable, appropriate, or
right, and in the case
of legal

obligations, unless someone
regards it to be preferable,
appropriate, or right to use
a particular means of
identifying rules in accordance
with which the rule requiring
the conduct in question
is valid.
Social Normat ivity and Justified
Normati

v-,'

r,.

The contribution that the
distinction between the
cognitively internal point of view
and the volitionally
internal point of view towards
rules makes to the social
rule theory of law is enhanced
by focusing on the distinction between what Raz has called
"justified normativity" and "social normativity
Raz maintains that
according to the conception of law
characteristically
.

endorsed by natural law theorists, the
normativity of law
is justified normativity
:

According to [this] view legal standards
of behaviour are norms only if and in so
far as they are justified.
They may be
justified by some objective and universally valid reasons. They may be intuitively perceived as binding or they may
be accepted as justified by personal commitment.
He goes on to state that "theorists using the
concepts of

justified normativity claim that

a

legal system can be
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regarded as normative only
by people considering
it as
iust and endorsing its norms
by accepting them as
part of
thGiiT own moiTdl views.
on the other hand, Raz
maintarns that according to
the conception of law
usually endorsed by positivists,
and
explained and defended most
successfully by Hart in The
Co ncept of Law the
normativity of law is social
norma tivity
,

:

On [this] view standards of
can be considered as norms behaviour
regardless of
their merit
They are social norms in
they are socially upheld as
binding standards and in so far
society involved exerts pressure as the
on
people to whom the standards apply
^ ^ to
conform to them.
Raz states that "theorists
using the concepts of social

normativity maintain that everyone
should regard legal
systems as normative regardless of
his judgment about
their merits."
An important consequence of the
social normativity
conception of law, as Raz points out, is
that because the
normativity of law is based on social facts
rather than
moral considerations, there may be a valid
law that one
is not morally obligated to obey
unless the relevant

social facts necessarily have moral significance.

In con-

trast, Raz argues that under the justified
normativity

conception,

"the concepts of the normativity of the law

and of the obligation to obey it are analytically
tied
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together..

Thus,

according to this vrew.
it the law is
valid, then one ought,
morally, to obey it.

Although these characterizations
of social normativity and justified
normativity are suggestive,
Raz has
not differentiated between
the justified normativity
theory of law and a version
of the social normativity
theory according to which
a group of persons has
a legal
system only if at least some
of its members believe
that
certain rules of recognition
are morally justified.
Raz

maintains that under the justified
normativity conception
of law a particular standard
of conduct is a valid rule
of law only if it actually is
morally
justified.

This

"natural law" thesis must be
supplemented with an explanation of what it means for a
standard of conduct to be

morally justified and of what other
conditions, if any,
a standard of conduct must
satisfy in order to
be

a

law.

For example, are all requirements
of justice conceived to
be legal requirements, or are some
moral requirements
acknowledged not to be legal requirements?
Further, is

standard of conduct a valid law only if it
states a
requirement of justice, or is the requirement
that a valid
law be morally justified satisfied as long
a

as the stan-

dard of conduct is consistent with the
requirements of
justice,

so that a standard of conduct that is morally

neutral may nevertheless state a valid legal
obligation?
the latter case, the fact that one's case is covered
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by a valid law does not
answer the question of
one's
obligation to obey the law.
Perhaps, then, to ensure
that
the theory does answer
affirmatively the question of
whether one is morally obligated
to obey the law, the
theory
holds that a standard of
conduct is a valid legal
standard
only if What it calls for
is consistent with morality
and
If It was adopted in
accordance with a just social
practice by virtue of which
participants in the practice or
beneficiaries of the practice become
morally obligated to
Obey otherwise .morally-neutral
directives. These questions deal with the nature and
scope of the natural law
theorist's commitment to the
conception of justified normativity.
In addition, the natural law
theorist's concep
tion of law will be affected by
his metaethical theory of
justified normativity.
For example, to use the examples
suggested by Raz in his description of
justified normativity, having justified normativity
may be thought to be
a matter of satisfying some
objective and universally
valid reasons, or of being the object
of moral intuition,
or of being the object of "personal
commitment." Kelsen's
metaethical theory, to take another example,
appears to be

noncognitivistic and relativistic, so that having
justified normativity is a matter of being the object
of

individual preferences, and statements about one's
obligations are analyzed as expressions of those preferences.
The justified normativity conception of law, accord-
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to which a standard
of conduct is a valid
law only if

It conforms to,

is consistent with,

and is adopted pursuant to, the requirements
of morality, however
analyzed
Must not be confused with
the thesis that a group
of persons has a legal system
only if at least some
members of
the group regard standards
of conduct identified by
means
particular rules of recognition
as having justified
no:
mativity.
According to the latter theory,
the existence
Of a legal system in which
those standards are valid
laws
depends upon the existence of
certain social facts rather
than upon those standards
actually having justified normativity.
However, Raz's statement that
according to the
theory of justified normativity
"a legal system can be
regarded as normative only by people
considering it as
just and endorsing its norms by
accepting them as part
of their own moral views" blurs
the distinction between
the justified normativity theory
and a social normativity
theory that maintains that the
existence of certain beliefs about the justified normativity
of law is necessary
for the existence of law.
The natural law theorist holds
that a standard is a law only if it
is just; whether people consider the standard to be just and
endorse it by

accepting it as part of their own moral views
is relevant
to the natural law theorist only if
his theory of morality

analyzes moral justification in terms of what
people believe to be morally required or in terms of what
people
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are ''personally committed"
to.

Raz's quarry was Kelsen's
theory, and his failure
to make the distincton
suggested here reflects Kelsen's
theory.
Raz argues that Kelsen has
a justified normativity conception of law because
Kelsen maintains that
If a norm is valid, then it
is binding, so that one
ought
morally to behave as specified by
the norm.^^ However,
Kelsen's moral relativism, according
to which moral judgments are matters of personal
preference, leads him to the
view that law is regarded as normative,
that is, morally
obligatory, only by persons who have
the appropriate personal preferences.
Furthermore, Kelsen rejects traditional natural law conceptions for failing
to recognize
that law IS a "social technique" for
controlling behavior
and that the same social technique is used
when a legis-

lator enacts a standard of behavior that is
unjust as

when he enacts
In effect,

standard of behavior that is just.^^

a

Kelsen appears to endorse

theory according to which

a

group has

a

a

social rule

legal system only

if there aie favorable attitudes among members of the

group toward using certain rules of recognition to idenf y the standards of

group.

In short,

behavior that are applicable to the

people must regard the system as a sys-

tem of norms or directives that ought to be obeyed.

The

concept of justified normativity becomes important because
of Kelsen's commitment to the theory of the unity of nor-
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mative systems.

The implication of this theory
for

Kelsen's theory of law is that the
existence of a legal
system depends upon there being
people who regard certain
socially-derived standards as morally
justified.
That
IS, according to the theory of
the unity of normative systems,

all standards of conduct regarded
by an individual

as valid and binding are regarded
as consistent members of
a

unified system of norms.

Thus,

if an individual regards

as valid a particular standard of
conduct adopted in accor

dance with a particular social practice,
then he regards
that standard as justified from the moral
point of view.

Consequently, if the existence of beliefs about
the validity and bindingness of such standards is
required in order
for a legal system to exist,

then there is

a

legal system

only if its rules are regarded as morally justified.
Kelsen's argument for the theory of the unity of nor-

mative systems is based on the thesis that valid norms
cannot conflict.
(.chapter,

This thesis was discussed in the last

when the criticism that Hart's theory erroneously

permits the possibility of inconsistent norms was examined
and rejected.

The argument considered at that juncture

was von Wright's argument that valid norms necessarily
are jointly realizable because the normative relationship

exists only if the subjects of a prescription can do or

forbear those things the issuer of the prescription wants
to make them do or forbear.

Thus,

if two norms are not
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jointly realizable then at least
one of them is not a
valid prescription because the
norm subject cannot be
made to do what both norms require.
This argument is
flawed by the fact that it incorrectly
assumes that prescribing some act is equivalent to
making the norm subject
comply.
Kelsen's argument for the thesis that
valid norms
cannot conflict is slightly different.
Raz summarizes
Kelsen's argument as follows:
[I]t makes no sense to say that
[a] normative system contains conflicting norms.
It IS of the essence of the concept
of a
normative system that it guides behaviour; it guides the behaviour of those
persons who adopt the relevant point of
view.
But if conflicting norms are
assumed to be valid from one point of
view, then they do not guide behaviour
for they point in opposing directions
at the same time.
Therefore, all the
norms held valid from one point of view
necessarily form one consistent system.

This argument differs from von Wright's in that what
is

supposed to be impossible is being guided in "opposing
directions" rather than being ordered to go in opposing
directions.

However, an analogous error seems to be

involved; namely, the error of maintaining that being

directed implies following the directions.

The fact that

an individual who is being guided in different directions

cannot follow both directions does not imply that he is
not being directed or guided.

In this respect the addres-

see of conflicting directives is unlike the person to whom
a

statement of the form "P and not-P" is addressed, where
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p IS a sentence in
indicative form.

m

the latter case,

the statement purports to
say something about the
actual
state of things in the world,
but fails to do so since
the state of affairs it refers
to is not logically possible.
In the former case, on the
other hand, the addressee IS being told what ought
to be the case, rather than
what IS the case. The statement
that some non-actual
state of affairs ought to be the
case is not vacuous,
even though the state of affairs
in question is logically
impossible

Hart’s theory is based on a social
normativity conception of law and, in contrast to Kelsen’s
theory does
not bring in a metaethical theory that
blurs the justified
normativity/social normativity distinction. However,
it

is less clear whether Hart believes that
the existence of
a legal

system in a group depends upon certain of its

members, and especially the officials who control
the
use of coercive power, believing that the rules
of con-

duct of the system or at least the secondary rules of

recognition of the system are morally justified.

We have

already considered Hart's characterization of social
rules,

according to which

a

pattern of behavior is the

subject of a social rule only if there is

a

"critical

reflective attitude" toward using that pattern as

a stan-

dard, which is displayed in criticisms of deviations and

demands for conformity expressed in "the normative ter-
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minologyof -ought,' -must,and -should,- -right,and
wrong.--

Furthermore, it may be
recalled that Hart
argues that social rules
are rules of obligation
only if,
inter
they are regarded as
important enough to
back up with serious and
insistent demands for conformity
and are believed to be
necessary to the maintenance
of
social life or some highly-prized
feature of it.32
the last chapter, Hill's
argument that a law possessing
these characteristics gives
rise to a prima facie moral
Obl-gation, whereas a law that
is merely valid under a
secondary rules does not, was
rejected.
It seems clear
that the fact that some rule or
system of rules

^

is re-

garded as necessary to maintaining
a social order is insufficient to yield even prima facie
moral obligation.
The implausibility of this view
is amply illustrated by
many examples of conventional norms
that fail to meet even
noncontroversial moral standards. The norms
of societies
that have accepted rules requiring
or condoning slavery,
racial discrimination, genocide, and
torture are obvious
examples
However, the question here is whether, granting
that
Hart's thesis namely, that the existence of
a system of

conventional obligation norms depends upon certain
people

regarding certain patterns of behavior as standards
that
are necessary to the maintenance of social
order--does not

entail that such a system actually is morally justified.
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it nevertheless does
follow that those persons
who regard

those patterns of behavior
as standards believe
those
standards are morally justified.
other words, is it
possible to believe that some
pattern ought to be main3,nd to ijeiieve
boliovp that mnai-i-fmaintaining it is necessary
to the preservation of
social life or some important
feature of It, but not to
believe that it is morally
justified?
In the sections of llie
Concept of r.;.w where the
analysis of social rules and
of social rules of obligation are presented it is not
foreclosed that Hart maintains that acceptance on morals
grounds is required. However, elsewhere he rejects
categorically any such requirement that the system be regarded
as morally justified.
For example, he maintains not only
that most members of
a society may be coerced by
laws that they do not regard
as morally acceptable, but that
even those who -'accept
the system voluntarily" may not
believe that they are
morally required to do so.
Moreover, according to Hart,

m

•

there is indeed no reason why those who
accept the authority of the system should not examine their
conscience
and decide that, morally, they ought not
to accept it,

yet for a variety of reasons continue to do
so."^^

Hart

suggests that among the reasons a conventional system
of
norms may be accepted are "calculations of long-term
interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional attitude; or the mere wish
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to do as others do.'.^S

the

Ust

Of alternative "reasons"
offered by Hart appears
to be a recrtation
of possible
y^r uncoerced acceptance of a legal system,
and that it is possible
that what
people accept as a consequence
of these "reasons"
or

causes is the moral
bindingness of the legal
system.
Nevertheless, Soper acknowledges
that Hart-s statement
that an individual may
accept the system but
believe it
to be morally unacceptable
indicates that the theory
advanced by Hart, at least in
the passage
in ^estion,

admits the possibility of
a group with a legal
system
that no members of the group
believe to be morally jus-

Although Hart rejects the idea
that

a

group has a

legal system only if certain
of its members believe the
system is morally justified,
Soper proposes such a theory
as an alternative to Hart's
theory.
He notes that the
basic thesis is that a legal system
exists only if the
"fundamental, constitutional designthe rule of recogni-

tion— is acceptable.

That is, some members of the

group must believe that the secondary
rules of recognition
are morally justified.
By requiring only that the rules
of recognition are believed to be
morally justified, Soper
avoids the obvious complaint that
particular laws or judicial decisions may be believed to be
unjust even though
they are the product of a system that is
considered by
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Its members to be morally
justifiable.

Conceivably, an

individual may believe that the
system as a whole is
morally the best that can be
realized and that it ought
to be maintained despite
occasional unjust results.
For
example, a judge who applies
what he believes to be an
unjust law may believe that the
value of legality- that
IS, of decision in accordance
with law— outweighs the
value of avoidance of individual
unjust results because
he believes that the system
generally is just and better
than any available alternatives,
and that maintenance of
the system depends upon realization
of the value of
legality.

Although Soper avoids this complaint, he
offers very
little reason for adopting his proposal.
The only con-

sideration adduced by him is the following:
[The theory] requires officials to claim
and believe in the justice of the system s basic rules, which then (and only
then) converts the system into a 'legal
system,
however unjustified in fact
such claims may be thought to be.
This
demand that the officials pay heed to
the moral acceptability of the system
they enforce may well furnish some small
theoretical, and no small practical,
limitations on the ability of an official to issue commands and at the same
time to appeal to respect for 'the law'
in urging obedience to those commands.
'

In effect,

Soper is claiming that if officials regard the

legal system as morally justified, then there will be some

constraints on their decisions.

The only link that this
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consideration appears to have
to the question of
the existence of a legal system
is that of efficacy
and stability.
That is, if the legal system
must be accepted by officials
as morally justifiable,
then conceivably the norms
re-

garded as legal norms will
be less arbitrary than they
might otherwise have been,
with the result that the per
sons subject to the system
will accept it more readily.
This link can be questioned,
since the moral beliefs of
the persons who control
coercive power in a group may
appear to be as arbitrary as the
rules of a system that
no one believes to be morally
justified.
Any doubts about
this observation should be
considered in the light of such
phenomena as the mass murder/suicide
at Jonestown, Guyana
by the followers of the Reverend Jim
Jones.
However, even
if the constraint of believed-in
moral justifiability

makes a system of norms more efficacious,
it does not entail that a system not believed to be
morally justified
is not a legal system.
All that follows is that such a
system is less effective and stable.
We are still left with the question of
whether some

members of the group must believe that the patterns
of

behavior that are preferred as standards for the
group
are morally justified.

There does not seem to be any way

to answer this question except to note that there
does

not seem to be any absurdity in supposing that the rules
of recognition regarded as appropriate for identifying the
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applicable norms are preferred
or accepted without any
regard to moral considerations.
For
example, it seems

perfectly possible for members
of

a group to

accept as

the appropriate means of
identifying rules applicable
to
the group a rule of recognition
selected entirely for the
purpose of conducting an experiment.

CHAPTER

V

I

THE FUNCTION AND CONTENT
OF LAW
In the preceding chapters,
Hart's social rule theory

of law has been expounded,
defended in certain respects,
and clarified or criticized
in other respects.
According
to the social rule theory,
a group of persons has
a legal
system if and only if (i) there
exist in the group certain
secondary rules, including in
particular secondary rules
of recognition, according to
which other rules, by virtue
of possessing certain characteristics
specified
in the

rules of recognition, are regarded
as rules that are
applicable to the members of the group
and (ii) the rules

recognized under the secondary rules as
applicable to the
members of the group are generally adhered
to by those to
whom they apply. A rule exists in a given
group only if
certain beliefs about the rule exist in that
group; in

particular,

a

rule of conduct exists in a group only if

some members of the group either actually
regard the form
of behavior called for by the rule as a standard
in terms

of which the behavior of members of the group
is appropri-

ately evaluated or, at a minimum, believe that the form
of

behavior is regarded as such by other members of the group.
In the limiting case,
a

no member of the group actually has

volitionally internal point of view" toward treating
166
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the subject matter of
the rule as a standard,
although
some members of the group
beli^ that that point of vrew
does exist in the group.
For practical purposes,
however
we can assume that if
a social rule exists,
some members
of the group actually
accept it as establishing
a standard.
Thus, a secondary rule of
recognition exists in a
group only if the criteria
specified in the rule are
regarded by some members of
the group as standards to
be
used for the purpose of
identifying rules that are applicable to the group.
short, the existence of a
secondary rule of recognition in a
group depends upon the
existence of favorable attitudes
among its members towards
using the criteria specified in
the rule as the basis for

m

Identifying valid rules that apply
to the group.
Hart maintains that there can be
a legal system even
If the only persons who accept
secondary rules of recognition are "officials" and persons who
are professionally
interested in the system of valid rules
of the group.
All
other members of the group need only obey
the valid rules.
As we have seen in the discussion of
Hart's criticisms of
the coercive orders theory, it is not
necessary to suppose
that those who do not accept the rules of
recognition
that

are accepted by officials but who do comply
with the re-

quirements of the rules that are valid under the rules
of
recognition, are merely acting habitually

.

Rather, they

may recognize the valid rules as well as the secondary
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rules as directives that
are applicable to the
group, even
though they do not regard
those rules favorably.
Hart's
principal criticisms of the
coercive orders theory are
based on his claim that the
theory must hypothesize
a

habit of obedience, which
he correctly shows to be
an
inadequate basis for explaining
certain aspects of a legal
system.
Although we have disagreed with
Hart's claim that
the coercive orders theory
must rely on the concept of
habitual obedience, we have
nevertheless rejected the
theory because it hypothesizes
a unitary psychological
will for every law. This defect
is remedied in Hart's
theory by virtue of the fact that
favorable attitudes need
exist only with respect to secondary
rules rather
than for

every rule validated by the secondary
rules.
In the last chapter it was
argued that even those

persons who do accept the secondary
rules of the legal
system need not believe that particular

rules or the sys-

tem of rules in general are morally
justified.

According

to the theory it is possible that
there is one individual

in the group, Rex,

for example, who regards favorably the

rule that (i) any directive endorsed by
Rex or by Rex's
lineal descendants and (ii) any directive
implied by such

directives and (iii) any order issued pursuant to
such
directives by

a

trier of fact appointed by Rex or his

lineal descendants is
a

particular group.

a

valid rule or order applicable to

The members of that group generally
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adhere to these rules
an. orders, an.
treat the™ as .irecapplicable to their
behavior, although none
Of the™ regards
favorably the authorizing
rule or the
rules or orders
authorized thereunder.
Moreover. Rex ™ay
be a contemplative
despot who believes that
such a system
rs morally bankrupt.
Nevertheless, Rex enjoys
making the
rules and has not
translated his moral
judgment about the
system's lack of merit
into an abdication of
rule-making
authority.
According to the theory,
this group of persons
has a legal system
despite its narrow base
of acceptance.
As we have seen, various
critics of Hart's theory
have attempted to introduce
substantive considerations of
various kinds into this
starkly positivistic theory.
For
example, some theories about
the formal characteristics

of a legal system, such as
the thesis that a legal
system
rs a system of non-contradictory
norms, imply substantive
constraints on the content of law,
this chapter we
will examine another approach
to the issue of limitations
on the content of law that
are implied by essential

m

fea-

tures of a legal system.

In particular,

the thesis that

a legal system has an essential
purpose or function and

tnat this purpose or function is
realized only if the
content of law is limited in specified
ways will be discussed.
Hart makes a half-hearted effort at
developing
a theory about the function
of law in The Concept of Law
T. M. Benditt, following
Hart and developing a theory

.
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along Hartian lines, makes
a more daring effort
in Law as
RlLl e and Princip e
Questions will be raised
about the
adeguacy and moral significance
of both Hart's "minimalnatural law theory and
Benditt's functional theory
l

.

.

of law.
Before examining the details
of the treatment of this
thesis by Hart and Benditt
it should be noted that
the
broad questions about whether
there is a particular essential purpose that all legal
systems have and whether such
a purpose implies
substantive moral constraint on
the
content of a legal system are
distinct from the narrower
questions asked on the one hand by
the lawyer about the
purpose of a particular legal norm
and asked on the other
hand by the legal historian or
sociologist about particular political and economic
functions that different legal
systems serve or that a single legal
system serves
at

different times.
The lawyer may be concerned about the
purpose of a

particular law for several different reasons.

The juris-

prudential significance of the answer to the
question
about the purpose of a law varies depending
upon the
nature of the concern and on certain contingent
features
of a legal system.
For example, the question about the

purpose of

a

law or body of law may be broached largely

for heuristic reasons.

Knowledge of the broad, generally-

acknowledged purposes of particular laws helps the lawyer
identify potentially applicable legal norms.

Thus,

know-
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ledge that the broad
purposes of certain
provisions of the
law Of corporations are
to promote shareholder
democracy
and informed investment
decision-making might lead the
legal advisor of a corporation
that proposes to engage
in some transaction to
consider whether the
transaction
Should be disclosed to the
investment community or submitted to shareholder approval.

Although certain purposes may
be generally acknowledged to underlie a particular
law,

cation of that law in

a

the fact that appli-

particular case is inconsistent

with or not in furtherance
of that purpose is not a
reason
for not applying the law in
that case unless the rules of
recognition so provide.
if the fact that acknowledged
purposes are not furthered by a
particular application of
the law were recognized as a
ground for not applying the
law, then purposes would be
not merely heuristic devices
for Identifying potential legal
problems, but elements of
the secondary rules of recognition.
Within a single legal
system the role of purposes may vary in
different areas of
law.

For example, it has been held by the
United States
Supreme Court as a matter of federal law
that the interest
an employee has in a compulsory pension
plan is not a

security subject to the requirement of registration
with
the Securities and Exchange Commission.^

In large part,

this holding is based on the fact that a primary
purpose

of the registration requirement under the federal
Secur-
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ities Act Of 1933 xs to
ensure that information
is disclosed to potential investors
in an enterprise.
This
purpose is not furthered in
the case of compulsory
pension plans because the
employee obtains his interest
in
the plan simply by virtue
of deciding to work for
the
employer who maintains the
plan.
general, the characteristics of the employer's
pension plan are not significant factors in the employee's
decision to accept
employment.
Thus, the employee's decision
to accept employment is not an investment
decision, so that disclosure
of information about the
enterprise (i.e., the pension
plan), such as the investment
portfolio and policies of
the pension plan, would not promote
the purposes underlying the disclosure requirement.
On the other hand, in
the area of taxation, statutes and
rules frequently are
applied without regard to acknowleged
underlying purposes.
For example, exemptions from taxes on
retail sales are

m

generally provided with respect to sales of
tangible personal property used or consumed in manufacturing
or
pro-

cessing tangible personal property for sale.^

The purpose

of such exemptions is to prevent a tax intended
to be

imposed on ultimate consumers from being

a

"turnover tax"

that applies to each transfer of ownership of an
item for

value or to each stage of
sale to a consumer

.

a

productive process prior to

Notwithstanding general acceptance

of this purpose, courts in many jurisdictions construe
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such exemptions so
narrowly as to defeat
the purpose.
Thus, the supreme Court
of Virginia held that
sales of
feed to commercial
breeders of laboratory
animals are not
exempt because the process
of breeding and raising
animals
for sale is not
manufacturing or processing
material into
.terns for sale.^
whatever one's answer to the
guestion of
Whether the terms "processing"
and "manufacturing" encompass breeding and raising
animals, it seems clear
that if
the purpose of the exemption
figured in the rules of
recognition of the jurisdiction
in this area of law, then
the exemption would apply.
The legal historian or
sociologist, to a greater
extent than the lawyer, seeks
to identify political or
economic purposes or functions
served by particular legal
systems that explain the content
of a legal system at a

particular time and modifications
of the law from time to
time.
For example, Roscoe Pound has
proposed what is
in

effect an explanatory account of
the development of modern
Western legal systems based on certain
functions of law.
In the first stage, which he
calls ''the stage of primitive law," "... law exists in order
to keep the peace in
a given society; to keep the
peace at all events
and at

any price.

The goal or purpose of the legal system is

to satisfy the desire for security.

hypothesis, such

a

As an explanatory

function might account for those as-

pects of the law of crimes and the law of torts
that are
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concerned with limiting the
use of violence and
force
against persons
in Pound's second stage,

law is

means of preserving
social and economic status
quo.
The function of a legal
system is to maintain "the
general security mediately
through the security of social
institutions."® Legal
rules in many areas of law
may be understood as the
product of efforts to satisfy
this function.
For example,
in Anglo-American law, rules
of property deal with the
rights and duties of individuals
with respect to concrete
things and abstract objects
such as ideas. Many of these
rules manifest "status" relationships
such as landlordtenant, debtor-creditor, or
trustee-beneficiary relationships.
Often these relationships may not
be varied by
mutual agreement of the persons
bearing the relationship
to one another, so that the
individuals have statuses
defined by rigid, highly-articulated
rules.
A particular
status may both protect and constrain
its occupants.
By
limiting the power of others who have
greater resources
and could extract concessions in unregulated
interaction,
a

a

a

status position protects its occupant; by
preventing

the occupant from pursuing and realizing
self-initiated

goals outside of the status, a status position
constrains
its occupant.
In contrast to the second stage,

in Pound

s

the function of law

third stage is to make possible "the maximum of
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individual free self-assertion.

^
Such a function might
be hypothesized to
explain much of Anglo-American
contract
law and commercial law.
That is, if the function
of the
legal system is to promote
the ability of each
individual
to maximize the satisfaction
of his own wants consistent
with an equal ability of
others to maximize the
satisfaction of their desires, then
it may be expected that
the
legal system will contain
rules that facilitate freely
bargained-for transfers of rights
to use resources and
obtain services.
theory, by enabling individuals
to
enter into bargained-for,
enforceable private agreements,
natural resources, manufactured
goods, and labor will be
utilized by those persons who place
the highest value on
such goods and services.
addition to rules providing
for the enforceability of such
private arrangements,
there may be rules protecting the
integrity of the bargaining process, such as prohibitions
of fraud and mis-

m

m

representation.

However,

in keeping with the function of

promoting self-assertion and satisfaction
of individual
v/ants by facilitating bargained-for
transfers, the protection against fraud may be limited in order
not to
increase

transaction costs.

For example, the "holder in due

course" doctrine in commercial law has the effect
of cutting off certain defenses that the maker of

instrument (such as
Thus,

a

a

negotiable

bank check) has against the payee.

if the maker draws a check to the order of a seller
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in payment for goods
the characteristics
of which the seller has misrepresented,
the buyer has a defense
against
the seller's enforcing
the buyer's obligations
on the
check.
But if the seller has
endorsed the check to an

individual who gives value
and takes the check in
"good
faith" in ignorance of the
maker's defense against the
seller, then he may become
a holder in due course
who can
enforce the maker's obligations.
The effect of this rule
IS to facilitate commercial
transactions by minimizing
transaction costs: the holder in
due course, who has a
pure heart and an empty head,
can transact business without having to inquire into
whether there was a fraudulent
transaction upstream from him with
which he had no connection.
The point of these examples is
to illustrate how
various aspects of a legal system
which may appear to
reflect incompatible underlying
concerns, can be explained
by a particular function that a
particular legal system
may serve. Thus, although cutting
off the defenses of
the defrauded buyer appears to be
inconsistent with promoting the integrity of the bargaining
process by prohibiting fraudulent dealings, both rules
serve the broader
purpose of facilitating commercial transactions
in order
to enable people to achieve maximum
self-realization.
In Pound's fourth stage,

the function of law is still

conceived to be that of promoting the satisfaction of
individual wants, but the approach is not that of facilitat-
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self-assertion and rndividual
arrangments reached
through bargaining in the
market-place, but that of instituting regulatory structures
that supplant the marketplace in order to alter the
bargaining power of individuals or to redistribute
wealth by more direct

intervention.
For example, a private
contractual arrangement might
be unenforceable not because it was not
freely bargained- for
without fraud but because it is
"unconscionable."^ The
relationship between employer and
employee might be subject to regulations that prohibit
an employer from
refusing to deal with an association
of employees (a
union) even though there are
potential employees with
whom the employer could deal on
terms more suitable to
the employer.

The hypothesis that the function of
law is to provide
for the satisfaction of wants per
se rather than to provide
for maximum mutual self-assertion
leads Pound to the following conception of a legal system:
[L]aw [is] a social institution to satisfy social wants
the claims and demands
and expectations involved in the existence of civilized society
by giving
effect to as much as we may with the
least sacrifice, so far as such wants
may be satisfied or such claims given
effect by an ordering of human conduct
through politically organized society.

—

—

Pound maintains
L-he

a

developmental theory according to which

four stages of law that he identifies manifest:
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dSirfr??,-

recognizing and
wants or claims or

e^rJfng-nf
£?ete^

aif eftec^?!.:

tence--in short, a continually
ficacious social engineering.il more efThis diachronic hypothesis
is questionable in view
of the
presence in a particular legal
system at any given time
of some or all of the kinds
of law associated with Pound's
four stages.
That is. Pound's developmental
hypothesis
IS empirically disproven
by the fact that the Western

legal systems he is describing
historically have contained
at all times some elements of
tort and criminal law,
status relationships as embodied
in property and family
law, contract law, and social
welfare legislation. .Admittedly, certain of these kinds
of law are more predominant
than others from time to time.
However, there is no evidence that there is a unidirectional,
historically determined progression from the predominance
of laws characteristic of Pound's stage one to the
predominance of laws

characteristic of Pound's stage four.

Rather, there

appear to be shifts in emphasis from time to
time which
reflect changes in the political ideologies that
underlie
the functions which are furthered by these
different
kinds of law.

The social activist who prefers a minimal

state in which individuals are provided with structures
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for ordering their own
affairs through enforceable
bargains struck among themselves
or the Iranian religious
leaders who prefer a society
with well-defined social
statuses may well strive for
the "development" of
society
beyond the welfare state
envisioned by Pound's "more
efficacious social engineering.''

Regardless of whether Pound’s
theory accounts for the
historical development of Western
legal systems in general
or of Anglo-American legal
systems in particular, and regardless of whether the hypothesized
functions of law provide a satisfactory explanation
of particular kinds of
laws, the fundamental point for
present purposes is that
the theory postulates functions
to explain certain general
features of particular legal systems.
The theory does not
maintain that a system of rules that
fails to satisfy any
of these functions is not a legal
system.
Nor
does the

theory suggest in some other way that
having or being
capable of having one or more of the
postulated functions
IS an essential characteristic of
a legal system.
In contrast to Pound’s empirical theory
about the

development of

a

particular legal system. Hart’s theory

of "the minimum content of Natural Law" postulates
certain

contingent, but universal truths about human nature
and
the circumstances of human life.

From these truths Hart

draws conclusions about certain characteristics that every
legal system created by humans v/ill have as a consequence
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Of these truths of hu^an
nature and the circumstances
of
human life. As we will see,
part of the puzzle of Hart's
theory is the difficulty of
determining the logical status
of the argument and the
implications of the conclusions
in regard to the content
of a legal system.

Hart begins with the observation
that it is a contingent fact that in general
human beings desire to survive.
Consequently, survival is a goal
and actions and
objects are appraised in part on
the basis of whether they
promote or impede the realization
of that goal.
Hart argues that survival is presupposed
as a goal
in terms of

which normative systems are created,
because -our concern
IS with social arrangements
for continued existence, not
with those of a suicide club.-^^
^^i^hough Hart maintains
that it is a contingent matter that
survival is a generally held goal and a contingent matter
that there are
legal systems, it is less clear whether
he maintains that
It IS a contingent matter that legal
systems promote survival.
That is, Hart may be arguing that it is contin-

gently true that survival is

a

generally held goal, but

that given this goal it follows in some way that
the function of

a

that goal.

legal system is to promote the realization of

This argument seems somewhat problematical

it seems to be logically possible for everyone to

have a particular goal but for no one to have regarded as

standards for the group types of behavior that tend to
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promote realization of that
goal.
For example, it is
conceivable that everyone
wants to avoid nuclear war
and
that no one has a desire
the realization of which
requires
that there exist nuclear
weapons, and yet no one may
regard dismantling such weapons
as a standard of behavior
for the group, even though
it would promote realization
of
the common goal.
short, it does not appear
to be true
that the fact that a particular
goal is universally held
implies that the system of social
rules is thought to have
as a function promoting
the realization of that goal,
even
where social rules provide a
suitable means of attaining

m

the goal

Criticism of the thesis that prevalence
of
lar goal implies that law has or is
thought to

a

particu-

have the

function of furthering that goal may
not be a criticism
of Hart since it is not clear that
he holds that view.
However, it is clear that he assumes that

it is the case

that law does have the function of
promoting the realization of what is, as a matter of contingent
fact,
a

versally held goal, namely, survival.
ise,

Hart argues that

a legal

uni-

From this prem-

system has

a

certain mini-

mum necessary content by virtue of the fact that
certain

contingent facts about human nature and the natural en

vironment imply the need for particular rules of conduct
in order to carry out the function of securing the goal

of survival.
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First, Hart points out
that humans are physically
vulnerable to one anoth«=‘ranother.
That is, humans are capable
Of attacking and harming
their fellows and of being
harmed
by the attacks of others.
Secondly, humans are roughly
equal in strength, agility,
and intelligence, so that

domination of others is impossible
without cooperation
among members of a group.
Thirdly, humans have only a
limited capacity for acting
altruistically. This combina
tion of facts-vulnerability,
rough equality, and limited
altruism-in conjunction with the desire
for survival
imply a need for constraints on
the use of violence and
provide a basis for inferring that
people generally will
agree to a system of mutual
forbearance in order to
achieve their goal.
A fourth set of contingent facts
provides a ground
for supposing that there necessarily
will be rules governing the relationships of persons with
respect to physical

resources.

it is a contingent fact that human
beings are

dependent upon physical resources for survival.
more,

Further-

it is a contingent fact that these physical
resources

are not abundant and are generally reducible
to usable

form only by the exertion of effort.

Rules regulating

contractual relationships, property rights, and the transfer of property rights from person to person are neces-

order to attain maximum mutual satisfaction of
the goal of survival in light of these facts.
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Finally, Hart attributes
the prevalence of enforcement procedures in legal
systems to the fact that
humans
exhibit limited willpower
and understanding and so
may
either fail to comprehend
the advantages of cooperation
their fellows in accordance
with a system of rules
or may fail to act in
conformity with the acknowledged
advantages of conformity in
order to pursue short-sighted
goals.
In view of these human
characteristics, the employment of sanctions contributes
to the realization of
the goal of survival by
guaranteeing that those who fail
to see or who ignore the
advantages of compliance with
rules will not gain the upper
hand.
Hart argues that:
... except in very small
closely-knit so^i^ties, submission to the system
of
restraints would be folly if there
were^ no organization for the
coercion
of those who would then try to
obtain
the advantages of the system without
submitting to its obligations.
'Sanctions' are therefore required not as
the
normal motive for obedience, but as a
that those who would volun—
t^J^ily obey shall not be sacrificed
to
those who would not.
To obey without
this would be to risk going to the wall.
Given this standing danger, what reason
demands is voluntary co-operation in a
coercive system. 13

Hart's observations about the physical and
psychological characteristics of human beings and the
environmental

tances of human existence are uncontroversial
Moreover, it is not unreasonable to suppose both that most

people do desire to promote their own survival and that
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systems Of social rules
generally are utilized to
attain
that goal. However, the
thrust of Hart's argument
is
unclear because he does not
seem merely to be asserting
that given certain contingent
goals, and given the
contingent fact that the system
of social rules is utilized
to

promote realization of those
goals, and given certain
contingent facts about human
nature and the environment.
It follows that there will
be certain kinds of rules-e.g., rules limiting the
use of violence and rules
facilitating the making of contracts
and providing for their
enforcement and not other rules.
We have questioned whether
the fact that the goal of

survival is prevalent implies that
there will be a system
of social rules designed to
promote that goal and it was
suggested that it is unclear whether
Hart endorses that
thesis.
However, Hart does argue for what
appears to be
a somewhat different thesis
about the relationship between
the fact that there is a particular
universal human goal
and the nature of a legal system.
Specifically, Hart may
be arguing that because the goal of
survival is so widely
held,

there can be

a

legal system only if its rules gener-

ally tend to promote that goal, and that
because the facts
about human life and the environment are such
as they are,
a

legal system can promote that goal only if it has
such

and such

a

content.

tem of rules has

a

Thus, Hart argues that unless the sys-

content that forwards "the minimum pur-

185

poses Of survival that men
have in associating with
each
Other," then

would have no reaoA; for obeying
son
voluntarily any rulesand without a minimum of
given voluntarily by thoseco-opLation'
who find that
It IS in their interest to
submit to and
maintain the rules, coercion of
others
who would not voluntarily
conform would
be impossible 14
.

This argument has significant
implications in relation to
Hart’s social rule theory, according
to which a group of
persons has a legal system just in
case some members of
the group accept certain secondary
rules for recognizing,
changing, and applying rules of conduct
and most people
generally act in accordance with such rules
of conduct.
The implication of the argument about
the content of the
legal system is that one of the necessary
conditions for
the existence of the system

— namely,

the requirement of

general compliance— is satisfied only if the
system contains rules of conduct that promote the goal of
survival.
Thus,

it is an essential characteristic of a legal
system

that it furthers the goal of human survival
The argument about the function and content of
legal system is not persuasive.

a

At most. Hart has pre-

sented an argument that there cannot be

a

legal system the

rules of which are radically incompatible with the realiza-

tion of the goal of human survival.

Such a system is im-

possible because, adopting Hart's argument, there would
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not be a sufficient base
of voluntary compliance
to enable
coerced compliance to be
effective, with the net
result
being that the generality
of (coerced or voluntary)
compliance required in order to
have a legal system would
not
exist.
Even
argument about the function
and content
of a legal system can be
questioned in light of the historical and contemporary
precedents of societies which
arguably had legal systems that
frustrated the fundamental
goals of large segments of the
society and which contained
laws that were generally obeyed
principally because of the
effective use of coercive power.
Slave societies, especially those in which the enslaved
population outnumbers the
free population, exemplify such
a system.
However, even
if the argument that there cannot
be a legal system that
f rustrates the basic goals of
most of the members of society, It does not follow that the
legal system must have
laws that promote the goal of human
survival.

^

In short.

Hart's social rule theory does not require
that the system of rules have the function of promoting
the realization of any goal at all. Although the
requirement that
the rules of the system be generally obeyed
may imply
that the system cannot contain rules that completely
frustrate a widely-held fundamental human goal, there
is no

implication that the requirement of general compliance

precludes the existence of

a legal

system that is neutral

with respect to promoting such a goal.
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Benditt, unlike Hart, does
not offer his theory
about the function of law as
an afterthought.
Rather, his
charcterization of the functions of
law is an integral
part of a theory of law that
is based on Hart's social
rule theory.
Benditt argues that there is a
particular
function or purpose that is essential
to a legal system
and that furtherance of that
purpose requires a legal
system to have certain properties
possession of which
guarantees that the system has a minimum
moral content.
As we will see, the theory appears
to be vulnerable to

certain criticisms that are applicable
generally to functional characterizations and descriptions.
Benditt begins his argument with an account
of functional terms and concepts.
According to
Benditt,

"a con-

cept is functional if, and only if, criteria
for evaluating the thing in question are part of the
concept."
Further,

"a thing has a function if,

and only if, evalua-

tive criteria are part of the concept of that
thing.
In other words,

a

thing has a function if and only if the

concept of that thing is
concept of the thing is

a
a

functional concept, and the
functional concept if and only

criteria for evaluating the thing in question are

part of the concept of the thing.

Unfortunately, Benditt

has not explicated what it means for evaluative criteria
to be "part of" the concept of a thing.

Furthermore, it

is unclear what the claim that a thing has a function
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implies about the properties
of the thing. Although
characterization of a kind of
thing in terms of a function implies that possession
by an instance of that
kind
of properties that facilitate
realization of the function
constitutes that instance a
"better" one of its kind,
it
does not follow that lack
of properties that contribute
to carrying out the
function renders a thing not
an inStance of the kind.
It is noteworthy that
although Benditt commendably

asks the basic question of
whether the concept of law is
a functional concept, his
argument that it is and that
law has the particular functions
that he identifies is

perfunctory and unpersuasive.

The argument appears to be

founded on Benditt 's assertion that
"the law must, logically, have some content or other;
it must deal with
some matters or other.
He then asserts that he can
identify "two possibilities ... for what
something that
IS called a legal system could be
dealing

with"; namely,

the resolution or at least the regulation
of conflict"

and "the expanding of possibilities for what
people can
do or bring about." Benditt argues that
the latter "pos-

sibility" itself merely creates "new areas of
potential

conflict" and therefore concludes that "we are thus,
left
.

.

.

with the resolution or at least the regulation of con-

flict as something that the law must, logically, deal

with."

'

Finally, Benditt asserts that "insofar as there
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or goal of a legal
system, something that
it
must aim at, and insofar
as whatever can be
pursued as
an end can be done in
better or worse ways, we
can conclude that the concept of
a legal system is a
functional
concept.

The validity and soundness
of Benditt’s argument are
doubtful.
First, he has concluded
that a legal system
has an end or goal.
However, the only basis for
this conclusion appears to be the assertion
that the law must have
some content or other.
Evidently, Benditt's claim that
the law -must
some matters or other- does
not
simply restate the thesis that
law must have some content
or other, but states that
whatever content the law has is
dealt with as a goal. No support
is given by Benditt for
the view that it follows from the
fact that a system of
directives has a particular content that
the system has a
goal or end related in some way to
that content.
A com-

^^

parison to other attributions of functions
based upon nonfunctional descriptions of things suggests
that this

inference is erroneous.

For example, it does not follow

from the fact that the heart makes certain
-heart- sounds
that its function is to make heart sounds; nor
does it

follow from the fact that the heart pumps blood
through
the body that its function is to pump blood.

If the latter

attribution of functions seems correct in some way that
termer does not, it seems to be because the heart is
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more frequently characterized
in terms of the contribution its property of
circulating the blood has in
realizing or maintaining a
particular state of the body
than in
terms of the contribution
its property of making
certain
sounds has
realizing or maintaining any
particular
state of affairs.
Turning back to the question
of whether
law has a function, it
appears that a legal system may
be
characterized in terms of the
contribution certain features of it make toward the
realization or maintenance of
many states of affairs, including
that of social harmony.
Relative to some such hypothesized
goal or end-state,

m

a

legal system can be characterized
as having a particular
function by virtue of the contribution
certain of its

properties make toward realizing that
goal.
However, the
mere fact that the laws that comprise
a system must be
about something does not
imply that there is any

^

end-state such that it is the function of
the legal system to contribute to its realization
by having laws about
whatever content is in question.
In short, Benditt has
not given us an argument for, but has merely
assumed that,
a legal

having

system must have a goal and that by virtue of
a goal

the system must have a certain content that

promotes realization of the goal.

This assumption states

the thesis but does not advance the effort to assess
the

functional theory of law.

Benditt has not merely failed to adduce any argument
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support Of the general
thesis that a legal
system has
a goal or end; he
also has failed to
Marshall any arguments in support Of the
thesis that the
goal of a legal

system necessarily is that
of resolving or regulating
conflict.
It is true that Benditt
has an argument for
the thesis,

since he maintains that
there are only two
E ossibilities of what the law can be
"dealing with"—
namely, the resolution or
regulation of conflict and the
expansion of possibilities of
what can be done in a normative context. However, he
does not argue for the proposition that these are the only
possibilities. This
thesis is not advanced by the
observation that legal systems typically do have a content
that regulates conflict
and facilitates transactions
within a system of rules.
First, the fact that the content
tends to promote realization of a particular goal does
not imply that the system
has any goal.
Secondly, the question is not whether
legal
systems actually have a certain content
or even a certain
goal but whether legal systems must
have a certain content
or goal.
In any event,

Benditt 's argument that

a

legal system

must have certain properties possession of
which guarantees a certain minimum moral content is
based on the

assumption that

a legal

system necessarily has the goal of

resolving or regulating conflict.
is as follows.

In general,

The argument, roughly,

a goal or

function can be
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furthered in better or worse
ways.

Thus,

the goal of

regulating conflict can be
furthered in better or worse
ways.
Conflict is
regulated if it is done with
less
friction and resistance on the
part of the regulatees.
Friction and resistance to regulation
are minimized only
If
... the addressees of the
rules (or as many of them

^

as

possible) can accept the rules-i.e.,

point of view toward them.''^®

ta)ie an

internal

Benditt concludes that the

function of a legal system is "...
to regulate the conduct
of the individuals to whom the rules
of the system apply
in such a way that most of the
rules of the system, and
indeed the system itself, can be accepted
by those
indi-

viduals."

This assertion is subsequently modified
to

provide that the rules must be such that they
rationally
can be accepted.
Benditt postulates a "minimum

sense" of

"rationality" according to which it is rational
to do

something only if there is at least some reason
for doing
it,

even though there may be more compelling reasons

against doing it.
rule,

Thus,

if it is rational to accept a

there must be some reason for accepting it, where

acceptance involves

a

willingness to recognize the mandate

of the rule even when it is contrary to one's overall
“iriterest

.

Benditt argues that there are only three

reasons for accepting a legal system:

a

legal system

promotes justice; it promotes the good of people (oneself
or others); and it promotes personal or social ideals.
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These three reasons for
accepting a system of law
are
lumped together under the
heading "promoting human
good."
The final leg in the argument
is the assertion that
a
legal system that can be
accepted by virtue of promoting
human good has a minimum moral
content because
the cri-

teria that are the basis for
acceptance are moral criteria.
In short, Benditt's argument
is that a legal system necessarily has a certain
minimum moral content
because a legal system has an
essential goal or end the
realization of which is maximized only
if the system can
be accepted rationally and a
legal system can be accepted
rationally only if it promotes human
good.
Let us return to the first stage of
Benditt's argument to examine the intermediate
conclusions he draws
from the hypothesis that a legal system
is a system of
rules that has the goal or function of
regulating conflict.
Benditt does not argue based on this hypothesis
that there
is some specific content that a system
of rules must in-

clude in order to be a legal system.

Such an argument

appears to be difficult to make in any event without
some

additional assumptions, since what will be subjects
of

conflict and how such subjects might be regulated in any

particular society from time to time are contingent matters.

For example,

it is a contingent matter of fact that

people engage in industrial processes that generate undesirable by-products and it is

a

contingent matter of fact
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that conflicts between
persons who engage in such
industrial activity and persons
who are adversely affected
thereby are regulated in one
way rather than another
(e.g., by rules permitting
the industrial user to
engage
in the activity versus rules
permitting the industrial
user to engage in the activity
so long as he compensates
hose adversely affected versus
rules permitting the affected persons to enjoin the
industrial activity).
Benditt's conclusion is not that
there is some specific
content that a system of rules must
include in order to be
a legal system, but that
there are certain (moral) criteria that a system of rules must
satisfy in order to be a
legal system.
He does not address the question
whether
satisfaction of these moral criteria by a
system of rules
entails inclusion in the system of
certain specific rules
or types of rules or merely exclusion
of certain rules
or types of rules.
The argument that Benditt does make on the
basis of
the thesis that a legal system is a system
of rules that
has the goal of regulating conflict is
connected to his

characterization of functional concepts.

Specifically,

Benditt maintains that since "whatever can be pursued
as
an end can be done in better or worse ways" and
since a

legal system has an end, then the concept of a legal sys-

stem includes evaluative criteria as "part of" the concept.

That is, to the extent that a particular kind of
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thing IS defined in
ter.s of having some
function or goal,
individual instances of
that kind are appropriately
evaluated in terms of that
function or goal. That
is, an
instance of the kind that
has properties that tend
to or
do result in the goal
being more completely or
consistently realized is a
"better" example of the
kind than an
instance that lacks such
properties or has properties
that
tend to result in less
complete or consistent
realization
of the goal.
However,

the key step for Benditt
is the inference
from the thesis that (i)
instances of a kind of thing
that
is defined in terms of a
function are appropriately

ua^

^-

in terms of how well they
carry out the function to

the conclusion that (ii)
something is an instance of that
kind of thing only if it has
properties that result in
its doing a better (or the
best possible) job of carrying
out the function. This step
enables Benditt to move from
the hypothesis that a legal
system has the function of

regulating conflict to the propostion
that

a legal

system
has that function of ”... regulat[ing]
the conduct of
individuals to whom the rules of the system
apply in such

way that most of the rules of the system,
and indeed the
system itself, can be accepted by those
individuals."^^
a

As we have already seen,

the subsidiary premise in this

inference is the thesis that a system of rules
achieves
the goal of regulating conflict well only if
it is such
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that the addressees of
the rules
the rules.

rationally accept

This key step in Benditt's
argument appears to be a
misstep.
Certainly, it is possible
for an instance of a
kind of thing that is
defined in part by reference
to a
function to be completely
incapable of realizing the
function; to wit, a dysfunctional
or malfunctioning instance
of the kind.
Furthermore, it is obviously
possible for an
instance of such a kind to be
less able to carry out the
function.
However, it does not follow
either case that
the individual in question
therefore is not an instance of
the kind in question.
Thus, there could be instances
of
legal systems identified using
the non-purposive social
rule theory analysis of the concept
of a legal system that
are "defective" because they
lack a property possession
of which is necessary in order for
a system of rules to
bMt realize the goal of regulating conflict, whether
that
property be the property of being
capable of being rationally accepted by its regulatees or some
other property.

m

Benditt anticipates the problem of "defective"
instances of things with a function, but
his analysis does
not provide an adequate response to the
objection that
there can be a legal system whose defect
is that it is

not capable of realizing well the alleged
goal of
system.

a legal

In discussing the notion of functional concepts,

Benditt considers the example of

a wrench,

which is

a

kind
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of thing defined in part
by reference to the
function of
turning nuts and bolts. He
states:

made
made^of
of tin foil is not

^
a

wrench but is
wrench, not

this
i^?hat^??^•°^^'
IS not even minimally
suit^
ab^e for

turning nuts and bolts.

But we

say that anything that cannot
be used
for turning nuts and bolts
is not a
for a wrench that is damaged
or
has a defect in it that
prevents its
being used to turn nuts and bolts
is
nevertheless a wrench. That is, we
not make it part of the definition f-anof a
wrench that whatever is a wrench
works.
Thus we should say that a thing
that has
a certain set of physical
characteristics (those of a wrench), but
is not
suitable for turning nuts and bolts
would not be suitable for this even and
if
non-defective, is not a wrench. 23

This last statement is ambiguous,
since it is not clear
what type of defect is being referred
to.
If Benditt
means that the defect of not being capable
of turning nuts
and bolts, then anything at all can satisfy
the functional
component of the definition of a functional
kind of thing
since if the thing is non-defective (i.e.,
capable of

turning nuts and bolts), then it is suitable for
turning
nuts and bolts.

Thus,

it would appear that Benditt is

referring to some other defect in virtue of which the
thing having the defect is not capable of turning nuts
and bolts.

However, in that case it is not clear what

constitutes the defect of a tin foil wrench.

Perhaps

Benditt 's point is made best by the initial statement in
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the quoted passage, namely,
that something that is
not
even "minimally suitable"
for performing the
function in
question is not an instance
of the kind, where lack
of

minimal suitability is a
matter of the thing's being
such
that in order to perform the
function there would have to
be radical changes in its
properties.
For example, in
order for a tin foil wrench
to be a wrench, tin foil
would have to be a rigid
substance.

Given this understanding of
Benditfs argument, it
IS difficult to see why he
thinks that a system of rules
that lacks the property of being
capable of being rationally accepted by its regulatees
is not even minimally
suitable for purposes of regulating
conflict.
All that
Benditt has argued for is that a
system of rules that has
that property is better able to
realize the
goal.

A

stronger argument, which he has not
made, is needed to
reach the conclusion that a system of
rules must have the
property in order to be a legal system.
As a final point about Benditt 's
argument,

it may be

noted that there is some plausibility to the
claim that
system of rules that is completely incapable
of being

rationally accepted by its regulatees could not be
system.
theory,

a

a

legal

This claim is consistent with Hart's social rule

according to which there must be general compli-

ance with the primary rules of the system.

Presumably,

there would not be general compliance if the system could

199

not be rationally accepted.

However, the burden of
the
argument now falls on what
can be ratronally accepted.
If all that is required
is that there be some
reason to
abide by the rules, then
a completely coercive
system
that IS racking in the
property of promoting human
good
can be a legal system and
Benditt has failed to establish
an essential link between
law and morality.
On the other
hand, Benditt might maintain
that a legal system that
promotes human good is more
stable and better able to
achieve the goal of regulating
conflict than a completely
coercive system. However, it
does not follow that a less
effective legal system is not
still a legal system.

chapter

V

I

I

SOCIAL RULES AND THE PROBLEM
OF
POLITICAL OBLIGATION
This study has been devoted
to an examination of
the
theory of law developed by
H. L. A. Hart in The
Concent
This theory, which we have
called "the social
rule theory of law," undertakes
to analyze the concept
of
law and to provide an account
of the conditions that must
obtain in order for a group of
persons to have a legal
system.
Our examination has led us
to reject certain of
Hart's criticisms of the coercive
orders theory of law
and to suggest certain inadequacies
in his analysis of
social normativity.
However, the key elements of Hart's
theory have been defended as providing
a broadly correct
analysis of the phenomenon of law and
in this regard a
number of arguments advanced by Hart's
critics have been
rejected.
One conclusion that emerges consistently
from the
arguments and positions that have been
defended is that
law and legal systems are social artefacts
that exist by
v^-irtue

bers of

of certain attitudes and practices among
the mema

group.

Although

a

legal system exists by virtue

of certain such social facts, what exists is
not merely

complex of behaviors or

a

a

set of predictions of the behav-

ior of particular members of the group (e.g., officials).
200
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Rather, what exists is
a system of rules
or norms.
As a
system of rules or norms,
a legal system
contains directives that set forth
the rights and obligations
of those
persons to w.hom the system
applies.
These legal rights
and legal duties and the
legal rules that establish
them
have been analyzed
generis.
Law has not been reduced
to expressions of the
psychological will of a sovereign,
nor has legal normativity
been shown to be parasitic
on
moral considerations.

^

Hart devotes the first four
chapters of The Concept
20;^ to a discussion and criticism of the coercive
orders theory of law, according
to which laws are general
orders backed by threats given
by one who is habitually
Obeyed but who habitually obeys
no one.
Several of Hart's
principal criticisms of this theory
are based on his
argu-

ment that the coercive orders
theory cannot account for
laws that confer powers rather
than impose
duties and

that in order for the theory to
account for phenomena
that would ordinarily be explained
by reference to powerconferring rules it is necessary under
the theory to
appeal to other devices. Thus, Hart
argues that the coer
Give orders theory must postulate a
habit of obedience to
the sovereign in order to distinguish
laws from the coercive orders of an armed robber. Habitual
obedience is

postulated since, if the theory cannot account
for laws
that confer powers, the sovereign cannot be
distinguished
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from the robber on the
ground that the former
is, but the
latter is not, authorize
or emfiowered to issue
orders.
Hart then shows that the
concept of habitual
obedience rs
inadequate to the role
assigned it under the
coercive
orders theory.
For example. Hart shows
that the notion
Of habitual obedience is
inadequate to account for the
continuity of law across
different sovereigns.
we have questioned some
of these arguments and contended that the coercive
orders theory is much more
capable of dealing with
power-conferring rules than Hart
seems to have recognized-for
example, by treating nullity as a sanction for
non-compliance with the require-

ments of a power-conferring
rule.

As a result,

certain

of the problems Hart raises
about the coercive orders
theory can be avoided. Furthermore,
we disputed Hart's
contention that the coercive orders
theory must rely on
the concept of habitual obedience.
Rather, since both
orders and rules are directives
specifying standards of
conduct by which the behavior of the
addressees of the
directive is evaluated for conformity
or nonconformity,
there are significant similarities
between order- following
and rule-following that Hart fails to
take into
account.

Exposing the errors and weaknesses in the
arguments
Hart levels against what he regards as a
leading theory
of law is a valuable enterprise in its own
right.
However,

our goal has not been that of vindicating the coer-
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civa orders theory but
of deepening our
understanding of
Hart's theory.
furtherance of that goal,
it has been
useful to explore the
concept of habitual obedience
for
the light it sheds on
the notion of rule-following,
while
at the same time rejecting
Hart's contention that the
coercive orders theory of
law must utilize that
concept
in order to explain
certain features of a legal
system,
Nevertheless, as far as the
coercive orders theory
itself is concerned, its crucial
shortcoming appears to
be that It m.aintains that
every law expresses the psychological will of the present
sovereign.
order to account
for a presently-effective
law that was originally
promulgated by a predecessor sovereign
but which has not been
expressly reaffirmed by order of
the current sovereign,
the theory must postulate the
dubious notion of a tacit
order, according to which the
present sovereign's failure
to rescind the prior order is
itself a tacit order reaffirming that prior order.
Similarly, the theory cannot
account for the apparent fact that many
laws fail to
express any will at all.
For example, laws enacted by a

m

m

sovereign lavraiaking body that lacks
psychological attributes, such as a congress, parliament,
or other
legis-

lative institution with multiple members,
do not express
any actual psychological will.
Like the coercive orders theory. Hart's social
rule

theory is a "will" theory, inasmuch as it maintains
that
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the existence of a
legal syste. in a group
depends upon
at least some members
of the group having
certain volitional states. However,
the social rule theory
is not
vulnerable to the criticisms
brought againt the coercive
orders theory.
The hey element in Hart-s
theory is that
the only rules towards
which at least some members
of the
group must have favorable
attitudes or about which
at
least some members of the
group must believe other
menders
of the group have favorable
attitudes, are secondary
rules
We have seen that Hart’s
own characterization of
the dis-

tinction between primary and
secondary rules is flawed.
Nevertheless, he correctly
identifies three types of rules
(which we can conveniently
label "secondary
rules" as a

reminder that these rules are
about rules) that are essential elements of a legal system.
These types of secondary
rules are rules of recognition,
which are rules that specify criteria for the identification
of other rules applicable to members of the group;
rules of change, which
are

rules that specify the procedures
whereby the rules that
are applicable to members of the
group can be changed;
and rules of adjudication, which
are rules that specify
procedures for determining whether rules
of the group have
been complied with in specific instances.

Under the social rule theory, the character
of
system as a social artefact is attributable

a legal

to the thesis

that a group has a legal system only if
there are instances

.

of secondary rules,
and especially instances
of rules of
recognition, that exist in
the group as social
rules
A
social rule, roughly, is
a rule that is accepted
by members of a particular group
as appropriate for use
as a
standard in the group, a
social rule of recognition
is
a rule that is accepted
as appropriate for the
purpose
of identifying other rules
that apply to the members
of
the group.
A social rule of recognition
may be
.

as simpl,

in form as the rule that
whatever the tablets Moses

brought down from Mt. Sinai say,
is law, or as complex
as the rules for determining
the applicable law in a
multi-jurisdictional system with legislative,
judicial,
administrative. Constitutional, and
customary law-making
sources
Given the concept of

a social rule of recognition,

the concept of legal validity can
be defined in terms of
having the properties specified by the
social rule of

recognition as properties possession of
which qualifies
the rule as appropriate for use in
evaluating the behavior of members of the group.
Having a legal obligation
,

in turn,

is a matter of having one's case come
under the

scope of

a

tern

valid rule.

The social basis of the legal sys

of a particular group is accounted for by the
fact

that the rule of recognition exists as

that group.

a

social rule of

However, it is not necessary for the valid

rules under the social rule of recognition to express the
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will Of any member of
the group.
Furthermore, nothing
precludes the possibility
that no members of the
group
regard any of the valid
rules favorably as such.
For
example, the secondary
rule that whatever the
tablets say,
IS law, could exist
as a social rule even
though, as it
turns out, no one approves
of what the tablets say.
Admittedly, this last possibility
seems remote, since it
would
seem unlikely that the rules
validated under such circumstances would be generally
obeyed.
that case, the rules
would not be effective, and
thus the group would not have
a legal system with
that particular constitutive
rule
underlying it. This last point
regarding the general effectiveness of the system of valid
rules is reflected in
^ summary statement of
the minimum necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence
of a legal system;
namely, that a particular group
has a legal system if and
only if there are certain rules
of recognition, rules of
change, and rules of adjudication
that are accepted by
officials as the appropriate rules for
identifying, altering, and applying rules of the
group, respectively, and
the rules of conduct that are valid
under the ultimate
rules of recognition are generally obeyed
by the members
of the group to whom they are applicable.

m

Hart never squarely addresses the task of
characterizing the phenomenon of acceptance of

a rule.

In general,

he appears to have relied on his distinctions
between
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iStern^ and extern^ attitudes,
statements, and points
Of view to fill in his
theory of social normativity.
However, his distinctions
fail to reflect the
diversity of
attitudes that people who
recognize the applicability
of
a rule to the behavior
of a particular group may
have
toward the rule. As in the
case of his analysis of
the
coercive orders theory, the
inadequacy of Hart's distinctions stems largely from
his initial focus on habitual
behavior.
The external point of view
for Hart is the
antage poxnt of the individual
who observes regularities
in behavior without taking
cognizance of the fact that
the behavior is rule-governed,
whereas the internal point
of view IS the vantage point
of the person who recognizes
and accepts certain standards
of behavior as appropriate
bases for evaluating the conduct
of members of the group.
This characterization fails to
distinguish (i) the individual who wants that standard of
behavior to be realized
and appraises conduct in terms of
whether it measures up
to the standard from (ii) the
individual who recognizes
the standard as a guide but who is
indifferent or hostile
to Its being realized.
The latter individual is not taking the external point of view since he
does not regard

conforming behavior as merely habitual; nor is
he taking
the internal point of view, since he does
not regard the

standard as an appropriate basis for evaluating conduct.
In response to this inadequacy in Hart's
conception of
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ncrmativity, a distincton
was developed between
volitionally internal point
of view” of the individual who for some reason
is committed to
observing and
maintaining a particular line
of behavior as a standard
and the "cognitively
internal point of view” of
the

individual who recognizes
that a particular line
of behavior IS being used by the
members of a group as a
standard
but who is not volitionally
committed to observing or
maintaining that standard. The
cognitively internal point
Of view is characteristic
of lawyers and other persons
who
have a professional interest
in identifying legal norms
and advising others of their
rights and duties under those
norms.
Despite their detached professional
point of view,
such persons contribute to the
realization of social normativity by particular normative
propositions by reinforcing the thesis that ^ose normative
propositions and not
others are the norms that are
applicable to this particular group.
As we have seen,

the analysis of law in terms of the

concept of social normativity has not
been favorably received by all of Hart's commentators.
In fact, much of the
critical response to The Concept of Law
has consisted of
efforts to introduce moral considerations
of
one kind or

another into the analysis of law in order to
link legal

obligation to moral requirements.

The arguments of Dwor-

kin and Benditt that were examined exemplify such
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efforts.

Dworkin attempts to show,

in^

social rule theory of law
cannot account for the obligations of a judge to apply
extant law even in controversial
cases where, according to
Dworkin, it is logically
impossible to have any soci^ rules.
The only recourse available to the judge is to appeal
to moral rules in a relatively complicated manner that
takes cognizance of certain conventional aspects of a
legal system.
We have conested Dworkin s characterization
of the phenomenology of
judicial decisions by maintaining
that in some cases

judges in fact legislate new rules.

Furthermore, we have

suggested that the social rule theory
can account for the
adjudication of controversial cases by
means of secondary
rules that provide for the recognition
of legal rules that
are ''embedded" in noncontroversial
legal rules.

Benditt, on the other hand,

must be modified to provide that

argues that Hart's theory
a

system of rules is

a

legal system only if it generally promotes
human good.

This conclusion is derived from the premises
that

a

legal

system has the essential function of regulating
conflict
and that conflict can best be regulated by rules
that

promote human good generally.

We have questioned the

soundness of this argument in several respects.

In par-

ticular, we noted that Benditt gives us very little rea-

son to think that a legal system must have any function
at all,

let alone the specific function of regulating
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conflict.

Furthermore, even if a legal
system necessarily
has a function, it does
not follow that a system
of rules
that is incapable of
realizing the function or
is incapable Of realizing it in
the best possible way
cannot be
a legal system.

The persistence with which
Hart's critics, such as
Dworkin and Benditt, have
attempted to show that legal
systems necessarily incorporate
moral considerations in
some way or another manifests
an underlying abiding concern with the problem of
political obligation. The ques
tion of political obligation,
roughly, is whether there
IS a moral obligation to obey
the laws of a particular
legal system.
Some theories about the nature
of law pro
vide a basis for answering the
question of political
obligation by maintaining that in order
for a rule to be
a valid law that establishes
a legal obligation, certain
substantive moral criteria must be
satisfied.
Benditt’
theory about the essential function
of a legal system
falls into this category, given the
reasonable hypothesis
that there is a prima facie moral obligation
to support
institutions that promote human good.

An investigation of the theories of political
obliga-

tion is beyond the scope of this study.

Many of the

leading theories have venerable histories with roots
in
the Crito

.

Recent works by Simmons,^ Woozley,^ Nozick,^

Smith, 4 and Raz,
•

.

5

among others, which have given gener-
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ally Skeptical treatment
to the leading theories,
raise
numerous significant issues.
However, in light of the
efforts of many of Hart's
critics to establish that
legal
obligation depends upon moral
considerations

in some way,
it seems appropriate to
end this study by showing
that the
social rule theory leaves
the question of political
obligation open.
For persons who are doubtful,
as I am, that
there is a
obligation to obey the law as
such,
this characteristic of the
social rule theory of law
is a

f^

virtue
First,

although it is not possible
at this juncture
to undertake a detailed
examination of theories

of politi-

cal obligation,

it is possible and useful
to consider cer-

tain general features of a theory
of political obligation.
The first task in characterizing
a theory of political

obligation is that of identifying the
proposition the
truth of which we seek to establish.
Simmons

states as

a "rough approximation" that
a political obligation is
"a moral requirement to support

and comply with the

political institutions of one's country
of residence."®
The term "moral requirement” is used
advisedly by Simmons
to encompass the possibility that the
relevant moral relationship between an individual and political
institutions
IS either an obligation or a dutv .'^

Obligations are moral

requirements generated by the performance of
act.

0

Promising to perform

a

a

voluntary

particular action gives
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rise to an obligation to
perform the action; voluntarily

accepting a particular job
gives rise to an obligation
to
perform the duties associated
with that job; and so on.
Duties, in contrast, are
either "positional" or
"moral,
Positional duties are those
that one has by virtue of
occupying a particular "position"
or office, whereas
moral duties are those that
one has simply by virtue
of
being a human being. As
examples of moral or natural
duties, Rawls cites the duty
to help those in need or
jeopardy, the duty not to harm
or injure others, the duty
not to cause unnecessary
suffering,
and the duty to support and further just institutions.^^
These duties are
owed oy all persons without
regard to any voluntary act
and irrespective of the existence
of any institutional
arrangements for carrying them out.

In contrast to

moral duties, positional duties are
requirements of
particular position or office. Legal
duties are

paradigmatic positional duties:

a

these are requirements

that attach to a person merely by virtue
of that person's
position in relation to a legal system.
Simmons argues
that positional duties give rise to moral
requirments only
if the person subject to those positional
duties voluntarily assumed that position.
This thesis about positional
duties is controversial; Tony Honore, for example,
has ar-

gued that there are positional duties that are not
volun-

burily undertaken but do give rise to moral requirements.
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^nd that legal duties
are among this class
of positional
duties
It is reasonable to
assume that the principal
"political institution" to
which our political

obligations
refer are the legal systems
that apply to us. Thus,
the
theory of political obligation
in large part seeks to
establish that there is a moral
requirement to comply
with applicable legal norms.
The goal is to show that
there is a general moral
requirement to comply with legal
norms as such.
it is not enough to show
that particular
persons have a moral obligation
to obey the law by virtue
of Idiosyncratic circumstances
that are not generally
applicable to members of the group.
Nor is it enough to
show that there are independent
moral grounds to comply
with particular legal norms (e.g.,
because such norms are
Identical to particular natural duties).
The goal is to
establish that there is a moral
requirement to obey a
legal norm simply because it is a
legal norm.
Raz states
the objective as follows:
To look for an obligation to obey the
law of a certain country is to look for
grounds which make it desirable, other
things being equal, that one should
always do as the law requires.
These
9^ounds need not be the same for everyone or for every occasion, but they
should be of sufficient generality so
that a few general sets of considerations will apply to all on all occasions.
The search for an obligation to obey the
law of a certain country is an inquiry
into whether there is a set of true pre-
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misses which entail that
everyone ^or
every citizen? every
resident’) ouaht
alwap to do as those laws
require and
""""
tLsf aSLns
^rfrequir^f bv"?
^
^ non-redundant
prLis^lf

There is one respect in
which Raz
characterization
of the proposition sought
to be demonstrated by a
theory
of political obligation
can be faulted. Although he
acknowledges uncertainty about the
identity of the group
the members of which the
theory seeks to show have an
obligation to obey the law, Raz
nevertheless appears to
assume that a theory of political
obligation must show
that all members of the groups
to which a legal norm
applies have an obligation to obey
if any member does.
However, despite the fact that we
would not conclude that
there is an obligation to obey the
law unless it is shown
that such an obligation is broadly
applicable in a given
society. It does not seem necessary
to discard a theory
that fails to capture within its net
everyone who has a
-

legal obligation.

Thus,

a

theory that establishes that

every citizen and resident--or generally
everyone who has
legal obligations under the legal systems
in question
has an obligation to obey the law, except
isolated moun-

tain people in the Ozarks and street people in
the Bronx,

appears to be an adequate theory of political obligation,

provided that there is

a

principled explanation of the

lack of political obligation on the part of those persons
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with legal obUgations who
are not covered by the
theory.
Thus, an adequate theory
of political obligation
must
cast a fairly wide net,
even though it is not
necessary to
show that every person who
has legal obligations
has a

moral obligation to obey the
law.

However,

it does not
follow that every member of
the group of persons whom
the
theory seeks to show have an
obligation to obey the law
must be shown to have such
an obligation for the same
reason.

Thus,

some persons (e.g., naturalized
adult citizens,
elected officials, civil servants)
may have a moral obligation to obey the law by virtue
of having voluntarily

undertaken to do so in circumstances
that have led others
to rely to their detriment on
such undertakings.
Others
may have such an obligation by
virtue
of duties of fair-

ness or gratitude, and so on.

As long as each basis for

political obligation is not idiosyncratic
and in the aggregate the different bases cast a wide
net, the objective of establishing an obligation to
obey the law would
have been achieved.
As the passage quoted above

indicates,

Raz recognizes that an adequate theory
of political obligation may postulate multiple grounds of
obligation, some of

which may be applicable only to selected members
of the
group of persons shown to have political obligations.^^
An important feature of the proposition to be estab-

lished by

a

theory of political obligation is that the

objective is to show that there is

a

moral obligation to

216

obey the laws of

a

particular country

such as the country
of which one is a domiciliary
or a resident or in which
one is voluntarily present.
Both Raz and Simmons recog
,

nize this point.

Simmons uses it to criticize
using
Rawls' natural duty to support
and further just institu
tions as a basis for political
obligations.
Rawls states
that the duty to support and
further just institutions

has

two parts
[F]irst, we are to comply with
and to do
our share in just institutions
when they
exist and apply to us; and second,
we
are to assist in the establishment
of
just arrangements when they do not
exist
at least when this can be done
with little
cost to ourselves

The commitment to an obligation to
obey the laws of a particular country is reflected in the
requirement that we
comply with the just institutions that
apply
us.
However, Simmons persuasively argues that
the statement that
a legal institution "applies to us"
either means that we
are within its territorial or jurisdictional
reach or that
we have performed some voluntary act whereby
we have

^

agreed to be bound by it or have actively accepted
its

benefits under circumstances that give rise to an obligation to obey.
a

If we mean the former,

then the fact that

particular legal system applies to us has no moral sigfinance and the natural duty to support just institu-

tions does not add up to an obligation to obey the laws
of one particular state rather than another equally just
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one simply because the
laws of the former "apply
to us.
If we take the latter
interpretation, on the other
hand,

then there may be an
obligation to obey the law of
a
particular state, but the
obligation is limited in occurrence, since few people
undertake such obligations.
On
the other hand, the natural
duty to support just institutions is a duty everyone has
without any voluntary undertakings.
However, this duty is not
equivalent to, nor
aoes it entail, a duty to obey
the laws of one's own
country in particular. The argument
that one
has a spe-

cial auty to support the laws of
one's own country, provided they are just, simply because
obedience to a system
of laws that one is close to tends
to produce greater

beneficial effects than obedience to

a

rarely in contact with, is unavailing.

system one is
if magnitude of

the effect is the determining criterion,
then it is pos-

sible under certain circumstances that
one will have an
obligation to obey the laws of another country
rather than
one's own even while within the jurisdictional
reach of
one's own country.
Even if we might have such an obligation in fact, it is not what is referred to as

a

political

obligation.
It may be noted that Benditt's theory about the

essential functions of law fails as a theory of political

obligation because the obligation to support institutions
that promote hum.an good is not equivalent to and does not
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entail an obligation to
obey the
uuey
piwo of
nne laws
one's own country in particular, even
if those laws are just.
Nevertheless, Benditt's theory
at least suggests a basis
for
linking legal and political
obligation.
contrast to
enditt s theory, the social
rule theory does not even
suggest a basis for linking
legal and political obligation.
The inadequacy of the social
rule theory in suggesting
an
answer to the question of
political obligation can best
be seen by considering first
the coercive orders theory,
which was discussed in Chapter
II.
The coercive orders
theory, which we have criticized
as an account of legal
obligation, is also inadequate as
a basis for inferring
a moral obligation to obey
the law.
The theory suggests
that It follows from the facts
that (i) an individual, i,
commands an individual,
2, to perform some action. A,
1

t

m

under the threat of

a

sanction,

s,

and (ii)

believed by 2 to have the ability to
apply
fails to perform A, that (iii)

perform A.

j_

i

s

has or is
in case 2

has an obligation to

However, this conclusion seems to fellow

only if we assume that

j_

has an obligation to perform

actions stipulated by sanction-supported
directives.
This principle is not one that is easy to
support.
as Baier has noted,

But

without this principle the theory is

unable to generate moral obligations.

First,

if we have

an obligation to do some act. A, we necessarily have
a

good reason to do A, but if we have (merely) been ordered
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by a coercive source to
do A we have a good reason
to do
A only If we want to avoid
the sanction and believe
that
non-compliance will result in the
imposition of

the sanc-

tion.

secondly,

A is

^

if we have an obligation to
do A, doing

jus tified and not doing A is
per se not justi but if we have merely been
coercively ordered to do A,
doing A may only be excusable
whereas not doing A may be
justified.
The implausible principle that
is needed to
overcome these shortcomings— viz
that we have an obligation to obey sanction-supported
directives— highlights the
apparent root of the problem. Namely,
genuine obligations
do not arise solely from the will
of another:
the mere
fact that an individual (e.g., the
sovereign) wills that
some act be done by another gives rise
to a moral obligation to perform that act only if there
is a moral obligation to conform to the behavior willed by
the sovereign as
.

a

standard.

,

This principle is obviously less plausible

than the principle that links legal obligation
under

Benditt's theory to political obligation--viz

.

,

that there

IS an obligation to support institutions that
promote

human good by obeying the rules of such institutions.
Like the coercive orders theory, the social rule

theory per se does not immediately suggest any plausible

principles that are capable of linking legal obligation,
as It is accounted for under the theory,

gation to obey the law.

to a moral obli-

Baier argues that as a theory of
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moral obligation, Hart's
social rule theory is merely
a
more sophisticated version
of the coercive orders
theory
and is vulnerable to similar
criticisms,
particular,
Baier notes that according
to Hart' theory, an
individual
has an obligation to
perform some act just in case
there
IS a social rule requiring
that act under that individual's circumstances. However,
the individual has a moral
obligation by virtue of these facts
only if there

m

is a

moral obligation to comply with
social rules that are
applicable to one's circumstances,
which in turn depends
upon the characteristics of social
rules as such.
As we
have seen in previous chapters,
the existence of a social
rule IS a matter of there being
general compliance with a
pattern of behavior that at least some
me.mbers of the
group accept as an appropriate standard
of conduct.
Baier
argues, in effect, that by grounding
social rules on what
IS accepted as a standard by certain
members of the group.

Hart has made social rules into expressions
of the will
of those persons.
The problem of deriving a moral obligation to
obey

social rules and rules validated pursuant to
social rules

can best be understood by considering independently
the

situation of those individuals who accept the social
rules and rules thereunder and those individuals who do
not, but whose conduct the rules purport to govern.

In

the case of members of the group who accept the rules.
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there is a somewhat plausible
basis for maintaining that
they have a moral obligation
to obey the rules.
At least
some of those persons who
accept the rules will, in so
doing, have voluntarily
undertaken to act in conformity
with the standard of behavior
in question.
it seems
plausible to maintain that in some
circumstances,
for

example, where others have
relied to their detriment on
one's undertaking to behave in
a particular manner, there
is a moral obligation to
act in conformity with the line

of conduct one has voluntarily
undertaken to follow.

principle adverted to here to derive

a

The

moral obligation

to obey the law is the principle
that one has a prima

faca^ moral obligation to perform
acts that one has voluntarily undertaken an obligation to
perform.
In one form
or another, this principle underlies
theories of political
obligation that are based on social contracts,
express or
tacit consent, and promising in short,
consent theories
of political obligation.

—

Setting aside any difficulties there may be in
establishing that even those members of the group who
have

voluntarily agreed to be bound by certain rules of the
group have a prima facie moral obligation to follow
those
rules,

the more difficult problem from the viewpoint of

the theory of political obligation is that of finding some

basis in Hart's social rule theory of law for attributing
a

moral obligation to obey the law to those individuals
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who have not voluntarily undertaken
to follow the rules.
Hart's theory appears to give rise
to the dilemma with
respect to whether persons who do
not accept the legal
rules that purport to apply to them
have a moral obligation to obey such rules.
if we suppose that these individuals ao not have any moral obligations
in

this regard,

then we appear to have an inadequate
theory of political
obligation.
Baier points out that the relevant moral
obligations are "categorical" in the sense
that the assertion that some individual has an obligation
cannot be

refuted simply by showing that compliance would
not further any ends of that individual. However,
the
thesis

that non-acceptors do not have

a

the law, whereas acceptors do,

appears to be based on a

moral obligation to obey

distinction between those for whom compliance furthers
personal goal and those for whom it does not.

a

On the

other hand, if we suppose that acceptance of the legal
rules of the group, in the sense of

a

taking to comply with those rules, is

voluntary undera

sufficent but

not a necessary foundation for political obligations,
and that non-acceptors have political obligations, then
it is difficult to see what characteristics of the social

situation that

m.ust

exist in order for there to be legal

obligations according to the social rule theory give rise
to a moral obligation on the part of non-acceptors to obey

the law.

What appears to be required is the principle
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that there is a erima fa cie
moral obligation to obey rules
that are generally obeyed and
that are accepted by at
least some members of the group
as standards of conduct or
as standards for identifying
standards of conduct). As a
moral principle, this thesis has
as little plausibility as
the thesis that there is a prima
facie moral obligation to
obey coercive orders as such.
In short,

the social rule theory of law
appears to

leave the question of political
obligation open. Furthermore the social rule theory does not
even appear to suggest a plausible general principle that
can link legal

obligation to political obligation, except to
the extent
that the theory's requirement of some degree
of accep-

tance of the rules establishing validity
suggests

a

prin-

ciple of consent that might account for the moral
obligation of certain members of the group to obey the
law.

Whether these features of the social rule theory are
thought to be defects depends upon what questions one
expects the theory to answer.

If,

along with Baier, one

looks to the theory to answer questions about our moral

obligations, then these features are fatal flaws.
ever,

if,

as we have done in this study,

How-

one looks to the

social rule theory to provide an account of legal obli-

cation sui generis

,

then its failure to answer, or to

suggest the means to answer, the question of political

obligation is not

a

shortcoming of the theory.

On the
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contrary,

to the extent that the
question of political

Obligation appears problematical,
the apparent neutrality of the social rule theory
with respect to the existence of an obligation to obey
the law is a virtue.
Of course, the fact that the
social rule theory of law
does not answer the question
of political obligation does
not end the inquiry. That is,
it is necessary
to look be-

yond the existence of general
compliance with rules that
are valid under rules of
recognition that at least some
members of the group accept as
appropriate for that purpose.
For example, in order to find a
basis for political obligation it may be necessary
to look for the implied
consent of those individuals who have
not expressly
or

tacitly consented or it may be necessary
to consider
whether obligations of fair play or gratitude
imply
that there is a moral obligation to obey
the law.
However,

these are matters that must be left for another

occasion.
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may enforce the remainder of the contract
without
the unconscionable clause, or it may so
limit the
application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid
any unconscionable result."
10.

Pound, op

11.

Ibid.

12.

H.

13

.

Ibid.

14.

Ibid.

15.

T.

16.

Ibid

17.

Ibid.

18.

Ibid.

19.

Ibid.

20.

Ibid

21.

Ibid.

pp.

22

.

Ibid.

p.

104.

23

.

Ibid.

p.

101.

.

cit., p. 47.

L. A. Hart, The Concept
University Press, 1961), p

p.

193.

M. Benditt, Law as Rule
Stanford University Press,

p.

103.

p.

104.

108-109.

Chapter VII
1.

John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political
Obligations (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

A.

1979)
2.

.

Woozley, Law and Obedience:
Arguments of
Plato’s Crito (Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1979).

A.

D.

236
3

.

4.

Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia
(New York:
Basic Books, 19747";
M.

B. E. Smith, " Is There a Prima
Facie Obligation
to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal
82 (1973),
p. 950.
.

5

.

6

.

Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford:
University Press, 1979).
Simmons, o£. cit.

,

Oxford

29.

p.

7.

pp. 12, 37.
Notwithstanding the following
discussion of the distinction between obligations
and duties, I shall generally use the terms "political obligation" and "obligation to obey the law"
without regard to the distinction, so that the
obligation in fact could be a duty.

8

.

P* 14; see also John Rawls, A Theory of Jus (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University
Press, 1971), pp. 108-117, esp. p. 114.

9

.

/

Simmons, o£. c^.
pp. 12-14.
Rawls, 0 £. cit.,
p. 114, calls non-positional duties "natural duties."
,

10

.

11

.

12

.

13

.

Rawls, o£. cit

Ibid

.

,

p.

.

p.

,

114.

334.

Simmons, 0£. cit

.

,

pp.

16-23.

Tony Honore, "Must We Obey? Necessity as a Ground
of Obligation," Virginia Law Review, 67 (1981),
p.

39.

14.

Raz, o£. cit., p. 234;
pp. 951-952.

15.

Simmons, o^. cit
pp 35-37, makes these points
about multiple grounds of the obligation to obey the
law and the adequacy of a theory that does not catch
every person with legal obligations in its net.
However, his discussion does not focus on Raz
characterization in The Authority of Law
.

,

see also Smith, op. cit.,

.

'

.

16.

Rawls,

17

Kurt Baier, "Moral Obligation," American Philosophi cal Quarterly 3 (1966), p. 214.

.

op.

cit

,

.

,

p.

334.
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.

argued earlier that certain problems of a will theory of legal obligation
are avoided
the social rule theory of law by virtue
of the
tact that the crucial social rules are
secondary
rules of recognition, change, and adjudication,
accordance with which other rules are identified in
as
norms applicable to the group. There may be
no
P^^ticular psychological will associated with any
of these latter rules.
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